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This paper examines the thinking behind the Russian local government reform of 
2003 (“Law 131”) in the context of the evolving relationship between the three levels 
of authority in the Russian Federation. Law 131’s critics have tended to see the law as 
part of a straightforward policy of centralisation, aimed at integrating local 
government into the ‘state vertical’. This paper argues that the motives behind the 
reform were more complex and may genuinely have included the aim of creating a 
stable triangular distribution of power between federal, regional and local institutions.  
 
In addition to published sources, the paper draws on the author’s participant 
observation of the work of the Federal Commission for the Division of Powers 
between Levels of Government in the Russian Federation (Kozak Commission), at 
intervals over the period 2002-4, including attendance at sessions of the commission, 
participation in seminars and conferences related to the Commission’s work and 
discussions with members of the Commission and its working group on local self-
government.    
 
The papers briefly reviews the role of the Law 131 in the work of the Kozak 
Commission and then considers the wider theoretical aspects of the reform, before 
considering whether the reform represented a genuine opportunity to establish a 
triangular balance of power between federal, regional and local levels, and why this 
opportunity was not fully exploited.   
 
 
Law 131 and its critics   
 
Since its appearance of its first draft, in October 2002, through its adoption by the 
State Duma in October 2003, and its coming into force in January, 2006 (and frequent 
amendments) the Law ‘On the General Principles of Local Self Government in the 
Russian Federation’ (“Law 131”)
i  has been the focus of sustained debate and 
controversy, to a degree matched by few other laws that have issued from the Putin 
administration.   
 
The law was seen by some as bringing local government into the structure of the state, 
in contravention of Article 12 of the Constitution, through the use of the term ‘public 
authority’
ii , it was seen to emphasise administrative-territorial aspects of local 
government, rather than economic development
iii, to centralise power while seeking 
to place the burden of meeting social guarantees on the local level
iv, it was seen to 
give governors even more extensive powers over the mayors while concentrating 
financial resources at federal level, devolving responsibility for social issues and 




Recentralisation of power from regional to federal level has been one of the defining 
policies of the Putin administration. However it does not follow that the policy 
towards local government should be interpreted as a straightforward extension of the 
same principle of centralisation. Were this the case then it would have been logical for 
the principle of appointment rather than election, applied to regional heads since 
October 2004, to have been extended to mayors. Such a step has been seen by some as 
entirely in keeping with the administration’s outlook:  
 
To..a product of the Soviet system the elimination of checks and balances appears to 
increase the manageability of the political system. …the same striving or clarity and 
order will encompass the sub-regional level …and may result in the direct 
subordination of mayors to governors.
vi  
 
The option of substituting mayoral elections with a system of appointment from above  
was openly considered by President Putin as early as 2000, was the subject of much 
high-profile debate in early 2005, and was then the subject of a draft amendment to 
law 131 in November 2006. On each occasion the principle appeared close to 
adoption only to brushed aside at the last minute, a vocal federal constituency in 
favour of appointed mayors being obliged to give way to another in favour of elected 
mayors.  
 
Were law 131 primarily about integrating local government into the state vertical, and 
if this were all that federal policy on local government amounted to, this repeated  
recoiling from the idea of appointing mayors would be inexplicable. This paper sets 
out to explain why the refusal (so far) to appoint mayors was consistent with the 
principles underlying Law 131, and how the latter was the result of a more complex 
set of aims.     
 
 
The Kozak Commission  
 
Law 131 was one of the main outputs of the Federal Commission on the Distribution 
of Functions between Levels of Power in the Russian Federation, which was 
convened by the President in 2001, The first chair of that commission was  Dmitri 
Nikolaevich Kozak., deputy head of the Presidential Administration, who had just 
competed an overhaul of the Russian Federation’s judicial system
vii.  Although the 
Commission revised over 300 federal laws in its programme of federal reform. Most 
of these were sectoral laws. Two new laws however had a special status as they dealt 
with the powers of institutions. The second was Law 95 of 2003, which dealt with 
Executive and representative arrangements in subjects of the federation (regions), and 
which included for the first time a closed list of regional competences. 
viii. On the 
basis of these laws all the sectoral legislation that covered the shared competences set 
out in articles 72 of the Constitution were altered.   
 
The reform of local government thus needs to be seen in the context of the wider 
reform, in which its role was, initially, to be a means of achieving a wider reform of 
federal-regional relations, not an end in itself.  The reform of local government was 
  2not even on the agenda of the Kozak Commission at its inception in 2001. At that 
stage the emphasis was on altering sectoral legislation, and the idea of revising the 
law on local self-government of 1995 only came to the fore during 2002, once it 
became clear that a closed list of regional powers was not possible without clarifying 
local government’s powers and its ability to carry them out. It was not anticipated 
then that law 131 would become the most visible and most widely debated of the 
changes initiated by the Commission (with the exception of law 122 on the 
monetisation of benefits, although here the Commission played a secondary role in a 
government-led reform).  
 
At the same time it would be misleading to link 131 with all federal policy initiatives 
regarding local government, as if there were some elaborate conspiracy to centralise 
power away from local government. Different group within the federal centre have 
entirely different agendas regarding local government. Broadly these may be divided 
into those who wish to see an unbroken vertical hierarchy running from the 
presidency to the sub-regional level, and those who saw local self-government as a 
basis for the development of a democratic state.  
 
 
The Commission’s  Approach  
 
The Commission was convened to provide a rational solution to the broader problems 
of Russian federalism as it had developed, including: 
  
1.  Overlapping jurisdictions and responsibilities, originated in Article 72 of the 
Constitution. 
2.  Unfinanced mandates created both by ill-informed of vague federal legislation, 
and by unclear responsibilities at each level of government.  
3.  Distribution of finance, and sources of finance, unconnected with functions 
and responsibilities at each level of government.  
4.  Excessive inequality between subjects of the federation (real and perceived), 
and unsustainable anomalies (such as subjects being located on the territory of 
other subjects). 
5.  Lack of checks and balances at the level of the subjects of the federation – 
local authorities over-dependent on subjects financially, and federal agencies 
numerous but (allegedly) operationally weak.  
 
The Kozak Commission sought to counter these problems by ensuring the following: 
 
1.  All functions contained in the competences listed under Article 72 are 
assigned to a specific level of government (avoiding the need for an 
amendment to the Constitution.  
2.  All sectoral legislation to assign responsibilities, including financial 
responsibilities to a specific level of government.  
3.  All functions to be allocated to specific sources of finance (as far as it is 
practicable to do so).  
4.  Special agreements between federal centre and regions to be kept to a 
minimum, and none to have ‘treaty’ (dogovor) status, except in the most 
exceptional circumstances.  The Commission’s work has also contributed 
towards the removal of territorial anomalies in terms of subjects being situated 
3on the same territory, and is thereby supporting the emerging consensus in 
favour of regional mergers in order to arrive at a more workable number of 
subjects of the federation 
5.  Strengthening of local self-government as a political entity and as a properly 
financed level of government delivering a substantial range of services.  
 
 
Observation of the sessions of the Commission showed debates to be remarkably 
frank, open and informal and characterised by genuine debate.  Valery Kirpichnikov, 
Chair of the Board of the Congress of Municipalities stated that in fifteen years he had 




  ‘The concept was simple. Take existing legislation, literally every second law and 
you will find that one or another service to the public, or obligation, is to be fulfilled 
by the executive of the subject of the federation and by local self-government. 
Everyone is responsible for everything and when everyone is responsible for 
everything, this is the main and fundamental sign of irresponsibility.  The task of the 
Commission was to remove these difficulties, draw up three columns and under each 




The commission was extremely productive, and managed the revision of over 200 
laws in less than two years. There is no space to reflect the scale of the Commission’s 
work here, where we are concerned with the more specific issue of local government 
and whether, how and why the Commission’s Law 131 did or did nor serve the 
interests of local government as an institution.  
 
It is useful to summarise the main points and rationale of the reform via 
Kirpichnikov’s account, as a member of the Commission:  
 
 
The first  major change was the  territorial structure of local self-government – one 
third of subjects do it one way, one third another way and in the last third there is no 
local self-government at all… In Tyumen (Governor) Roketskii was for the settlement 
model, and then in his place came (Governor)Sobyanin who was for the territorial 
model and changed everything. The same in Orenburg and Kursk..The new law brings 
local self-government closer to the people via two types. The first type is settlement – 
if it’s over 1,000 population it should be a municipal formation.  The second type 
brings together these settlements, currently in rural raions (districts) and makes these 
municipal raions.  – existing boundaries taken so as not to break things but make 
maximum use of what is currently there). Each type given its powers, a closed list 
which can only be added to by a law of the subject. Why? In 7 years of the current law, 
not one subject has added a single local function, but regions have been adept at re-







  4Composition of the Commission and the working group on Local Government  
 
The commission has been criticised for its composition
xii, which included only two  
regional and two local government representatives, but drew instead on the 
presidential administration, government ministries and specialist institutes. This has 
created the impression that the law was put together by person wholly removed from 
municipal reality, and with a centralist agenda – in contrast to the more localist Law 
of the same title of 1995. This is a misleading view on both counts.  
 
Although there would have been strong arguments in favour of including more 
serving governors mayors and councillors, this should not obscure the fact that the 
working group which prepared the text of Law 131 (and all subsequent Kozak and 
Shuvalov
xiii Commission legislation on local government) was dominated by people 
strongly identified with local government, and specifically with the Congress of 
Municipalities throughout its history. The working group was chaired by Vitaly 
Shipov, formerly mayor of Kaliningrad and chair of the Congress of Municipalities of 
the Russian Federation, Igor Babichev, secretary of the Congress, Oleg Syssuev, the 
President of the Congress, Vitaly Chernikov, formerly Mayor of Kaluga and a leading 
expert of the Congress. Valery Kirpichnikov, founder of the Congress, was a member 
of both the working group and the Kozak Commission.  
 
Secondly, the other members of the working group had been heavily involved   
associated with the 1995 reform – including Alexander Shirokov, also a former mayor, 
a key author of both texts, Leonid Gil’chenko, deputy president’s representative of the 
Volga region (also a former mayor and a well known expert on local government), 
and Alexander Zamotaev, an expert on local government from the presidential 
administration.   
 
Those who had been involved in the previous law did not (as a rule) share the 
idealised view of that law that has subsequently become common among critics of 
law 131. Shirokov in particular came to the view that the previous law needed to be 
altered substantially and the paper, written before the Kozak Commission was formed, 
in which he outlines the changes needed reads like an early draft of Law 131
xiv.   Igor 
Babichev describes how the authors of the 1995 law agreed that they would revise it 
within five years and that this work had commenced in 2000, again before the 
Commission was set up
xv 
 
It might be argued that the group were obliged to follow the concept set out by Kozak. 
Whilst formally correct this ignores the degree to which Kozak’s concept of a two-tier 
local government system, was derived from critiques of the existing law by the 
members of the working group and others in the local government policy network that 
had become established in connection with the 1995 Law and its aftermath. Babichev, 
in the paper cited above, regards the introduction of the two-tier structure as the most 
revolutionary innovation of the new law, ending the ‘artificial uniformity’ of 
municipalities under the previous law.  Vladimir Mokriy, the chair of State Duma 
Committee on Local Self-Government
xvi considered that it had been clear from the 
start that the law of 1995 would not be implemented in most parts of the country, 
since it did not deal with the relationship between local self-government and the state 
at a territorial level, and ignored the existing system of raion state administration 
which continued to exist under the guise of local self-government in many subjects. 
5The introduction of municipal raions was seen to provide territorial basis for co-
operation between local self-government and the state.  
 
A similar analysis was presented as early as 1998 by a team from the (then) Ministry 
of Nationalities, responsible for local self-government
xvii, who noted the widespread 
use of pre-existing state administrative raions as the first level of local self-
government under the 1995 Law. At the same time the authors understood that ‘to 
avoid discrediting the new system of local self-government the organisation of 
municipal formations on the level of villages and rural councils in most cases, and at 
the level of small villages and hamlets in all cases, is unrealistic and pointless’. This 
implied that a two tier system might work better, although the authors appeared to go 
one stage further a consider letter local government develop via a two-stage process – 
becoming established first in larger units and then extending the principle to smaller 
settlements over time. This would suggest that the error in Law 131 was not the 
establishment of a two-tier system (without which the system would not work) but in 
that it attempted to introduce a strongly settlement-oriented principle from the start, 
which could only lead to large numbers of small municipalities
xviii.   
 
 
The Reform  becomes enmeshed in the Monetisation of Social Guarantees.  
 
At first the Commission’s aim appeared to be to reduce the  dependence of the Federal 
state on the regional level, by transferring powers either up to the federal level or 
down to local government (by creating a formal system for delegation of powers and 
local government units at district level capable of carrying out delegated functions. 
Transferring powers and responsibilities to the federal level encountered a major 
obstacle, however. The Commission became aware that successive laws (mostly from 
the late 1990s) had lead to a position where accumulated expenditure responsibilities 
on social guarantees were twice as great as the amount of budget funds available for 
that purpose. This led to what appeared to be a change in strategy. Shared 
responsibilities (which were not being met by any level) were to be divided between 
levels of government according to the proportion of actual expenditure currently 
incurred at that level. It would then be incumbent on the level concerned to decide 
what level of guarantees it would meet and on what basis, out of its own resources
xix.  
 
The regional representatives on the Commission were less than enthusiastic about this 
approach, preferring that more social responsibilities might stay at the federal level, at 
which Dmitri Kozak commented:   
 
When we talked about earth’s resources then we heard all about the principles of 
federalism, now we’re talking about social responsibilities we are hearing less…This 
is about decentralisation of powers and of money. No function should be devolved 
without decentralisation of the corresponding revenue resources. This is the 
principled position of the President.  Of course there will always be too little,  but we 
have to distribute real money and send it to the right level
xx. 
 
The Commission’s approach, driven by the need to pay off external debts as well as 
the desire to rationalise state spending, led ultimately to Law 122 on the monetisation 
of state benefits which provoked street protests the like of which had not been seen  
since the early 1990s. The policy may have been the government’s rather than the 
  6Commission’s but it was to have significant knock-on effects for the policy of 
strengthening local government as an institution. In order to delegate the hard choices 
on social guarantees down to regional level, a greater proportion of funds than 
previously envisaged was transferred to the regional level (who had been previously 
hit by budget cuts).   
 
This had two effects as far as local government was concerned. The Commission had 
repeatedly stressed that the aim of its activity was to divide powers and 
responsibilities between levels and then ensure that adequate ‘own’ revenue sources 
were made available through amendments to the Tax and Budget Codes, thereby 
avoiding the chaotic practices of the 1990s, when subjects had routinely re-designated 
their responsibilities (under article 72 of the Constitution) as local responsibilities and 
passed them down to local authorities as unfunded mandates. This is probably the 
most justifiable criticism that may be made of the reform, that it did not lead to the 
expansion in local tax income that would have been expected from the outset and 
would be necessary for its success. Instead it proved necessary to increase the 
subject’s budgets to meet expanded social expenditure (the transfer did not lead to the 
anticipated reductions).  
 
This led to a vicious circle whereby local government’s role in large multi-level 
functions such as education, health and social support were reduced in favour of the 
subjects, on the basis that local authorities did not have sufficient budget
xxi. There 
were debates within the working group and the Kozak and (later) Shuvalov 
Commission over the risks in allowing the long-term policy of division of power 
between levels of government to become intertwined with a deeply unpopular 
rationalisation of social guarantees, but considered that there was no option – this was 
the largest issue arising from the overlapping jurisdictions of Article 72, and therefore 
had to be confronted. This underlines the importance of seeing the local government 
reform in the larger context of the reform of the federal-regional division of 
competences.  
 
For its part the Ministry of Finance does not appear to have envisaged a massive 
transfer of funds to local government. The head of the budget department of the 
MinFin, Alexei Lavrov saw the priorities as being first to establish a local government 
structure where functions were clearly assigned according to a two-tier structure, then 
to ring-fence local budgets from regional interference, standardise the system for 
delegating state competences to municipal districts. Only then could any serious 
expansion of local budgets take place (part of a wider system of introducing results-
based budgeting across the State sector)
xxii. 
 
The intertwining of the Kozak reform agenda with that of the monetisation of social 
benefits this led to unintended consequences and suggests that there were limitations 
to what could be achieved by a systematic and rational reform programme, despite the 
very substantial scale of legislative changes carried through. This brings us to 
consider the reform campaign concerned can be incorporated into a theoretical 





7Russian Federalism between gemeinschaft and gesellschaft  
 
In order to analyse the changes brought about in the early years of the Putin 
presidency Robinson
xxiii proposed a framework derived from two sets of opposed 
ideal types: absolutist versus constitutional (whether power is concentrated or 
divided) and bureaucratic (in the Weberian sense) versus patrimonial (whether or not 
officials are selected through patronage and have personal access to the state’s 
resources.  Robinson sees the Yeltsin period, particular the late 1990s as characterised 
by constitutional patrimonialism, that in which the state has the least capacity and the 
least organisational integrity, the injustice and inefficiency of patrimonial regimes, 
without the certainty and authority of absolutism or the accountability of democracy.   
 
Of the four possible combinations constitutional patrimonialism is the least stable and   
the least likely to endure. For all Yeltsin’s brinkmanship
xxiv, it was clear that any 
successor would need to move the state in a different direction
xxvIn terms of the 
framework there are three possibilities – constitutional-bureaucratic (the Western 
model) and absolutist-patrimonial (the Third World authoritarian regime) or 
bureaucratic absolutism. Putin’s modernisation project from 2000 onwards could be 
seen as to move Russia away from the weakness and uncertainty of constitutional 
patrimonialism and towards either constitutional bureaucracy or absolutist 
bureaucracy The oscillation in foreign policy in Putin’s first term between European 
and Chinese  reference points reflected this
xxvi, although in the first term the long term 
aim of a European-style constitutional-bureaucratic model dominated, so that if 
absolutism were to be used it would be a means of moving towards the Western 
model. This was the basis of the alliance between economic reformers and strong state 
advocates that supported Putin. The argument for this two-stage approach would run 
as follows:  
 
a)  it is not possible to move from the chaos of constitutional patrimonialism directly 
     to constitutional bureaucracy, as the weakness of the state has removed the  
     capacity to create a rule-based bureaucracy (or, by extension, a law-based  
    Rechtstaat).  
 
b) this transition can only be done via absolutist bureaucracy. Constitutional  
     bureaucracy requires the rule of law, and this can only be achieved by reasserting  
     the power of the state. Power must be re-centralised. Then, once the rules have  
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This would involve moving from quadrant 1 and entering quadrant 3 as a precondition 
for entering the final destination, quadrant 2. In some respects this may be seen as the 
trajectory of Russia’s modernisation, at least as it appeared during Putin’s first 
administration, absolutist bureaucracy (quadrant 3) being seen as preferable to 
absolutist patrimonialism (quadrant 4) which would be antithetical to modernisation.  
 
It would be misleading to consider quadrant 3 as a return to the USSR, since 
absolutist bureaucracy need to imply control of the entire economy, only over the 
political system and machinery of government. It would involve some of the form of 
the Soviet system, but not its content. The movement from quadrant 1 to 3 may still 
be seen as modernisation in that it involves (at the level of federal-regional relations) 
a shift from gemeinschaft (the informal power of quadrants 1 and 4) to gesellschaft 
(the law-based authority of quadrants 2 and 3)
xxvii.    
 
This logic is not without plausibility although it is clear there are two potential 
problems. Firstly, the move from Quadrant 1 to Quadrant 3 entails the removal of the 
checks and balances that operate (however imperfectly) in Quadrant 1. Secondly, the 
movement from one quadrant to another may be carried out by judicial (and 
legislative) means and by administrative pressure
xxviii. If administrative pressure 
predominates, movement to a democratic law-based state could be impeded
xxix, 
although a purely legal approach without development of wider support and 
engagement might be too weak.  
 
A weak change coalition can prevent the values underlying the change from being 
institutionalise and normalised, leading to a return to rule by power rather than law
xxx. 
Anything other than an optimal balance between judicial, administrative and political 
could, in the absence of a system of checks and balances, lead to slippage in the 
direction of absolutist patrimonialism (Quadrant 2). Centralising power without 
9changing the principles by which it is exercised may amount to exchanging one form 
of patrimonialism (differentiated) for another (integrated).  This lay behind the 
perception (in late 2006) that the mono-centric system established by President Putin 
could, on his departure, or even earlier, revert into a polycentric system of ‘feudal 
pluralism
xxxi.  The problem is as before a lack of state capacity, or rather insufficient 
state capacity for the strategy adopted, leading some to question whether the vertical 
hierarchical approach associated with the current administration is necessarily more 
effective than the discredited decentralised approach of the Yeltsin period
xxxii  
 
A further theoretical dimension may be provided by placing the model in the context 
of the Romantic-Baroque distinction developed by Chunglin Kwa
xxxiii. The first 
quadrant implies acceptance of a degree of (baroque) complexity in the governmental 
system and the idea of each element and each situation requiring special arrangements 
and deals. Quadrant 4 also involves a baroque type of complexity behind apparent 
unity – the type of incipient feudalism liable to emerge in the event of a weakening of 
an autocratic regime. The right hand quadrants are both, by this definition, romantic, 
in that they attempt to apply an overarching rationalist conception to deal with 
complexity (quadrant 2 – although this may be seen as overlaying baroque elements) 
and eliminate it altogether (quadrant 3 – which has no trace or tolerance of the 
baroque). The Kozak Commission may be seen as having been split between these 
two approaches, that of creating a system to deal with complexity and that of seeking 
to eliminate it. This may be seen as reflected in the choice of a dual local government 
system – the small settlement model being a unit of baroque complexity and 
specificity, whereas the territorial district reflects the romantic view of state 
bureaucracy uniting through uniformity.  
 
The framework, understood in this way. helps to explain the otherwise curious nature 
of the political/professional alliance that supported the Putin administration – ex-
secret service personnel, economic liberals and ‘St Petersburg lawyers’
xxxiv. All three 
groups might be expected to regard the combination of fragmentation at the centre 
and entrenched quasi sovereign regimes in the regions with displeasure, albeit for 
different reasons.  The alliance may be seen to derive from the St Petersburg 
mayoralty post 1991 (where Vladimir Putin served as Deputy Mayor for External 
Affairs and Dmitri Kozak as head of the legal department, and to have grown out of 
the split between two groups of liberals, those attached to the late 1980s ideas of 
democracy from below, and those who had come to the view that reform required 
strong executive rule
xxxv. Those who had supported the council against the executive 
in St Petersburg and elsewhere were generally strong supporters of the principle of 
local self-government as a popular rather than state institution
xxxvi.  Thus the schism 
that occurred after 1991 in St Petersburg within what had been the liberal 
intelligentsia was to focus in the longer term around the issue of local self-
government, which, as a result, took on major symbolic as well as practical 
significance, as the terrain on which a compromise was still sought between state 
pragmatism and the democratic ideals of the late 1980s.  
 
However, the significance of the Robinson framework, as far as local government is 
concerned, lies more in the degree to which Russian regional interests tend to be 
based on the left hand gemeinschaft of the framework, as subjects of a pluralistic 
constitutional patrimonialism (Quadrant 1) or (as in the case of the more autocratic 
  10titular republics of the Federation) in Quadrant 4 as domains of absolutist 
patrimonialism in their own right.   
 
In terms of this framework, Law 131 with its emphasis on rationalising and clarifying 
the division of powers and responsibilities between levels (and with clarifying the 
rules for delegating functions between levels) was clearly aimed, as was the entire 
project of the Kozak Commission, at moving the system of inter-govermental 
relations from the left (gemeinschaft) side of the framework to the right (gesellschaft) 
side, substituting rules for informal arrangements. As one senior federal official put it:  
 
The problem was the habit of ’living by unwritten rules’ rather than by laws, these 
unwritten rules being neither in local government’s nor the public’s interest, but in 




The paradox of the Kozak Commission is that, the more the law’s authors sought to  
contain regional power through clarification and rationalisation of the division of 
powers between federal and regional government, the more difficult it became to use 
traditional (i.e. more patrimonial) counters to regional power. In the end the most 
effect counterweight to a tough regional patrimonial regime may well be a strong 
mayoral regime at municipal level. However the reform itself was, through the 
reinforcement of rational rules, to render the establishment or maintenance of such 





Where Subjects of the Federation (regions or republics) operate within Quadrant 4 
local government is largely or entirely subservient to the regional authority
xxxviii.  It 
would be wrong to imply that patrimonialism was more prevalent at regional level 
than at federal or local level. However, the more a regional authority inclined towards 
patrimonialism (especially of the absolutist type) the more local authorities were 
likely to be under pressure. As one senior federal official commented:  
 




There were regions such as Vologda and Tambov where the regional administrations 
were supportive of local autonomy, but there were many others where local autonomy 
was kept to the absolute minimum. Larger cities, typically regional capitals, were as a 
rule caught in a zero-sum struggle for power and resources against regional heads
xl, 
exacerbated by the lack of clarity between local and regional (and federal) 
jurisdictions.  
 
The struggle for supremacy between mayors and governors has in many ways been 
analogous to the power struggle between regions and the federal centre. There is a 
fundamental difference, however. Although the federal centre has often targeted 
individual regional heads, centre-regional tensions have tended to be manifested and 
mediated through collective  institutions such as the upper house, the Federal Council 
(especially prior to 2001 when regional heads were still ex officio members of that 
11body). Even in the late Yeltsin period, when special agreements with individual 
regions were the federal authorities preferred method of dealing with conflict, and 
according to some the most effective
xli, it could be said that it was the collective 
bargaining power of the regions as a while that kept the federal authorities on the 
defensive.  
 
  Local-regional tension, by contrast, has tended to manifest itself through 
individualised conflict between governors and mayors, with usually only the regional 
capital involved - the pattern  of Russian urbanisation is such that in most regions 
there is only one city substantial enough to challenge or resist the regional authority
xlii. 
This conflict appears to be endemic to the system – some have suggested that it would 
exist even under a system of appointments:  
 
Prussak (former governor of Novgogord region) got his own person elected when the 
Kursunov (mayor of Novgorod city) died, but within six months they were enemies. 




Conflict between municipalities and the State thus tends to be on a one-to-one basis,   
involving the State at regional rather than federal level, and does not directly involve 
federation-wide collective institutions such as the Congress of Municipalities or the 
Union of Russian Cities. Although the Congress of Municipalities was closely 
involved in the process of developing Law 131, the lack of a tradition of federal 
lobbying of municipal interests was to put the municipal point of view at a 
disadvantage when it came to passing the draft law through the Federal Council, and 
regional interests began to make their presence felt.  
 
The degree to which, in Russian federalism, tensions have been common between 
federal centre and regions and between regions and the larger municipalities, but not 
directly between federal centre and municipalities (until very recently), raises the 
question of whether a common interest in containing regional power existed between 
federal and municipal authorities.    
 
In terms of the Robinson model, discussed above, this question takes on considerable 
significance. The Federal centre cannot by laws alone bring about the modernisation 
of the state and its constituent regions and attempts to compensate for this by using 
administrative methods risks undermining its own modernisation through the 
accumulation of unaccountable power at the centre. If, on the other hand, pressure 
was exerted on the regions through the development of municipalities as a 
countervailing force, this would lessen the need for administrative methods to be 
applied from above, and would enable the reassertion of federal authority and 
modernisation to take place in accordance with the principles of pluralism and 
constitutionalism, rather than risking their abandonment and with it the integrity of 







  12Vertical or Triangle?  
 
The notion of deploying local authorities as a political counterweight against the 
regions dates back to the nineteenth century councils (zemstvos) – seen as part of a 
system of ‘constrained autocracy’
xliv and it may be seen as a natural consequence of 
Russian adversarial political culture and geographical expanse. As Sakwa has 
observed:  
 
Local self-government has the potential to become a powerful third tier, something 




It has, however. rarely been supported with any sustained commitment from the 
federal centre, due to the lack of a strong enough pro-local government group at 
federal level, where there are also groups who are wholly unsympathetic to local 
autonomy. The Yeltsin administration did attempt to revive the strategy, particularly 
through the localist local self-government law of 1995, but the abolition of local 
councils in 1993, in the wake of the clash with parliament sapped the ability of local 
government (even once reconstituted) to fulfil this role
xlvi .  The idea of local 
government as a ‘second front’ in the struggle between the centre and the governors 
was considered, but the speed with which Putin was able to establish the seven federal 
districts to oversee and coordinate the regions was seen to reduce the necessity of this 
second front
xlvii. Early in his first term it appeared that Putin supported this strategy, 
but even at that stage (in 2000) he seriously considered doing the reverse – allowing 
mayors to be appointed by governors - in exchange for concessions from the 
governors. This was the bargain that was implicit in Putin’s statement:  
 
“If the head of a territory can be dismissed by the country’s president under certain 
circumstances, he should have a similar right in regard to authorities subordinate to 
him..This is not just a right thing to do, but simply necessary in order to restore the 
functional vertical structure of executive power in this country..It would mean we are 
living in one strong country, one single state called Russia”
xlviii. 
 
In the event the Duma agreed with the proposal on condition that it should be the 
President and not regional heads that would have the power to sack mayors. This was 




It is clear that the aim of restoring the vertical is to strengthen Russia as a state, a 
derzhava or power, and that it is the regions that provide the potential threat to unity, 
with the sub-regional level being (apparently) offered as a concession to secure the 
loyalty of the regions. The tendency for the Putin administration, despite its rhetoric, 
to strike bargains with regional leaders, giving them monopoly of power in their own 
region provided they were loyal to the centre, has been noted by Matsuzato
l and 
contrasted with the Yeltsin administration’s approach. Yeltsin feared separatism 
where regional leaders were too well entrenched and backed challengers to unseat 
them. Putin has been more inclined to use the party United Russia and other means to 
exact loyalty from regional leaders, but has apparently been content to leave them 
with their regional monopoly of power intact where they are loyal. This approach 
supports the derzhava rationale for centralisation, but runs counter to the 
13constitutional rights argument for centralisation that was often used during Putin’s 
first term. . If the aim of centralisation is to ensure that citizens enjoy the same rights 
regardless of where they live within the Federation, then supporting authoritarian 
regional regimes cannot long remain a feature of that policy.  
 
The idea of a local counterweight does have an enduring residual acceptance in the 
federal centre, such that each time proposals for appointment or dismissal have been 
raised they have been opposed successfully whether in the Duma or (even) in the 
Federation Council of regional representatives. This may reflect a recognition that a 
structure based on checks and balances (what we have here termed a triangular 
structure) may be more robust than a simple vertical structure, due to limitations 
placed on any vertical hierarchy by principal-agent theory
li  
 
It is worth considering why the debates on local government reform have tended to be 
polarised between those the ‘statists’ who see local government as part of an 
unbroken vertical line of authority and accountability and those who see it as entirely 
disconnected from that line. The alternative, which we have referred to here as the 
‘triangle’ option, would draw on the original Florentine notion of the balance of 
power
lii, whereby three or more parties in potential conflict prevent any one of their 
number from becoming too powerful. Thus all stay in the game and none wholly 
dominate the game. However the participation in this approach would imply the 
recognition that complete control over other actors is not possible, and this would run 
counter to the tendency in Russian political culture to maximise rather than optimise 
control.   
 
However it is not necessary for local government to actively pursue this role for it to 
be effective. Simply by virtue of being autonomous municipalities can exert restraint 
on the growth of regional power – as I.V. Babichev, the secretary of the Congress of 
Municipalities argued: 
 
If local autonomous self-government is absent from the  federal state, the self-
sufficiency of the Subjects would threaten the existence of the Federation
liii.  
 
This view is seen by some to be understood by all sides:  
 
There will be no appointment of mayors for political reasons. There needs to be a 
counterweight to governors, and the Subjects (regions) know that. The talk of 




The ‘Triangle’ under Strain  
 
The problem of the ‘triangle’ or ‘balance of power view of federal-regional-local 
relations is that it comes under pressure in the run-up to federal elections, when the 
loyalty and support of regional heads comes at a premium.  As one commentator put 
it:  
 
Now that the Kremlin is ‘perfecting’ local self-government by means of turning it into 
a system of opposition to the gubernatorial power…can the Kremlin rely on 
governors’ support at the parliamentary or presidential election?”
lv 
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What premium can be offered to regional heads? It is a choice between extra 
resources (which cannot by definition be granted to every region) or political support 
against sub-regional rivals (which is potentially available to all regions). 
 
One interviewee saw the electoral cycle as influencing the ebb and flow of the 
centre’s support for local government was seen as de-stabilising:  
 
Local self government has ended up as an instrument of political struggle – between 
elections – each president starts by developing local-self-government, then makes 
peace with governors. This is wrong – it should be about people’s needs not politics
lvi. 
 
Given that the progress of Law 131 from its genesis in early 2002 through to its 
adoption in October 2003, with amendments beginning almost immediately (and 
becoming a regular feature as the implementation of the reform progressed) straddled 
most of the electoral cycle, right up to the presidential election of 2004, it should be 
possible to test this hypothesis regarding whether the evolution of the law became 
more pro-regional as the election approached. Some commentators saw this effect at 
work as the draft law was being finalised in late 2002.   
 
 Why make people angry before an election? The fate of Dmitry Kozak’s municipal 
reform is a very convincing example – first the reform was carried out fast enough, 
however of late its tempo has considerably slowed down. At present there are 
numerable consultations with regional leaders.
lvii  
 
This comment was proved wrong in terms of tempo, but there did seem to be a 
perceptible change in the style with which the reform was approached after mid-2002. 
In early 2002 the rhetoric was very strongly in favour of local government as a 
constitutional principle that was being denied by a substantial proportion of the 
Subjects of the Federation
lviii. The impression was very much of a joint campaign by 
an alliance of the Presidential Administration (or rather a section of it – and not 
including the legal division) and the Congress of Municipalities, with the aim of 
promoting local government and containing the power of regions to interfere with 
local authorities. As a member of the working group on law 131 put it:  
 
Municipalities will have no fewer own powers than under the existing Law - under 
which they already have more than in Europe. Delegated powers will be increased - 
so they will have more power overall.  Small municipalities will lose those that they 
cannot deliver. However it is hard to imagine greater dependence on the regional 
level than at present. We have tried to remove any dependence on the regional level 
altogether…We can judge by the reaction of the regions. They're not happy, so 
therefore what we're doing must be right. Yes, they will be distributing more money, 
but they will be having to do it according to new rules.
lix 
 
However by the Autumn of 2002 there were signs of strain in this alliance. On a 
number of issues the Commission appeared to have different views from some of 
those (though not all) in the Congress who had previously supported the reform 
wholeheartedly. By June, 2003, when Vladimit Putin attended the annual conference 
of the Congress of Municipalities, there was no disguising the discontent of municipal 
leaders including leaders of the Congress and the project of building up local 
15government as a counterweight to regional government seemed to have fallen into at 





Why did what we have termed the ‘triangle’ concept of federal-regional-local 
relations not take hold in the course of the local government reform of Law 131? The  
reason may have been electoral considerations, as suggested above, but an even 
simpler explanation is possible. From September, 2002 Dmitri Kozak and his team 
were preoccupied with getting the law through the Federal Council. This brought him 
into contact with a much better organised lobbying body than the Congress, and 
compromises (although more in style than substance) were necessary to win support. 
The Congress on the other hand, had never managed to evolve into a genuinely 
powerful representative body, partly because of its own internecine problems
lx and 
partly because, as described earlier, the lack of an established interlocutor/relationship 
at the Federal level.   
 
Following the establishment of the seven federal districts in 2001, the territorial 
directorate in the Presidential Administration was abolished. The other main central 
interlocutor was the Ministry of Nationalities which was reorganised and re-created 
under various names before being incorporated into the Ministry of Economy, soon 
after which its local government related functions were transferred to the new 
Ministry of Regional Development which is only gradually developing a curatorial 
role for local government
lxi.  This lack of an institutional dialogue meant that the 
cities and towns that were in conflict with regional heads had no standard means of 
dealing with the federal state as corporate bodies. It also meant that federal officials 
derived their information about the situation on the ground from regional heads, with 
whom they were more likely to have official contact. 
  
In 2001, when the Kozak Commission was established, the President of the 
Association of Russian Cities (which forms part of the Congress) the Mayor of 
Ekaterinburg, Arkady Chernetsky asked Kozak personally whether he might fill the 
vacuum and be, in effect, the federal curator for local government
lxii, and although 
this was never formalised there was a period during which Kozak appeared to be 
acting in the capacity of champion of local government. Kozak believed that local 
government should not be coordinated by a central ministry but through a network or 
association coordinated from the centre
lxiii. This was the role that clearly seemed to 
have been marked down for the Congress of Municipalities, and in early drafts of the 
Law, the Congress was referred to by name as being responsible for organising local 
authorities, which would be obliged to join the Congress (which may help to explain 
some of the Congress’ enthusiasm in the early stages of developing Law 131). Late in 
2002 this was changed as it became clear that this role would deprive the Congress of 
its voluntary non-governmental status, even if it were to increase its influence. Instead 
law 131 has led to obligatory associations being established in each Subject of the 
Federation, leaving the Congress in an ambiguous position.  
 
In conclusion, one may state firstly that the centralisation campaign of the Putin 
administration was never uniform regarding local and regional government, and that 
the notion of local government as a counterweight to regional power has survived. On 
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the other hand it remains largely undeveloped as an idea, with no mechanism to give 
it greater application. This is not, it is argued, due largely to any conspiracy by the 
federal centre, but more to as yet weak capacity in local government’s own federal-
level institutions. This in turn may be explained by the absence of any substantial and 
continuous institutional dialogue between the federal centre and local government.  
 
In terms of the evolution of the Russian state, the limited degree to which the 
‘triangle’  of federal, regional and local power has developed has led to the 
development of what may prove to be a brittle ‘state vertical’ once again vulnerable to 
the development of patrimonialism both at the centre and in the regions. Support for a 
balance of power between the three levels would have helped to secure movement 
towards constitutional democracy. The experience of the Kozak Commission suggests, 
however, that a rational approach to establishing a law-based state may have 
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Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University 
 
 
Not solely are separate executive officers required for purely local duties 
(an amount of separation which exists under all governments), but the 
popular control over those officers can only be advantageously exerted 
through a separate organ. Their original appointment, the function of 
watching and checking them, the duty of providing or the discretion of 
withholding the supplies necessary for their operations, should rest, not 
with the national Parliament or the national executive, but with the 
people of the locality….It is necessary, then., that, in addition to the 
national representation,, there should be municipal and provisional 
representations; and the two questions which remain to be resolved are, 
how the local representative bodies should be constituted, and what 
should be extent of their functions. 
     John  Stuart  Mill,  Considerations on Representative Government, 1890 (original, 
London Parker, Son, and Bourn, West Strand, MDCCCLXI, 1861.), pp.287-288. 
 
Local self-governance may be regarded as being at the crossroads of democratization 
and civil society. Historically Russia has no decentralization and autonomy, because 
of its extensive territory and ethnic diversity. Moreover, in the Soviet period, it had 
closed cities and an extremely concentrated system of power. Therefore, local 
self-governance may be regarded as an indicator of democratization and the maturity 
of civil society in Russia’s transformation. 
 
Local government and local governance may be differentiated from each other. The 
term government refers to the formal procedures and institutions, and local 
government imposes a uniform system of local administration. On the other hand, the 
term governance is a flexible pattern based on loose networks of individuals (John, 
2001) 
 
Local self-governance is based on a dual principle: local government as a part of the 
state administration structure, and local autonomy as a democratic organization from 
below. This dual principle suggests that local budget may be managed not only by 
centralization (direct control) but also decentralization (micro intervention). Based on 
the principle, the pattern of local self-governance is classified into two types (John, 
2001): The first is Anglo-Saxon or the northern type (Britain and northern European 
states), based on the tradition of autonomous organizations. The local government has 
relative strong institutional independence, and is given the responsibility for 
administering welfare services. There is a clear institutional distinction between the 
central and the local. The second type is the continental or the southern type (France 
and Italy), where the degree of centralization is stronger, and the authorities’ 
delimitation is obscure. Central government field services take the responsibility. 
Each country has its own peculiarities. Germany and Switzerland are hybrid systems 
containing states or cantons which have both sets of traditions and structures (John, 
232001, p.36). Even though there is no uniform pattern, an overall transition from local 
government to local governance is now discussed (John, 2001). Local self-governance 
systems are this profoundly affected by historical tradition, embedded institutions and 
state building. With its tradition of a strong centre and a dependent local level, Russia 
may be classified as being closest to the southern type. 
 
Sixteen years have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. There continues to 
be a controversy on the type of market economy in Russia: normal or abnormal
i. To 
this may be added a more recent but o less profound controversy on the type of 
democracy and local self-governance obtaining in Russia. During the period of the 
Putin regime, the ruling ‘vertical’ has been reactivated and regional and local 
governments seem to have lost their capacity for independent (or voluntary) behavior. 
The following measures were undertaken during Putin’s first term: the removal of the 
governors
ii from the upper house of parliament; the creation of the seven Federal 
Districts and the system of Presidential Representative and Inspectors to oversee the 
regions; the campaign to conform regional laws with federal law; the revision of the 
Tax Code; and others (Goode, 2007, p.373). The president’s appointment of governors 
with permission of the regional assemblies was approved in December 2004 and 
ensured regional compliance with the federal centre to strengthen Russian statehood. 
This policy of centralization has provoked some criticism
iii, and is see by some as 
reviving the Soviet legacy and the Soviet system of administration.This recent history 
also has implications for the system of local self-governance. 
 
Therefore, local self-governance may be regarded as the key research topic for 
understanding the Russian economic system. Needless to say, this topic necessitates 
cross-disciplinary approaches. While Adrian Campbell examines the contemporary 
changes of local self-governance in Russia from the political science and the regional 
studies, his conclusion on the perspective of the change from gemeinschaft to 
gesellschaft contributes to economic analysis also.   
 
This paper comments that by Campbell (2007), which presents recent on local 
self-governance in Russia. In this paper will trace the evolutionary process of local 
self-governance in Russia and examine the impact of Law 131, which provides the 
focus for the Campbell paper, derived from his own fieldwork in Russia, notably his 
participant observation of the work of the Kozak Commission as well prpviding 
contextual information on the current local self-government reform. His comments on 
the opinions on local self-governance within the Commission clarify not only 
complicated mixture of interests among the policy makers concerned, but also 
specificity of the institutional changes in Russia. The paper will thus contribute to our   
understanding of the 2007 State Duma election and the 2008 presidential election. 
 
 
Scheme of the administrative division and local self-government 
 
In order to understand the background Campbell’s paper we need first of all to review 
the overall pattern of evolution of local self-government in Russia. 
 
In the Soviet period, the unified Soviet system integrated the whole country, and cities 
and regions had no autonomy as self-governing bodies. The local soviet was 
organized as an executive board, and the Communist party infiltrated into the 
 
24sub-regional level. The collapse of the Soviet Union drastically changed the 
administration and local self-government. Based on Turovskii (2006), Sakwa (2002), 
Orttung (2004) and Jounda (2004), we take a general view of evolution in local 
self-government and characterize 4 periods after 1990 (Table 1). 
 
The first period is 1991-1993, when amendments to the old constitution introduced 
the concept of the local self-government. In July, 1991, the Law on Local-Self 
Government in the RSFSR determined the local self-government to be an autonomous 
entity and established the popular election of a head of administration for a five year 
term. However, vertical subordination remained within regions, and heads of 
administration were thus appointed by the regional administration than elected. In this 
period, the local self-government could not be separated from the state authority, and 
till 1993 the local soviets retained the executive committee (ispolkom), except in 
major cities (notaby Moscow and St Petersburg where the introduction of elected 





April 1990  Law on the general principles of local self-government and 
local enterprise in the USSR 
July 1991  Law on local self-government in the RSFSR 
December 1993  Adoption of the New Constitution of Russian Federation 
August 1995  Law on the general principles of local self-government 
organization in the Russian Federation 
September 1997  Law on the financial bases of local self-government in the 
Russian Federation 
October 1999  Decree of the President of Russian Federation on general 
statements of local self-government policy in Russia Federation 
6 October 2003  New Law on the general principles of local self-government 
organization in the Russian Federation 
  




















The second period is 1993-1996, and based on the Constitution 1993, the local soviets 
were abolished, and the autonomy developed. According to Article 131.1
iv,  
 
Local self-government in urban and rural settlements and other territories is 
exercised with due consideration for historical and other local traditions. The 
structure of local self-government bodies is autonomously determined by the 
population. 
    
The new scheme was adopted in August 1995: Law on the general principles of local 
self-government organization in the Russian Federation. At the same time, the Federal 
centre took steps support the institutional strengthening of local self-government. In 
1995, the Federal Programme of Government Support to the Local Self-governance 
operated, and the Congress of the local self-government reform was established 
25(Velikaya, 2003, p.126). The Law determined the framework of local self-government, 
along with the Law on the financial bases of local self-government in the Russian 
Federation. After that, the executive boards of local self-government were organized, 
and the popular election was carried out
v. However, elections were delayed, and in 
many regions election of the local head was carried out together with the governor’s 
election. In others there was no election, only appointment by the region. In practice 
most of the local self-government system was inherited from the Soviet system, and 
its status was not sufficiently clarified by the law.   
 
The third period is 1996-2003, during which period the Law of 1995 was in force and 
d each region determined its own model of local self-government. At the same time, 
there were wide regional variations and gaps in implementation of the law can be 
observed, and the all-federal standard was not able to sufficiently function in this 
period. In principle, the head of local self-government was elected by the popular 
election, or by the deputies of government, or by the contract (employment). 
Concerning the model, the following points may be raised: 1) the liberal model where 
the head was elected by the popular, 2) settlement model which means that 
municipalities are not the administrative units but the resident units (Kursk, 
Novosibirsk, Tumen), 3) restricted election model which means that the head is 
elected by deputies of local self-government or appointed by the contract (Bryansk, 
Orel, Saratov and others), 4) ‘republic’ model which preserves the vertical power 
relation (the head is appointed by the president of the region, Bashkortostan, Tatarstan 
and others). 
 
In the third period, the number of local self-governments with the liberal model 
decreased and most of them were not free from the control from the above. The two- 
tier system of local self-government was refused, and the status of individual local 
self-government was restricted and ambiguous. The most powerful stakeholder for 
local self-government was the regional government and the governor. The governors 




The period described above was confusing as there were both radical changes and 
conservative changes. On the one hand, Russia appeared as a western-oriented 
democracy. Through the three periods after the transformation, “Russia was applying 
for membership in the Council of Europe (COE), where the institution of local 
self-government is one of the standards for admission”
vii. Russia joined the COE, and 
following the recommendation on the state of local self-government and federalism 
(COE, 2007), Russia ratified the European Charter of Local Self-Government
viii in 
1998. The EU Commission, launched in 1997/1998, intended to enhance the 
development of local self-government in Russia. Not only policies for federal-regional 
relations but also municipal management were provided (Ruutu, Johansson, 1998, 
pp.6-7). Therefore, Russia policy was aimed at the western (Anglo-Saxon) model of 
local-government officially and legally, with a concomitant emphasis on local 
autonomy.  
 
On the other hand, the system’s actual evolution was unclear. The federal centre and 
the regions did not relinquish their control of local bodies. “Governors and presidents 
reduced local government to no more than top-down executive management.
ix” Under 
the environment of segmented regionalism and asymmetrical federalism, regional 
 
26leaders excessively expanded their own regions
x. The conflicts between the federal 
centre and the regions became overt. These conflicts have served to amplify the 
control over local self-government from the regional level. Conflict between regional 
governors and mayors of the big cities became endemic in 1997-1999, because big 
cities had enough resources to compete with governors (the paper by Campbell and 
Denezhkina recounts and analysis the longest running city-regional conflict, that of 
Ekaterinburg and Sverdlovsk region). The conflict, however, was not so simple. All 
the local self-governments did not cooperate with big cities in competing with 
governors and some periphery municipalities were against them (Turovskii, 2006). In 
addition, the federal centre tried to support local self-government based on a common 
interest in containing regional power existed between federal and municipal 
authorities (Campbell, 2007). Therefore, local self-government stood within a vertical 
hierarchy. As far as the pressure from the above has been strong, Russian local 
self-governance may be characterized as a continental type
xi. 
 
The fourth period is after 2003, Law 131, which has brought about the drastic reforms 
in local self-government. The Putin government reforms may be seen as moving not  
only regions but also local self-government in the direction of the ruling vertical. 
 
 
Local self-government under Law 131 
 
As Figure 1 shows, the Russian system of government consists of three administrative 
levels: the federal centre, subjects of the federation (region) and local self-government, 
and all the administrations have their own budgets. While the regional governments 
can be classified as a part of vertical authority (as a level of state administration), 
local self-government has dual roles: an autonomous entity and a state organization. 
 
Law 131 determines the two-tier structure of local self-government
xii (Figure 2). The 
fundamental unit of municipalities is settlement (urban and rural), in which residents 
directly participate. It may include separate small communities. The settlement is 
determined on the basis of population density and accessibility. A rural settlement may 
include either one community with above1000 inhabitants or several with less than 
1000 inhabitants. For the area with high population density
xiii, 3000 inhabitants 
becomes the criterion. The transfer of authority to the settlement will be carried out 
gradually by 2009 (in the transition period) based on regional decision. 
 
The settlement has following powers: local financial-economic policy (budget), 
infrastructural policy (electricity, heating, gas, transportation and others), social, 
housing and cultural policy, land use planning and territorial maintenance, local 
security, guardianship, organization of funeral ceremonies and graveyards and others. 
The larger unit, municipal raion (district) includes some fundamental units, and it has 
some similar powers with the settlement. The administrative centre of the district is 
required to be located within one day trip to all settlements in principle. It is said that 
there is not a severe demarcation between settlement and municipal district. 
Concerning the authorities, joint activities may be permitted. The municipal police, 
inter-budget relation, some aspects of education and health are specialized in the 
municipal district. Some aspects of leisure and sports and fire security are specified 
for the settlement. The urban okrug (borough), former city belonging to the region, 
has dual functions of settlement and municipal district. 
27 
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Region: Subject of the Federation 
: 88 
Local self-government: 24196 
municipal raion (district): 1793 
urban okrug (borough): 520 
territories inside of cities with 
federal significance: 236 
urban settlement: 1799 
rural settlement: 19848 
Source: Regiony Rossii, 2006 
 
28In addition, the following local categories are dealt as specific status: cities with 
federal significance which are subjects of the federation (Moscow and St. Petersburg), 
border territories, closed cities (ZATO: closed administrative-territorial formation), 
and science cities. The last three are determined by the federal law
xiv, and territories 
inside cities with federal significance are determined by Law 131 (Turovskii, 2006). 
 
Law 131 determines the new municipalities, and demarcation of powers between the 
administrations and their transfer become the main problem of local self-government. 
The Kozak commission recognized the lack of a clear assignment of expenditure 
responsibilities at the regional and local levels, and tried to establish a clear 
delineation among all the levels of government (Martinez-Vazquez, Timofeev, and 
Boex, 2006, p.69). All directly relate to reorganization of the budget system and the 
financial guarantee after the 1
st January 2006
xv. Stressing the above process, as 
Campbell points out, a ‘triangular’ view of the systems is indispensable. 
 
Legislation is different from enforcement of the law. According to Law 129 (12 
October 2005), regions provide the newly established local self-government 
(settlement). Based on the research data of the Ministry of Finance, in 14 regions of 
85, settlement municipalities did not become independent bodies, and could not make 
their own local budgets. In 7 regions, local budgets were formed without splitting into 
each type of municipalities. In 2 regions, settlements and municipal districts had 
integrated addition. Therefore in 62 regions of 85, budget authorities were demarcated 
by Law 131 between municipalities, in 26 regions of 62, however, there were few 
funds for transferred authorities. As a result, in 36 regions, the reforms have begun, 49 
regions did not prepare the reform.   
 
Demarcation was followed by changes in local finance. In 2006, revenue of local 
self-government increased by 26 %. While tax revenue decreased by 23 %, non-tax 
revenue and subsidies, subvention and others increased. As Table 2 shows, the share 
of subsidies, subventions and local allocation tax radically increased, and among them 
subvention (subventsiya
xvi) occupied more than half of the total grants and subsidies. 
 
Subvention is unclear due to lack of standardized calculation method and minimum 
social standard and opaque accounting systemsl. However, the number of powers with 
local significance transferred to municipalities has rapidly increased, due to the 
federal law
xvii. For example, in Krasnoyarsk krai and Murmansk oblast 23 powers 
were transferred, and in Stavropol krai 17 powers were transferred. Not only the 
federal centre but also regions transferred tasks, which brought about unfunded 
mandates. Municipalities could not provide the budget service at the required level. 
The share of settlements revenue in local budget is only 6.4 %, of which 49.5% is for 




Table 2. Comparison of local self-government budget (%) 
 
                                  1
st  quarter  of  2005     1
st quarter of 2006 
Tax  and  non  tax  revenue                    53                   36.3 
Subsidies, subvention and local  allocation  tax   45.2                  63.7 
Source: Eremeeva, Kazyukova, Kalantarova, 2006, p.38. 
 
29Moreover, tax revenue is very weak in municipalities. Tax revenue from the land has 
drastically decreased in 2006 due to lack of organizations collecting taxes, and regions 
have kept tax revenue paying insufficient subvention. At the very least, the reforms do 
not change all the schemes of authorities and finance of local self-government, and 
local governments have increased partial responsibilities without sufficient funds. 
Local society and residents are obliged to adapt the new environment. The Kozak 
proposal in this respect turned out to be vague, provoking dissatisfaction. 
 
 
Impact and influence of Law 131 
 
Law 131 and the Kozak Commission
xix have strongly influenced the laws and acts of 
all levels, the mutual relation among centre-regions-municipalities, and organization 
of the local governments (three types). At the same time, “there is a strong opposition 
to these reforms from regional officials and public sector employees
xx”. Law and 
Commission have accepted many revisions and supplements in the process of 
enforcing Law




In order to develop the reforms of local self-governance, in 2005, the Ministry of 
Regional Development was established, which actively enforced Law 131. Moreover, 
Committee of State Duma on problems of local self-governance and other 
organizations held the meeting for revision of Law 131. The monitoring of the 
reforms was carried out by many institutes, and the coordinating committee was 
created in September 2005. While in 2005, preparation of necessary drafts of 
normative legal acts was behind schedule, in 2004-2005, 14 federal laws were 
adopted for revision of Law 131, and the new law was enforced. The process did not 
go smoothly. The subjects of the federation (regions) have kept their influence over 
the local self governments and the election, and the transition period to the beginning 
of 2009 for the reforms was determined.   
 
The regions have been a driving force in implementing the reforms. First of all, they 
established the new municipalities
xxiii, and determined the procedure of formation of 
legislative organs there, date of the election, and the term. As the local 
self-governments were formed in 12215 municipalities in 2000, the number of 
municipalities in 2006 has doubled by Law 131 (Figure 1). The first region carrying 
out the elections in the total 128 municipalities in February 2005 was the Republic of 
Kalmuikiya
xxiv. At the same time, all the municipalities have adopted the new 
regulations. 
 
The most decisive problems lay in the reorganization of municipalities. In spite of the 
needs of the local consensus (referendum), some regions simplified the process with 
the support from the deputies. Especially, concerning the status of municipalities, 
more than 80 % of the former municipalities lost their competence
xxv. There were 
some cases that oblast legislative assembly did not agree with the residents’ demands, 
and the latter were not always upheld by judicial decisions.   
 
The demarcation of local self-government powers has brought about conflicts over 
diminished functions. In particular powers in the social sphere were concentrated in 
the hand of municipal districts, which deteriorated service provision. Many regions 
 
30restricted the new municipalities’ authorities on the problems of local significance
xxvi 
and they stimulated settlements to transfer their authority to municipal districts which 
were directly given subvention from oblast budget. Although the region could 
determine the regional standard of medical service which exceeded the national 
standard, the rule did not function due to Law 131 (Article 18). The demarcation of 
property has also been the subject of conflicts between settlements and municipal 
districts. Moreover, the provision of powers to the municipalities was not legally or 
formally determined by the region. Redistribution of ownership among municipalities 
has often caused interests conflicts among concerned. In order to register the property, 
municipalities need to pay the state duty. 
 
Concerning the management of the local self government, Law 131 permits election 
of the head in municipalities from deputies and employment of manager in executive 
organs
xxvii. Moreover, in 2005 Law 93 determined candidates of the local self 
-government from the political parties, and United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya) has 
become a very active player in all the regions
xxviii.  
 
The political trend may show the strong state vertical control, the intervention of the 
region, and conflicts among the new municipalities, especially in the two tier 
municipalities and redistribution of authorities. In short, regions have kept control, 
and so many municipalities have lacked not only formal qualifications to deal with the 
local governments but also resources to execute their authorities. 
 
 
Strong state or weak state 
 
The vertical line cannot be restricted in the field of local self-government. The year 
2003 can be regarded as a turning point of the economic development in Russia. Now 
Russia may be said to be a model of State Capitalism. From 2003 the government has 
drastically changed its course to the state capitalism way. In the economic field, the 
Yukos affair may well regarded as a turning point and after that the government 
adopted the specific measures for intervention (Yukos model or Shibneft model)
xxix. At 
the same time, the external economic policy has also dual meaning. On the one hand, 
the government has shown the positive attitude toward globalization and 
Europeanization: G8, the WTO entry negotiation; liberalization of capital account; 
intention to join the OECD in 2006. On the other hand, Russia has opposed to the 
west: energy price policy to the EU; energy blackmail to concerned countries (near 
abroad and distant abroad)
xxx. 
 
As background factors of policy change, the following can be raised: state capitalism 
concept, global competition and state security, rent-seeking by government, formation 
of new (official) oligarchs. 
 
The Putin government has strengthened the intervention policies as follows: selection 
of global strategic enterprises and industry, industrial policy, restrictions to the foreign 
capital in the strategic sectors, the role of the government. The government decided 
priority projects in infrastructure like health, education, housing, agriculture, and 
Investment Fund with joint public-private partnerships was established in the federal 
budget. Moreover, the government started the creation of special economic zones to 
foster economic diversification and innovation
xxxi. As all the measures of intervention 
31are called institutions of development (growth), the contemporary stage of 
transformation can be called as a reorganization of formal institutions. 
 
Then, how can we judge the strength of the state? Generally speaking, the Putin 
regime may be regarded as a ‘strong hand’. Due to the despotic measures with the 
enthusiastic popular support, the vertical ruling in administration and the intervention 
policy in the economic sphere have strengthened the Russian statehood. As the 
constitutional regime in Yeltsin era was weakened by the reforms, the Putin style 
seems to contribute to regaining the constitutional regime. 
 
However, we cannot measure the strength of the state by the absolutist style and 
despotic behavior of Putin. When the bureaucracy is fragile and there is no trust from 
the inhabitants, the laws cannot be protected strictly enough. Corruption may be 
raised as an indicator of the untrustworthy state. According to Transparency 
International, Russia cannot escape its miserable position in Corruption Perception 
Index Ranking
xxxii: 126
th of 159 countries in 2005 and 121
st of 163 countries in 2006. 
The position of Russia is similar with developing countries like Rwanda and Nepal. 
Therefore OECD (2006) emphasized the necessity to improve the quality of public 
administration and characterized Russia as “a weak state but strong officials” or as “a 
weak state with strong components” (p.118). From the bureaucracy and competence 
of bureaucrats, Russia is a weak state. 
What brought about a weak state and untrustworthy bureaucracy? OECD (2006) 
insists that “the state bureaucracy today is a product of Soviet and post Soviet 
state-building” (p.117). The administrative system is inherited from the Soviet 
administration. As “Soviet administration rejects both the separation of political and 
administrative spheres and the autonomy of administrative bureaucracy…the rule 
oriented Weberian model was rejected (p.117)”. The contemporary Russian 
bureaucracy follows the Soviet way far more than any Weberian model. At the same 
time, the Russian bureaucracy inherited a highly personalized administration system. 
All the inheritance has been preserved in the Yeltsin state-building, and all the 
economic actors are forced to adapt preserved inheritance and institutional legacies. 
 
The case of local self-government also clarifies the contemporary Russian 
bureaucracy. Undoubtedly, the local self-government reforms in the mid 1990s 
enlarged local self-government employees. Figure 3 indicates a considerable increase 
in 1997/1998. The severe economic condition stimulates the governments (not only 
local but also federal and regional) to employ officials and civil servants for 
stabilization. Therefore, an increase of employees does not directly show the 
development of safety-nets. In addition, Figure 3 tells us an aspect of effects in Law 
131. Even though Law 131 has enlarged authorities and obligation of local 
self-government, in the mid-2000s, the number of civil servants is unchangeable. 






32Figure 3. Number of Workers in local self-government
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Source: Rossiiskii statisticheskii ezhegodnik, 2004 p.44, 2006 p.44.
 
 
There exists quite a contrary situation. In the Soviet period, the regional leaders were 
supplied from the local committee (obkom) of communist party, and they organized 
clan network
xxxiv based on patron-client relationship. In the transformation period, the 
regional leaders were inherited from the network of the Soviet period. In practice, the 
local Soviets (Ispolkom) kept their organizations in the first stage of the local 
self-government reforms. Moreover, the strong regional leaders came from the former 
Soviet administration and they behaved in the similar way to the Soviet regime
xxxv. 
Regional elites could survive in the Yeltsin period through the leadership of executive 
(ispolkom) of various regional levels and directors of industrial and agricultural 
enterprises, and the democratic measures of the regional government and local 
self-government restricted the recruitment of the regional elites from the non-elite 
classes
xxxvi. As a result, the governor could easily become ‘a ruler of the region’ and 
the mayor could become ‘a ruler of the city’. This scheme, however, has dual 
meaning: fragility of institutions and stabilization (harmonization of interests) in the 




What is an institution in Russia? 
 
New institutional economics examines the nature of institutions and regards them as 
important for reduction of uncertainty. According to Douglas North, 
 
“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the 
33humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they 
structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic. 
Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is 
the key to understanding historical change
xxxviii”. 
 
Institution with a broad meaning includes following points
xxxix: 
(a) formal rules: political rules, economic rules and contracts (their enforcement 
are based on the law and the state agencies and others); 
(b) informal rules: patterns of behavior that are collectively shared (from routines 
to social conventions to ethical codes); 
(c) negative norms and constraints. 
 
From the viewpoint of institution, I will present a transformation framework for 
comparison with that of Campbell (2007) in Figure 4. I characterize the 
transformation process not only from the political legitimacy but also from the 
perspective of institutional arrangements. Russia would evolve from quadrant 1 (State 
Capture, Constitutional Patrimonialism in the paper of Campbell, 2007) to Business 
Capture model (quadrant 4) in 1990s, and under the Putin regime, Russia would move 
to State Capitalism (quadrant 3). In short, formalization of institutions can be regarded 
as the trajectory of Russia through the hand of the bureaucracy. 
 
Figure4. Framework of Transition in Russia 
Constitutional































34However, the change of the trajectory is not so easy for Russia, judging from the local 
self-government reforms. First of all, it is difficult to cut the interests network within 
the local actors and the regional actors operate because they are considerably 
accustomed to the traditional personal relations. Irrespective of ideology, the clan 
network has been institutionalized. Due to lack of expertise and competence of local 
body members and the civil servants, local self-government cannot become a reliable 
body for the inhabitants. At the same time, the regional and the federal body are 
reluctant to leave their authorities and own funds. Thus, dependence on subsidies in 
the local society cannot be removed in the short run even after the legislative reform. 
Secondly, when the social minimum is stressed in the federal level, the voice in favour 
of decentralization is declining. Thirdly, the influence of clan and lobbying cannot be 
ignored, even though Law 131 strengthens the autonomy. When the enterprise has a 
dominant position in the local market (corporate regions), all the inhabitants behave in 
the conservative way. The company itself internalizes the authority of local 
self-government like housing and provision of welfare goods as corporate social 
responsibility. 
 
Besides, even though we admit formalization, how to change from quadrant 3 to 
quadrant 2 will become the next question. Can the local self-government reform by 
Law 131 normalize the state? As far as formal rules between two quadrants (2 and 3) 
are widely different each other, quadrant 2 cannot become a simple perspective of 
Russia  
 
Figure5. Institutional Change of Transformation 
 
 
The above process can be understood regarding institutional change (Figure 5). The 
new institutions cannot be understood as completely imported or transplanted. They 
consist of the formal rules of the western countries and institutions of the former 
















35At the same time, the new institutions cannot stabilize only on the base of formal 
aspect, and rearrangement of informal rules is indispensable. Enforcement of the law 
may be guaranteed by values and behavior. Therefore, institutional change is obliged 
to be incremental. Moreover, institutional rearrangement is path-dependent.   
 
Evolution of local self-government and legislation suggests that the former formal 
institutions and the informal institutions have hardness to survive in the new 
environment and softness to adapt it. In spite of drastic changes in formal rules, new 
institutions involve traditions, networks and regional elites embedded in the local 
society (e.g. ispolkom  and clan). Particularly, Russia has traditions in the vertical 
ruling. “Putin utilized a short-cut in reviving Soviet legacies of rule that either lay 
dormant in the formative experiences of Russian politicians or which survived the 




Above all, informal constraints can survive strongly and deeply.   
 
“Although a wholesale change in the formal rules may take place, at the same 
time there will be many informal constraints that have great survival tenacity 
because they still resolve basic exchange problems among the participants, be 
they social, political, or economic.
xli” 
 
Then, why is enforcement of formal rules weak and why is the institutional adaptation 
strong in the Russian local self-government reforms? To ensure enforcement, good 
governance, trust and motivation mechanism are indispensable (Figure 6). Particularly, 
enforcement is uncertain where there is asymmetry of information. Enforcement 
needs time and costs. 
 
“Creating a system of effective enforcement and of moral constraint on 




In Russia, because of the ambiguity of the Constitution and legal doctrine, and 
because of uncertainty with respect to behavior of the actors, the rulers can still easily 
behave as they please, and they do not follow self-enforcing constraints. Local 
inhabitants also attach importance to certain informal norms, deteriorating further the 
enforcement of formal rules. 
 
 







However, adaptation of institutions can be observed in Russia. Law 131 indicates the 
new rules by which existing institutions are obliged to adapt (governance of the 
federal centre and the region), and complicated interests conflicts among the sub-local 
authorities (municipalities). In other words, the decisive role in revising Law 131 is 
not ideology but natural adaptation and mentality. 
 
The local society also has similar impact to institutionalization. After the 
transformation, “local privileges were granted in return for loyalty. The development 
of civil society was inhibited since these were privileges not to individuals but to 
corporate groups
xliii”. The corporate groups also use the social benefit (fringe benefit) 
to bargain with the region and local self-government for stability and rent-seeking. 
 
Such behavior is strong in the rich territories. In those areas, the dominant enterprise 
captures the regional government and local self-government. For example, Severstal 
in Vologod oblast, Yukos in Evenki, Norilsk Nnikel in Taimuir and Krasnoyarsk krai, 
Rusal in Khakashiya and others. In addition, enterprises in company towns have also 
preserved control over the local society. 
 
The above element is also derived from historical experience. There were two types of 
community inherited from the soviet system: local communities and enterprise 
communities. The new rule and market system cannot create the new community. 
Therefore, Law 131 is not free from these pre-existing communities. 
 
Of course, I have no intention to criticize Russian civil society as fragile. In Japan too, 
local self-government has evolved according to its own historical path. We can 
observe not only formal institutions (continental type) but also informal institutions 
(e.g. neighborhood associations and lobbying groups in the rural area), which 
characterizes the Japanese local self-governance system. Thus, Russia gives us the 
new possibility to compare peculiarities that deviate from the orthodox western model 









i  See Shleifer, Treisman (2004), Roselields (2006), and Hanson, Teague (2005). 
 
ii  The governors mean the heads of 88 regional executive branches. 
 
iii  For example, comment by the Council of Europe, https://wcd.coe.int (30 August 2007). 
 
iv  Sakwa, 2002, p.250. 
 
v  The first election was held in Vladivostok in 29 July 1993, and the election spread out from there. 
 
vi There are various methods of local self-government formation. In Smolensk oblast, not only the 
popular election but also appointment by the contract was utilized. 
 
vii Tishkov, 2007. The COE comprises 47 countries (and 1 applicant country: Belarus) in 2007, and it 
was set up to promote democracy and protect human rights and the rule of law in Europe in 1949. 
Russia sent the representatives of local self-governments to Congress of Local and Regional 
Authorities. See http://www.coe.int. (3 September 2007) 
 
viii The Charter was drawn up within the COE in 1985. 42 countries had ratified the Charter by 
September 2007. 
 
ix Sakwa,  2002,  p.231. 
 
x  Even the military lost its unity, and the legal space also fragmented. In 1997, nearly half the regional 
laws did not conform with the constitution or federal legislation. See Sakwa, 2002, pp.231-237. 
 
xi See  Matsuzato,  1999. 
 
xii See  Turovskii,  2006. 
 
xiii  “High” means three times the national average in Russia and “Low” means a third of the average. 
 
xiv  Subvention and subsidies are given by the federal programme. 
 
xv  See Eremeeva, Kazyukova, Kalantarova, 2006, pp.37-48. 
 
xvi Grant-in-aid  earmarked  for a specific purpose. 
 
xvii  Regions cannot transfer authorities to municipalities without determination of the federal law. 
 
xviii  See Eremeeva, Kazyukova, Kalantarova, 2006, pp.46-47. 
 
xix According to Robert Orttung (2004, p.44), the reforms seek to include Russia’s local governments 
into Russia’s hierarchical state structure even though the constitution formally separates them from the 
state. And the reforms seek to give the federal government much greater control over the local 
government. 
 
xx Orttung,  2004,  p.44. 
 
xxi  Concerning the impacts, see Ragozina, 2006, pp.13-35. 
 
xxii  For a problems in 2005, see Ragosina, 2006, pp.13-35. 
 
xxiii For example, in Shelekhov raion (district) of Irkutsuk oblast, the former single district consists of 
the seven new municipalities: 2 urban settlements, 4 rural settlements, and one municipal district 
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(Vetrov and Lantsev, 2006, p.60). 
 
xxiv  By the beginning of November 2005, 60 thousand deputies of local self governments were elected 
(Ragosina, 2006, p.18). 
 
xxv Angarsk (Irkutsk oblast) changed into urban settlement within the Angarsk municipal district, 
which caused the negative response of residents (Ragosina, 2006, p.18). 
 
xxvi  Leningrad oblast restricted the authority of land disposal in municipalities, and Vladimir oblast 
constrained settlements’ authority on ownership, utilization and disposal of local property (Ragosina, 
2006, p.22). 
 
xxvii  36 regions adopted this model, even though the residents do not agree with it (Ragosina, 2006, 
p.28). 
 
xxviii In  Saratov  oblast, this party accounts for 87 % of the total candidates, and in Tver oblast, the share 
reaches 94 %(Ragosina, 2006, p.29). 
 
xxix  The government has adopted some measures, based on the market mechanism (market transaction 
of control, block shares). 
 
xxx  See Mau, 2007. 
 
xxxi  The special zones in 1990s failed. The new law abolishes the previous zones, and it has two 
categories: technical innovation zones from a part of the government’s innovation strategy, and 
industrial production zones eligible for various tax incentives. 
 
xxxii   See Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2001, 2005, and 2006 
(http://www.transparency.org, 7 September 2007). 
 
xxxiii See  Eremeeva,  Kazyukova,  Kalantarova, 2006, p.46. 
 
xxxiv  The vertical informal organization with common interests (Kosals, 1995, p.6). 
 
xxxv See  Turovskii,  2006,  pp.646-649. 
 
xxxvi  Kruishtanovskaya, 2005, pp.141-144. 
 
xxxvii  In the years of Putin’s presidency, the interests of big business, combined with those of the 
Kremlin, have penetrated into the local society (Goode, 2007. p.386). 
 
xxxviii North,  1990,  p.3. 
 
xxxix  Coriat and Dosi, 2002, p.98. 
 
xl  Goode, 2007, p.388. 
 
xli North,  1990,  p.91. 
 
xlii North,  1990,  p.60. 
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40Local Budget and Local Self-Government in Russia 
 
Kazuho Yokogawa 
Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University 
 
 
After the collapse of Soviet Union, Russian local governments have received in the 
new Constitution a status of local autonomous bodies, which is separate from the state 
authority and has the right to solve local problems by themselves. However, Law 131 
on local self-government, which is adopted in 2003 under the centralization policy of 
Putin’s administration, had the effect of lessening the autonomy of municipalities and 
drawing them back into the vertical line of state control. 
 
 
Points of the paper by Adrian Campbell 
 
The paper by Adrian Campbell focused on the discussion behind the adoption of Law 
131 and revealed that Kozak Commission, which had prepared a draft of the law, did 
not necessarily intended to retreat the local self-government in Russia, rather it 
thought to create power balance between three levels of government: federal, regional 
and local. The attitude of the Commission, which the author explored through 
participation to sessions and interviews with commission members are informative for 
us, and so are the reasons why their idea was not realized. The author showed that 
Law 131 was a product of compromise between Commission and Federal Council, the 
representatives of Russian sub-federal interests, and it implies Russian ‘state vertical’, 
which seems so robust, holds also the fragility inside. As a result, local 
self-government was sacrificed for power balance between federal and regional 
governments.  
 
Campbell used the Robinson’s theoretical framework and showed Putin’s reform 
should take the two-stage approach from Constitutional Patrimonialism to 
Constitutional Bureaucracy through Absolutist Bureaucracy. It is logical to think 
Russia needs strong centralized state to establish the rules at present. But whether 
Russia will head for a Western democratic, pluralistic model of state at next stage will 
be controversial, because difficulty of Russia’s transition towards local democracy has 




Institution building by centralized state 
 
In this paper, I briefly introduce the impact of Law 131 on local budget reform in 
Russia. The law is often criticized by those who advocate self-government for the 
reason that it deprived municipalities their autonomy. Actually, following the adoption 
of Law 131, there were amendments to Budget Code and Tax Code in 2004
ii, which 
brought concrete reform to the local fiscal system corresponding to the Law 131. It 
can be said that these laws have two-fold effects for the realization of Russian local 
self-government. 
 
At first, the structure of municipal budget was changed from one-tier system created 
41under the previous law on Russian local self-government in 1995 to two tiers, and 
now not only municipal districts (munitsipaliny raion) and cities (gorodskoi okrug), 
but also rural and urban settlements (seliskoe i gorodskoe poselenie) under the 
jurisdiction of municipal districts, and territories inside the cities of federal 
significance got their own representative organ and budget. So, the reform did make 
progress in the sense that it enabled governance at the level closest to its residents.   
 
Also, local budget under old legislation lacked the clearly defined law on its revenue 
base and expenditure assignment, and its management often depended on the informal 
arrangement. But the reform clearly divided expenditure responsibility among levels 
of government, in order to resolve the unfunded federal mandates which resulted from 
the ambiguous division of expenditure responsibility, and it gave all municipalities 
rule-based revenue source, including taxes and transfers from upper government. So 
we can say the reform had positive effect in establishing the fiscal system based on 
formal rules.   
 
But at the same time, we can see the tendency of centralization of Russian budget 
system, which can be described as ‘ogosudarstvlenie’ (statization)
iii. It means that as a 
result of adoption of Law 131, almost a half of local budget must be spent for the 
expenditure responsibility, which is delegated by federal and regional government, 
and revenues for that is given from the upper levels of government in a form of 
subvention (subventsiya). Besides, size of local budget was around 10% of GDP in 
mid-1990 but it shrunk to about 6% after 2000, though regional budget keeps almost 
the same size, 10% as in 1990s. So, now local governments have smaller budget than 
before, and contents of budget is more controlled by upper governments, not by local 
residents. 
 
Thus, we can see the institution building is going on by the centralized state in the 
field of public finance. Law 131 contributed to a creation of rule-based local budget 
system, strengthening the vertical control toward local fiscal management. 
 
 
Struggle over tax source between regional and local government 
 
However, precedent reform program up to 2005
iv, which was leaded by Alexei Lavrov 
of Ministry of Finance, aimed to reduce dependence of local budget on regional 
government and give local level broader tax source than before. In 1990s, formal tax 
source of municipal government was very limited and local fiscal management was 
under the control of regional government. So, it was a reform which respects more the 
balance of federal, regional and local governments. But actual reform didn’t proceed 
along the program and gave way to the Law 131 later. Why? 
 
To take an example, according to the government program up to 2005, federal 
government aimed to give municipality property tax as their original tax source, into 
which corporate property tax, personal property tax and land tax should have been 
integrated. But after all, this integration didn’t realize because regional governments, 
which possess corporate property tax, the biggest source of these three taxes, resisted 
delivering this tax to the local level. In the process of Putin’s reform of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations, the federal center tried to take back the control over 
taxes which it had devolved to some regional governments in the 1990s in order to 
42recover lost state integrity, so we can assume that the federal government couldn’t 
help making some concession in return to regional governments, keeping their tax 
revenue up whilst sacrificing a municipal tax source. 
 
 
Change in local budget structure 
 
How did the structure of local budget change under Law 131? The law has executed 
since 2006 with transitional period of 2006-2009, so it is still difficult to analyze the 
change based on budget data (Besides, Russian ministry of finance stopped opening 
local budget data since 2005). Here, I will comment on changes in local expenditure 
and revenue structure which have happened under Putin’s reform until Law 131, and 
some perspectives after adoption of the law. 
 
Expenditure by Russian local government since 2000 showed remarkable changes. 
Local government had initially played an important role in budgeting housing and 
utility service, education, and health. One of the biggest changes was reduction of 
expenditure on housing and utility service. Its share in total expenditure was almost 
30% in 2000 but diminished to 18.5% in 2004
v. The reason of this is deeply 
connected with reform of housing and utility service by federal government. Russian 
government is trying to reduce subsidies to housing and utility service and raise the 
price of the service, because the cheap housing and utility service is regarded as a 
legacy of socialism and too costly. It is important that federal government prohibited 
local government from spending fiscal transfers from upper level of government on 
subsidy to housing and utility service. That is why local government lost resource for 
the subsidy.   
 
Also, expenditure on social policy by local government has increased in the same 
period from less than 5% to 8%. Expenditure on industry and construction increased 
sharply from 1% in 2000 to 8% in 2004. The social policy included a number of 
unfunded federal mandates, and according to the reform program, it was obliged that 
federal and regional government have to take responsibility to compensate fund to 
localities to realize these mandates. So, we can say the policy concerning fiscal 
transfer to local budgets plays an important roll in the structural change of local 
budget expenditure. 
 
On the revenue side, share of tax revenue in total revenue of local budget have been 
steady decreasing from 68% in 2000 to 52% in 2004, and according to an estimation, 
it would decrease to less than 30% under the Law 131
vi. The biggest tax revenue of 
local government was personal income tax (PIT) and local government had been 
keeping more than half of the tax. But regional government extended its right over 
PIT while its revenue grew, and under the Law 131 municipal budget in total can get 
only 30% from PIT revenue.   
 
Now rural and urban settlements are given tax revenue from land tax, personal 
property tax, 10% of PIT and some other, municipal districts are practically left 
without its original tax base but 20% of PIT, and city district have tax base both of 
settlements and districts. Russian local governments have lost a lot of tax source 
which they had in 1990s, and now only a limited tax source was left for them, because 
land tax and personal property tax are still small in Russia. The change means that 
43local governments have lost authority and fiscal incentives to intervene to the local 
economic activity through tax system, as it did in 1990s. 
 
Instead, the share of kinds of transfers from upper budget in total revenue have grown 
from about 28% in 2000 to over 40% in 2004, and would increase to almost 2/3 of 
total revenue
vii. Especially subventions, which are given for the expenditure of 
national meaning, delegated to local budgets according to the decision of federal and 
sub-federal governments, should drastically increase. Thus, the management of local 
budget is now largely under the control of federal and regional government, and its 
autonomy in fiscal policy has became very limited. 
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44The Struggle for Power in the Urals 
 
 
Adrian Campbell and Elena Denezhkina 




Eduard Rossel  Governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast (from 1991 to present, not including 1993-5). First 
on current United Russia regional list. Formerly founder of ‘Transformation of the 
Urals’ and ‘For Native Urals’. 
Arkady 
Chernetsky 
Mayor of Ekaterinburg from 1992 to present. Second on United Russia regional list. 
Founder of ‘Our Home Our City’, formerly regional leader of ‘Fatherland’ 
(Otechestvo), later deputy regional leader of United Russia. President of the Union 
of Russian Cities.  
Vladislav 
Surkov 
Deputy Head of Presidential Administration, responsible for work with social and 




Presidential Representative, Urals Federal District (since 2001) 
Yuri Osintsev  1st Deputy Mayor  (1999-01) then Minister of External Affairs,, Sverdlovsk 
Oblast(2001-4), then Chair of Oblast  Chamber  of Representatives (upper house of 
Sverdlovsk Duma). Previously ally of Chernetsky, then of Vorobyev/Rossel. Mayoral 
candidate in 2003. Member of Federation Council (senator) 
Alexei Vorobev  Premier of Sverdlovsk Oblast Administration 1997-2006 
Yakov Silin  Chair of Ekaterinburg City Duma (1997-2005) Ally of Chernetsky  
Alexander 
Levin 
Rossel’s press secretary and chief of staff since 1991. In charge of political/election 
strategy and PR. Acting head of United Russia in Sverdlovsk Oblast since 2006.  
Vladimir 
Tungusov 
Deputy Mayor since 1997.The ‘Grey cardinal’.  Head of Chernetsky’s political and 
media team.  
Sergei    Tushin    Chief political analyst for Chernetsky and Tungusov. Head of public relations 
operations Reputedly ex-FSB. Now Mayor’s chief of staff. .  
Vitaly Smirnov  1
st Deputy Mayor of Ekaterinburg until 2006, subsequently deputy of Oblast Duma.   
Galina 
Kovalyeva 
Sverdlovsk Oblast Minister of Economy until 2006, subsequently worked for Anatoly 
Chubais at RAO ES (national electricity supplier).  
Yevgeny 
Porunov 
Chair of Oblast Duma until 2004, subsequently chair of City Duma. Ally of 
Chernetsky.  
Anton  Bakov  State Duma deputy since 2002. Formerly deputy of Oblast Duma., Political   
adventurer. Sometime ally of both Rossel and Chernetsky/Tungusov 
Alexander 
Burkov 
Leader of ‘May’ protest movement, later deputy head of Oblast administration,  top 
of regional list for Party of Justice. Ally of Bakov.  
Alexander 
Khabarov 
Leader of OPS Uralmash criminal society (‘Uralmash Social and Political Union’, 




Co-Leader of OPS Uralmash, City Duma Deputy and member of Oblast Chamber of 
Representatives 2001-5 Alleged ally of Rossel 
Maksim 
Serebrennikov 
Member of OPS Uralmash,, City Duma deputy 2001-5, formed  inter-regional group 
of deputies. Ally of Osintsev. Mayoral candidate in 2003 
Victor 
Maslakov 
Head of Economy Department, Ekaterinburg City Administration (until 2001), then 
Oblast Deputy Minister for Property. Ally of Osintsev.   
Alexander 
Vysokinsky 
Replaced Maslakov as head of economy department of city. Coordinated 
preparation of city strategy document 
Jan Gabinsky  City duma deputy, Party of Life, ally of  Levin/Rossel. Mayoral candidate in 2003. 
Yevgeny 
Royzman 
Former associate of OPS Uralmash. Elected to State Duma 2004. Leader of ‘Party 
of Life’ forming part of federal ‘Party of Justice’. .  
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  “..A paradox arose; mayors of regional capitals, also directly-elected, claimed 
themselves independent from the authorities of the corresponding regional level and 
free to pursue a policy of their own – in doing so they were supported by the Law on 
Local Self-Government. How come the largest city of the region with a quarter of 
region’s population in it, a city having a colossal economy… is not under the control 
of region’s authorities?  It was the beginning of a war..between Edward Rossel, the 
Governor of Sverdlovsk Region, and Arkady Chernetsky, the Mayor of Ekaterinburg. 




“They say that, in our country, personality drives out institutions. It seems to me that 






The aim of this paper is to analyse the evolution of the conflict between governor 
Sverdlovsk Oblast (region) and the mayor of the regional capital, Ekaterinburg 
(formerly Sverdlovsk) over the period from the early 1990s up to 2007. Conflicts 
between governors and the mayors of regional capitals were the rule rather than the 
exception in Russia during the 1990s
iii. However this conflict was sustained and 
intense to a degree not encountered elsewhere. In the process we will consider the 
nature of the participants and the ideas that appeared to inform their stance during the 
struggle, in order to see whether, as Matsuzato implies
iv the protagonists were 
interchangeable or whether there were genuine ideological differences between the 
two sides.  
 
Secondly, although different forms of illegality and criminality were hardly a rarity in 
the Russian provinces during the period covered, it was Sverdlovsk which was the 
example usually held up if one wished to advance the thesis that Russian was 
descending into bandit capitalism or that the state was becoming criminalised. 
Sverdlovsk Region, and Ekaterinburg in particular became known as a key centre of 
organised crime from the late 1980s onwards. By the late 1990s, not only had major 
groups succeeded in legalising their substantial role in the economy what was now a 
booming region, but the largest group, OPS Uralmash,  had become a major actor in 
its own right in the politics of the region.  This process reached a watershed during the 
Ekaterinburg mayoral election of 2003, in which the theme of organised crime 
dominated the campaign.  The paper starts from the assumption that there are links 
between the protracted nature of the struggle for power and the high visibility of 
organised crime in regional politics, although the nature of that relationship is not 
direct nor simple.  
 
Thirdly the paper attempts to situate the Sverdlovsk epic into a narrative of the 
development of the Russian State from the chaos that followed the collapse of the 
Soviet Union to the stabilisation and centralisation of the Putin era. This history has 
for many acquired the characteristics of a moral tale, although the choice of heroes 
and villains varies – from those who see a once-weak State being rebuilt under Putin 
in order to save the country from the depredations of the governors
v, to those who see 
a democratic dawn in the early 1990s usurped by a resurgent bureaucracy
vi. Here we 
  46are confronted by the traditional Russian dilemma – which should be supreme, State 
of Society? This history and its implicit dilemmas are addressed by Shlapentokh
vii 
through the traditional opposition of Locke and Hobbes. The fall of the USSR reduced 
Russia initially to what Locke refers to as ‘the state of nature’, in the sense of the 
absence of a law-based state
viii. However whereas Locke sees the state of nature as  
(potentially) providing the basis for civil society and collaboration between equals 
and (again, potentially) quite distinct from the state of war, which occurs when one 
person tries to place another under their power 
ix , Hobbes sees a the state of nature 
leading naturally to a state of war of each against all only avoided though the   
assertion and acceptance of a sovereign power.  Shlapentokh’s reading is that Locke’s 
assumption was tested to destruction by the democrats who took power in the early 
1990s. Russia’s democrats both at federal and sub-national levels were seen to have 
underestimated the importance of statehood, being more preoccupied with market 
reforms, in line with the dominant paradigm of the period, which emphasised 
ownership not institutions or rule of law
x. As a result, a hybrid society ‘liberal 
feudalism’ had been created in which a market economy underpinned a civil society 
of the strong, rather than the equality before the law implicit in Locke’s civil society.  
 
Developing Shlapentokh’s argument one may argue that what he terms ‘liberal 
feudalism’ has the fundamental defect in that, due the contradiction between its two 
components – liberalism and feudalism, it operates in a moral or ideological vacuum. 
This, and not just the absence of a common state authority and legal base, means that 
it is likely to remain mired in what Hobbes terms the state of war, a struggle without 
justice – ‘where there is no common power, there is no law, no injustice’
xi In the early 
1990s Russia this was exemplified by what was (usually disparagingly) referred by 
the public in the as ‘bor’ba za vlast’’, the struggle for power, the endless spectacle of 
different groups within the elite struggling for supremacy. This state of affairs, 
according to the Hobbesian argument could only be brought to a close through an 
energetic re-assertion of the state, very much along the lines of what Vladimir Putin 
has achieved since 2000.   
 
However the question is not whether the State should have been re-asserted, but 
whether this is sufficient condition to end the ‘state of war’ or, indeed, whether a 
‘state of war’ should be annulled altogether. It is with this question in mind that we 
have reconstructed the narrative of the longest power struggle, that of Sverdlovsk and 
Ekaterinburg.   
 
The paper draws on research over a long period and through different means. Initial 
visits were made in 1993-5 to analyse the development of federal-regional and 
regional local relations. There followed a period of intense participant observation in 
2000-3 during which the authors were directly involved in the development and 
implementation of a strategic plan for the city of Ekaterinburg
xii (which for a brief 
period in the Spring of 2003 was the main focus of political conflict), followed by 
documentary research of local media and a follow-up visit in 2007. Due to the nature 
of the subject matter and the fact that most of those involved are still in post in what 
remains a highly sensitive political environment, we have made relatively little use of 
direct quotation from interviews or conversations, but have rather let the insight from 
these inform our reading of printed sources.  
 
  47Although personalities were not (we would argue) the main cause, the conflict was 
manifested as a war of attrition between two strong personalities and it would be 
difficult to present the narrative without reference to a range of personalities who 
played key roles ion the conflict. To make the narrative more accessible we have 
included a list of dramatis personae and a chronology of events throughout the period 
(Table 1).  
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Table 1 Chronology of the Struggle for Power in Ekaterinburg   
 
Year   Russian Federation 
 
Sverdlovsk Oblast (region)  Ekaterinburg 
(city) 
1990  First multi-party elections in 
soviets (councils) at all levels 




majority on city 
council.  
1991 Boris  Yeltsin  elected 
first  president of Russian 
Federation 
Dissolution of USSR 
Eduard Rossel appointed first  
Governor   
 
Rossel establishes  
Association for Economic Co-






Fall of USSR and Communist Party lead to unravelling of soviet system and consequent power vacuum 
leads in turn to conflict initially on horizontal axis between executive and legislative branches of power 
and on vertical axis between federal, regional and municipal power.   
1992  Federal Treaty   
 
Tension over asymmetrical 
federalism (differential 
conditions for ethnic republic 
and other Russian regions)  
Rossel develops support for the idea of 
the Urals republic both in Sverdlovsk 






Authority is maintained by system of appointed executives at regional and city level, reducing power of 
councils. Regional attempts to strengthen itself against the centre, taking advantage of 
executive/legislative conflict at federal level.  City seeks to remove itself from regional control 
especially on economic and land use planning. 
1993 ‘October  Events’  – 
(suppression of 
parliamentary insurrection) 
Adoption of Federal 
Constitution 
Rossel declares ‘Urals Republic’ (up-
grading the status of Sverlovsk 
Oblast’(July)  
 
Rossel sacked by Yeltsin and replaced 
by Strakhov  (1
st Dep. Mayor of 
Ekaterinburg) 
 
Regional council abolished by 
presidential decree  
Conflict between 
mayor and council 
leads to resignation 






Defeat of parliamentary insurrection in Moscow leads to abolition of councils at regional and city 
levels, to be replaced by weaker assemblies/dumas.   
1994    Rossel elected chair of new oblast 
duma 
New city duma 
elected.  
Resolution of horizontal conflict will bring vertical conflict to centre stage, once elections for governor 
are introduced.  
1995  Law on General Principles of 
Local Government in the 
Russian Federation 
(strengthens position of 




Rossel’s Transformation of 
the Fatherland (the federal 
version of his regional party) 
contests federal State Duma 
elections, but with limited 
success.   
Election for Governor (September) 
Strakhov  (supported by Kremlin and 
Our Home is Russia) defeated by 
Rossel (supported by Bakov and own 
Transformation of the Urals Party) in 
2nd round.   
 
 
Election for Mayor 
(December).  
Bakov (supported 
by Rossel ) 
defeated by 




Our Home Our City 
political party. 
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power’* (in this case Our Home is Russia) cannot win in region without support from existing regional 
elite.  Similarly the regional elite proves unable to dislodge city elite. City elite now allied with federal   
centre against regional elite. Both oblast and city levels now have their own ‘parties of power’ which 
are stronger than federal parties in the region. 
1996-
1997 
Boris Yeltsin wins 
presidential election with 
support of ‘oligarchs’ 
Rossel signs agreement between 
Sverdlovsk Oblast and federal centre, 
covering powers and finance. This is 
the first bi-lateral agreement between 
an Oblast and the centre (such 
agreements later came to epitomise 







the head of his 
political team, as 
Deputy Mayor 
Election campaign- PR capacity and activity becomes key theme in regional politics. Regional and city 
elites compete to control mass media as election campaigning through highly polarised and partisan 
coverage become a permanent feature, City and regional elites back candidates for elections to each 
other’s legislatures.   
1998 
 
Financial crisis and ‘default’ 
weaken federal centre. De 
facto decentralisation of 
power to governors,  
Chernetsky and Tungusov’s Our 
Home our City heavily defeats 
Rossel’s Transformation of the Urals 
in Oblast Duma elections.  
 
Businesses gravitate towards either Rossel’s Transformation of the Urals or Chernetsky’s Our Home 
Our City. 
1999  Vladimit Putin appointed as 
Premier 
 
Resignation of Boris Yeltsin  
 
Vladimir Putin appointed 
acting president 
Election for Governor of Sverdlovsk 
Oblast:  Zhironovsky disqualified from 
running for governor. Series of alleged 
attacks on property of Chernetsky 
supporters.  ‘May’ movement populist 
tactics  receive maximum publicity. 
Chernetsky subject of heavy PR 
onslaught and ids pushed into third 
place (15%) behind Bakov ally May 
leader Burkov  (17%), with Rossel in 
first place (30%). On second round PR 
resources are turned against Burkov 
and Rossel win by wide margin.  
 
Khabarov, now leader of Uralmash 
criminal society changes its name to   
Uralmash Political Union and enters 
politics. 
Election for Mayor 
(December). 
Oblast-backed 






head of regional 
branch of  
‘Otechestvo’ 
(Fatherland Party 
headed by Moscow 
Mayor Luzhkov).  
 
 
Regional elite appears to use decoy movement to beat off challenge from city elite (a tactic more usual 
at federal level).  City elite strengthen links with federal level through activism in successive federal 
‘parties of power’.  Isolated regional elite appears to strengthen links with legalised organised crime.  
2000  Vladimir Putin elected 
President.  
Rossel’s former ally, Bakov publicly 
breaks with Rossel.  
 
OPS Uralmash leader Kruk ‘suicide’ 
in Sofia 
Chernetsky elected 
President of the 
Union of Russian 
Cities.  
Re-assertion of federal authority and ascendancy of city elite puts region on the defensive.  Contact 
between the regional elite and OPS Uralmash gang (who have allegedly supported Rossel since the 
election of 1995) becomes systematic, following the re-launch of the gang as a business and political 
organisation.  
City elite begins major project of Strategic Plan, which may reinforce the city’s autonomy. Other major 
projects, such as hosting the Urals-Siberia exhibition balance or outflank the regions defence industry 
exhibition and economic forum.  
  502001  Establishment  of  seven 
Federal Districts – 
Ekaterinburg designated 
capital of Urals Federal 
District 
 
End to governors’ ex officio 
membership pf Federal 
Council 
 
Establishment of Kozak 
Commission on distribution 
of powers between levels of 
government.  
Porunov (supported by Chernetsky and 
United Russia) elected chair of Oblast 
Duma   Attempt by Rossel to remove 
him leads to suspension of work of 
Oblast Duma.  
 
Obast Deputy Satovsky (ally of 
Burkov) assassinated ( 
 
Dispute between Rossel and incoming 
President’s Representative Latyshev   
 
Bakov arrested and questioned over 
assault on oligarch Fedulev during 
forced takeover of Khimmash plant, 











and as ‘curator’ for 





head of regional 
branch of new pro-




Uralmash)  elected 
to City Duma.  
The regional elite, now under pressure through city control of the regional legislature, appears to seek 
to regain the initiative by co-opting the city strategic plan’s initiators.  
2002  Kozak Commission prepares 
draft law on General 
Principles of Local Self-
Government in the Russian 
Federation 
Rossel’s anti-Moscow faction ‘For the 
Native Urals’ wins majority in Oblast 
Duma.  
Khabarov, leader of 
OPS Uralmash 
criminal/political 
society,  is elected, 
to city Duma,, 
(along with four 
colleagues) with 
regional support.   
 
Deputy Mayor 
Tungusov  appears 
to make alliance 
with Bakov   
 
City-raion (district) 
heads replaced in 
advance of 
anticipated tough 
mayoral election.  
The regional elite increasingly rely on the (former) criminal organisation Uralmash to make inroads 
against Chernetsky’s city regime.  The Duma’s anti-mayor bloc, consisting of Uralmash members and 
the inter-regional group, seen as associated with Uralmash and backed by Minister Osintsev, will by 
2002  have reduced the Mayor’s bloc  majority on the Duma to fourteen  out of 27 seats. Chernetsky 
and Tungusov’s grip on the oblast duma is also weakened.  
Having failed to re move Silin from the  post of chair of the Duma the regional elite begin to exert 
pressure on the strategic plan through apparently coordinated action by Minister Osintsev and the 
duma opposition.  This avenue is blocked after a public dispute with international consultants. post of 
chair of the Duma the regional elite begin to exert pressure on the strategic plan through apparently 
coordinated action by Minister Osinstev and the duma opposition.  This avenue is blocked after a 
public dispute with international consultants (May, 2003)  
  512003  Law on the General 
Principles of Local Self-




Federal policy, having 
appeared pro-municipal and 
anti-region in 2000-2, now 
appears to move towards an 
accommodation with 
regional elites, allegedly in 
order to secure maximum 
result in coming  presidential 
election 
 
Putin and Federal Chancellor 
Schroeder visit hosted by 
Rossel. Visitors impressed 
by completed Cathedral-on-
Spilt-Blood on sight of 
Romanovs’ killing.  
Election for Governor (September). 
On eve of poll Rossel leaves 
Transformation of the Urals and joins 
United Russia, who support him as 
candidate 
Bakov (supported by Chernetsky) 
defeated by Rossel in 2nd round. 
 
Chernetsky-backed United Russia 
deputies on Oblast Duma removed 
from leading posts by the party, which 
is now working with Rossel’s  team. 
 
Osintsev adopted as candidate by 
United Russia, in preference to 
Chernetsky, previously leader of 
United Russia in the region.   
 
However, prior to the second round 
the Oblast authorities have apparently 
been divided between those, such as 
the premier who is seen to back 
Osintsev for Mayor and the Governor 
who is seen to back Gabinsky. Both 
candidates are weakened by a PR 





in city budget 
debate on behalf of 
Oblast (January) 
 
Boycott of city 
strategic plan by 
oblast-backed city 
deputies (April)  
Strategic plan 
ratified by Duma 
(June) 
  
Election for Mayor 
(December) 
Osintsev (supported 
by Rossel) defeated 
by Chernetsky in 
2nd round. He 
result was 
Chernetsky 54%, 
Osintsev 39%, and 
‘none of the above’ 
7%.  
Regional elite succeeds in securing support of federal party of power United Russia, undermining city 
elite and its representatives in Oblast duma. City elite responds with sensationalist campaign by Bakov 
playing anti-mafia card in both elections to embarrass regional elite (and United Russia) over links 
with the Uralmash gang. The campaign acquires genuine public resonance and leads to Chernetsky 
winning a third mayoral election despite this time campaigning against an unprecedented combination 
of the regional elite and United Russia. The campaign demonstrates the limitations of United Russia’s 
capacity in mainstream election campaigns, just as the Rossel’s victory in 1995 demonstrated the 
limitations of the then federal party of power Out Home is Russia. 
  522004 President  Putin elected for 
second term 
 
Direct elections for Governor 
abolished in the wake of 
Beslan tragedy 
 
High profile mass meetings of 
criminal fraternity organised by 
Khabarov to resist increased control 
by Moscow criminal formations 
provoke arrest of leading Uralmash 
criminal/political society figures, 
including Khabarov. 
 
Chernetsky and Rossel make ‘non-
aggression pact’ following 
negotiations between Tungusov and 
Golubitsky, head of governor’s 
administration.  
  
Governors’ political allies, now 
formally representing United Russia 
now have 21 out if 28 oblast duma 
seats.   
However Chernetsky and Tungusov 
have (allegedly) been able to maintain 
influence through negotiations with 
individual deputies and through 
blocking debates by making them 
inquorate. 
Joint development 
projects and plans 
launched between 
city and oblast.  
 




for the first time 
since 1994.  
 
City loses right to 
dispose of (most) 
land without  
Oblast agreement> 
Burkov sees this as 
detrimental to small 
business.  
Pressure from Moscow leads to Chernetsky and Rossel making a non-aggression pact and in a very 
public fashion, with joint walkabouts and tours of public projects. This leads to an acceleration of 
capital projects (such as the new airport terminal and some new area developments which would have 
been difficult to achieve without a degree of co-operation between levels of government. Investment 
from oligarchs such as Vechselberg, and from many other business sources was not forthcoming for 
such projects during the years of the political stand-off. Now Vechselberg is to fund the development of 
the new Akademichesky district.   
 
Partnership between city and oblast partly reflects also the new approach that emerged during the 
Strategic Plan – senior oblast figures had always been included at least on paper in the governing 
board of the city strategic plan, and now this was being carried out in practice (e.g. on the land use 
plan). However the weakened position of the city on land use as a result of the passage of the local 
government reform, Law 131), meant that the city had a greater need to be friendly to the Oblast.  
 
Meanwhile the rapprochement between city and oblast, to say nothing of the embarrassment brought to 
United Russia during the 2003 elections, had left Khabarov exposed (in an echo of Rossel’s past 
resistance to centralism) seeks to resist Moscow crime bosses attempt to impose an overall Moscow-
imposed ‘avtoritet’ (criminal boss) on the region’s criminal system. A large gathering of criminal 
groups to discuss this raises the criminal profile of OPS Uralmash too a level that provokes federal 
agencies into action (although only after the federal State Duma had taken an interest).  
 
 
2005  Putin’s comments on  media-
oriented mayors, seen in 
Sverdlovsk as having been a 
Rossel-inspired attack on 
Chernetsky. Speculation 
about possible abolition of 
elections for mayors 
In prison (January) Khabarov found 
dead. Prosecutor later (2007) declares 
the cause of death to be suicide..  
City Duma 
elections (April) no 
OPS Uralmash 
candidates stand, 
and their allies 
(inter-regional 
group) all lose their 
seats.  
 
Uralmash are eliminated along with most of the pro-oblast opposition in the city duma. There is now a 
nationwide debate on whether elections for mayor are needed.   
  532006  United Russia intervenes to 
prevent passage of  
amendment to law 131 that 
would have abolished 
elections for mayors of 
regional capital cities 
(November)  
Rossel instructs ‘For Native Urals’ 
deputies in Oblast Duma to switch 
their allegiance to United Russia.  
 
Surviving OPS Uralmash leader 
Kukovyakin arrested in Dubai after 
evading arrest in the RF.  
 
United Russian showing some division over the elected mayors issue with those in favour of elections 
still able to use a veto to prevent abolition. Among the reasons is almost certainly the view that 
autonomous local government insures the state against over mighty regions, as well as the view that 
city autonomy provides the basis for a democratic society and  sine qua non of European approval.  
2007  Series of high-profile cases 
of mayors being dismissed 
on corruption charges 
 
President Putin accepts 
invitation to take first place 
on United Russia list for the 
State Duma elections of 
December, 2007. United 
Russia is now fully the 
President’s party, thereby 
marginalizing ‘Just Russia’ 
which had also had 
presidential backing. 
 
Rossel and Chernetsky are both called 
in for separate interviews with Surkov 
(presidential administration). In 
exchange for commitment to deliver 
high United Russia vote in Duma 
elections, Rossel and Chernetsky are 
given respectively the first and second 
places on the United Russia list in the 
region. 
 
Former Uralmash associate and 
potential mayoral candidate Evgeny 
Royzman and other leaders of ‘Just 
Russia’ are replaced on that party’s 
regional list by group headed by 
Alexander Burkov (reportedly with 
assistance from mayor’s allies).  
 
Acting regional head of United Russia, 
Alexander Levin, proposes to Burkov 
that if he join United Russia, thereby 
withdrawing ‘Just Russia’ from 
standing for election in Sverdlovsk,  
he will be given full support to run as 









from standing in 




proposal that in 
future mayoral 
elections should 
have one round. 
However the Oblast 
Duma rejects the 
second part of the 
proposal, that in the 





appoint a winner 
(the number of 
candidates is 
usually such that 
Chernetsky wins 
only on second 
round) 
For a period Chernetsky appeared to be under pressure through the use of legal instruments, as 
applied to a number of other mayors (and governors) but this approach does not seem to have been 
favoured by United Russia. A similar pattern has characterised federal policy towards the big cities – 
rumours of elections for large city mayors being considered for abolition, followed by a rejection of 
this by the United Russia leadership. 
 
The federal level political team rely on regional bosses to deliver the vote but, due to abolition of 
gubernatorial elections the former can exert pressure on them to deliver a higher result. Rossel is first 
to be called in and first to agree. Titov (governor of Samara) faced with similar conditions, resigns. 
The Kremlin appears to accept that Rossel and Chernetsky are more likely to deliver than any 
externally-imposed officials. This does not mean that their rivalry is over. Rossel’s team appear to be 
trying to combine the removal of ‘Just Russia’ from the regional election (thereby increasing United 
Russia’s share of the vote) with once again turning a Chernetsky ally (Burkov) into an anti-Chernetsky 
candidate, this time without the ‘baggage’ of an OPS Uralmash connection 
2008  Presidential election (March)    March – election 
for mayor.  
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Sverdovsk Region and Ekaterinburg 
 
Strategically situated on the Europe-Asia, and with a population of 4.6m Sverdlovsk 
is one of the most populous of Russia’s Subjects of the Federation. It is also one of the 
most developed economically, having been a centre of industrialisation from the 18
th 
century, which saw the establishment of substantial metallurgical capacity and the 
region remains a major source of copper and a range of ferrous and non-ferrous 
metals. The region saw considerable development throughout the Soviet period, not 
only as a result of the five-year plans but also through the large-scale evacuation of 
war production from besieged Leningrad and Moscow. Two of the Soviet Union’s 
largest factories were sited in the region – the Uralvagonzavod in Nizhniy Tagil and 
the mechanical engineering plant ‘Uralmash’, which constitutes an entire district of 
the regional capital Ekaterinburg (Sverdlovsk during Soviet times). In the post war 
period defence industry continued to expand, with the addition of new sectors such as 
biological weapons (at Sverdlovsk 17 in Ekaterinburg) and missile technologies.  The 
scale of defence production in the city, and its strategic importance in high technology 
defence research was recognised by the Soviet authorities by Sverdlovsk 
(Ekaterinburg) having its own line, separate from that of the region, in Gosplan state 
economic plans.  
 
The pattern of industrial development has meant that, after Moscow, St Petersburg 
and Moscow Region, Sverdlovsk is the most urbanised of Russia’s Regions (over 4m 
urban inhabitants), the majority of the population living either in Ekaterinburg (1.3m) 
or in the belt of industrial towns which surrounds Ekaterinburg in the South of the 
region
xiv.  The concentration of defence high technology research and development 
facilities meant that Ekaterinburg (a closed city until 1992) possesses a high 
concentration of what was in soviet times termed the ‘scientific technical 
intelligentsia’. As a result the city became a centre of progressive politics, and closely 
associated with Boris Yeltsin who was Party First Secretary for the region 1976-85. In 
the first multi-party elections in 1990, Ekaterinburg (then under its soviet-era name of 
Sverdlovsk) was one of only three large Russian cities to return a large majority of 
pro-reform candidates.  
 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union 1991, and the subsequent massive 
reduction in Russian defence procurement budgets, the city’s economy – in terms of 
its large industrial enterprises) almost ground to a halt in the early 1990s.  This was 
partly compensated in the mid 1990s by increased commercial and service sector 
development. Since the Russian default crisis of 1998, the city has seen increased 
prosperity due to four main factors: a) partial restoration of the heavy industrial 
sectors, through defence export orders, b) considerable increase in consumer goods 
production, substituting for imports c) expansion of the city’s retailing, financial and   
professional services sectors, d) proximity to the booming oil-fields of Western 
Siberia (Tyumen Region).  These trends have helped to create the most noticeable 
symptom of increased prosperity, a major expansion of construction, especially of 
residential and commercial properties (notably retail/leisure centres).  In 2003 
Ekaterinburg received a medal for the fastest growth of any Russian city, a 
considerable achievement when the Russian economy was growing overall by 7 per 
cent per annum.   
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covers thirteen regions and population of over twenty million. It is the major higher 
education centre in the wider region, with a total of nineteen universities.  For several 
years the city has enjoyed the highest levels of growth in retail and commerce, (and 
highest property prices) of all cities outside Moscow and St Petersburg. The city has 
seen a shift in industrial profile with more profitable enterprises being found in the 
food, drink and consumer products sectors than in traditional defence sectors (a shift 
less pronounced in the smaller cities in the regions where industry is primarily heavy 
and defence-oriented. As a result, by 2000, the city of Ekaterinburg accounted for 
over sixty per cent of the economy of Sverdlovsk Region and over eighty per cent of 
its service sector income.   
 
The regional economy has thus been at the intersection of two separate economic 
trends, one of which benefited the both region and city (increased defence orders for 
the Russian military, and, more significantly for South and East Asia).  The second 
trend, the expansion of service and consumer industries, has benefited Ekaterinburg,  
but the rest of the region only indirectly.  
 
This has an impact on the economic strategies of the city and regional levels. The 
region has pursued an active but traditional strategy emphasising support for defence 
and heavy industry. The city, on the other hand has in recent years been pursuing a 
consciously post-industrial strategy, on the European model, promoting the city as a 





The factors outlined above provide the background to a power struggle between the 
heads of the city and region that has outlasted all other such mayor-governor conflicts 
in the Russian Federation, running consistently from 1995. The reasons for the 
conflict are broadly the same as in other regions in the Russian federation. Most 
regions are monocentric, with one large city that accounts for a large proportion of the 
population and a higher proportion of its economy. This gives the regional leadership 
an incentive to try to gain control of a city budget and its commercial revenues, and 
the commercial sectors that fall within the city’s rather than the city’s planning remit. 
Control of land use has, until recently been ambiguous and open to acrimonious 
disputes between city and region. The political culture tends towards political-
business alliances and these will seek to minimise the power of the others to reduce 
their influence. Finally the governors, as a general rule, have in many cases been 
uncomfortable with the notion that cities are not subordinate, especially as the larger 
cities have the ability to influence the region’s economic performance.  
 
Why has the power struggle been mayor and governor been so durable in the case of 
Ekaterinburg and Sverdlovsk Region?  In most similar cases mayors were forced out 
of office or gave in to pressure before the end of one term of office or were beaten in 
elections. Three factors may be cited. Firstly the regional and city economies are 
strong enough to support to two rival political regimes over a long period – in many 
other cities the mayor will not have had a strong economic base. Secondly the region 
and city has a lively political culture
xv, a high level of education and political 
awareness and a wide range of institutes, associations and commercial and non-
  56commercial organisations that may be mobilised in support of one side or the other. 
By the late 1990s and afterwards this had translated into an media industry in which 
mayor and governor had 2-3 television channels with associated PR organisations 
dedicated entirely to an unremitting daily struggle to gain the advantage over the other 
side. 
 
However a major factor has been the personalities of the persons concerned
xvi. Unlike 
in some other mayor-governor contests, particularly in the early years, where, for 
example, an academic, NGO activist or entrepreneur might find themselves up against 
a seasoned bureaucrat or enterprise manager.  In this case both mayor and governor 
had been senior managers in heavy industry during the late Soviet period and were 
experienced in defending their interests, and in mobilising resources to this end. Of 
the two, Rossel was the more impetuous and enterprising, whilst Chernetsky tended 
towards discretion and solidity. Both became known well beyond the boundaries of 
the region and were adept at defining their position at the federal level as well as 




The Urals Republic versus the Centre 
 
Following Boris Yeltsin’s election to the executive presidency of the Russian 
Federation in June 1991, Eduard Rossel was appointed the first governor of 
Sverdlovsk Oblast (region). Rossel then appointed Arkady Chernetsky to the post of 
mayor of Ekaterinburg in 1992.  Rossel, had (like Boris Yeltsin) pursued a career in 
construction, ending up as the head of the main regional construction enterprise, 
before being elected a as a deputy in 1990 and becoming the first regional leader to be 
allowed to be both chair of the regional council and chair of the regional executive 
committee Chernetsky had, like many in the Urals elite, started as a metallurgical 
engineer and had been, from 1987 to 1992, general director of the chemical enterprise 
Uralkhimmash, where he had pushed through a radical restructuring plan against 
opposition.   
 
Rossel was one of the most assertive governors from the start. His project for a Urals 
republic pursued two aims. Firstly the immediate aim was to ‘upgrade’ Sverdlovsk to 
republic status, thereby eliminating the difference between Sverdlovsk as an ethnic 
Russian region and titular ethnic republics such as Bashkortostan or Tatarstan (which 
at that stage was seen to enjoy substantial fiscal privileges). This would effectively 
neutralise the nationality (as opposed to territorial) principle in the regional structure 
of the federation. The advocates of the Urals Republic considered that having three 
categories of subject (as in the Federal Treaty) was an attempt by a weak centre to 
divide and rule, and that the national ethnic principle of regional policy was ‘a bomb 
planted in 1918 that will sooner or later go off, now that the Party is no longer there 
to exert pressure from above’
xvii.  
 
Secondly, Rossel had, in 1990, established an Association of Economic Cooperation 
between six regions in the wider Urals area. The aim was now to convert this into a 
larger territorial unit.  The historical precedent was the larger Urals Region that 
existed pre 1933
xviii and the proposal presaged the Urals Federal District as created in 
2001. The argument pursued by Rossel and his supporters had much in common with 
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regions that emerged from the Stalin period and sought to restore the larger Gosplan 
economic planning regions of the 1920s 
xix 
 
As mayor of Ekaterinburg, Chernetsky had been pressing an analogous demand, also 
based on the precedent of Gosplan, for Ekaterinburg to be made a subject of the 
federation in its own right, on the basis of its past status as a separate Gosplan entity. 
This thinking was to inform subsequent campaigns (after 2000) to have Ekaterinburg 
recognised as a ‘Third Capital’ as this would open up the possibility of becoming a 
‘federal city’ like Moscow or St Petersburg (i.e. to be a region in its own right).   
 
The prospect of an aggrandised ethnic Russian region raised for some the spectre of 
secession, and the move was rejected both by parliament and president. On 10 
November President Yeltsin (having just suppressed the Parliamentary insurrection) 
dismissed Rossel from the post of governor and replaced him with Alexei Strakhov 
(Chernetsky’s 1
st Deputy Mayor) who was opposed to the Urals republic. Rossel was 
once more elected chair of the Oblast Duma and from there successfully lobbied for 
federal support for a law whereby a the governor of the region should be elected.   
 
 
‘Transformation of the Urals’ versus ‘Our Home is Russia’ 
 
In the election, held in July 1995, the federal authorities attempted to get Strakhov re-
elected for Our Home is Russia – the then ‘party of power associated with the then 
prime minister Victor Chernomyrdin. However Rossel’s campaign was far more 
effective and he won almost 70 per cent of the votes on the second round
xx .  
 
Rossel’s campaign was a landmark in the use of PR techniques in Russian elections
xxi, 
This was not new to the Urals, as Boris Yeltsin’s move to Moscow from Sverdlovsk 
had been the result of a systematic campaign of image-making and projection in the 
early 1980s
xxii  Strakhov’s campaign by contrast was inept in the extreme, despite 
being assisted by federally-approved Moscow-based political campaigners, and 
considerable financial backing. Characteristic of the low level of Strakhov’s   
campaign was a poster depicting a giant pawn dominating a chessboard, with the 
slogan ‘let the authorities explain to each citizen how they will play them’. Rossel’s 
campaign image depicted the candidate peering grimly over a raised telephone 
receiver, clearly in the process of resolving a complex practical issue, an image that 
registered well with a public who wanted practical results. The campaign involved the 
creation a new party ‘Preobrazheniye Urala’ (Transformation of the Urals). This was 
a broad coalition, including groups as diverse as communists, cossack nationalists and 
Yabloko social democrats).    
 
Rossel’s campaign had in reality begun well before the election and had received 
support from the federal level that had undermined his opponent’s position   
Particularly noteworthy had been a visit by the deputy chair of the federal government 
Sergei Shakhrai who had  neglected Strakhov in favour of a longer private meeting 
with Rossel and Bakov (see below)
xxiii 
 
Rossel saw the result as a vindication of his earlier Urals Republic project
xxiv At his 
victory celebration Rossel declared his aim to broaden the movement to become 
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village will have a branch of the movement., in order to strengthen both the federation 
and civil engagement’
xxv. In the event, the movement, although it attracted many 
candidates in other regions, often being seen as a broader based alternative to the 
existing liberal parties, did not find sufficient electoral support outside its Urals 
heartland in the elections of 1995 and ceased to operate at federal level. It may be 
seen as a curious blend of two types of Russian political organisation – the inter-
regional network of the type later exemplified by Luzhkov’s ‘Fatherland’ movement, 
and the attempt to build civil society from above on the basis of village level 
organisation, as with the Gorbachev era’s territorial self-government initiative and, 
arguably the Kozak Commission’s promotion of self-government at settlement level. 
In regional terms, the episode demonstrated the scale of the ambition and aspiration 
that has tended to characterise Sverdlovsk politics as both regional and city level.  
Opinion polls collected by the governor’s researchers suggested that this was not 
merely hubris on Rossel’s part – public attitudes supported the idea of the governor 
being a figure of federation-wide significance
xxvi 
 
An important factor in the success of Rossel’s campaign was the support he received 
from a team headed by Anton Bakov, a young political operator, who had been 
elected to the Regional Duma under Shakhrai’s Unity and Agreement Party (PRES) 
and who had actively supported the Urals Republic idea in 1993 and who joined 
Rossel’s Transformation of the Urals.  Bakov, described by his associates as a 
‘Napoleon’
xxvii figure and by journalists as an ‘affairiste’ was a metallurgist had 
already made a fortune in the aluminium business and was eager to establish himself 
politically.  He saw the campaign very much in terms of preventing Moscow not to 
dictate to the regions and wanted to see this principle extended to stopping the ‘neo-
colonial’ expansion of Moscow banks buying up property in the regions 
xxviii  This 
defensive position against Moscow business was shared by the criminal gang OPS 
Uralmash, who took a protectionist view of the region’s resources.  Rumours of the 
organisation’s support for Rossel date from this period.  
 
Strakhov had attempted to build support among local authorities by passing a new 
regional law that would allow elections for municipal heads. In the event this was 
ruled out by a court decision, but the passing of the Federal Law on the General 
Principles of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation meant that elections 
for municipal heads would take place in any case.  
 
 
‘Transformation of the Urals’ versus ‘Our Home, Our City’  
  
Immediately after the victory in the gubernatorial election it was agreed that Rossel’s 
team would support Bakov as an official Transformation of the Urals candidate for 
mayor against Chernetsky at the first election on 17 December, 1995. Chernetsky, for 
his part, formed his own party ‘Our Home, Our City’, echoing the federal Our Home 
is Russia’ party (Chernetsky’s party colleague, Vladimir Tungusov (ubiquitously 
referred to as the ‘grey cardinal’) had supported Strakhov directly through the party). 
He had considered supporting Strakhov, but had not done so actively as it had soon 
become clear to all that the latter’s campaign was heading for a heavy defeat
xxix and 
that supporting it would only reduce Chernetsky’s own chances in the mayoral 
election a few months later.   
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The Bakov camp considered Chernetsky a worthy if somewhat traditional opponent 
but expected Rossel to ‘put him in his place’
xxx. In the wake of Rossel’s victory, 
Chernetsky appeared isolated to some – he was seen as having no need for the city 
council, seeing them as a dilution of mayoral authority, although his high level of 
professional ability (not universal among mayors in the early 1990s) meant that many 
councillors still  supported him
xxxi.  Nonetheless the poor relations between mayor 
and at least some councillors opened up a line of attack that would be exploited by 
Rossel’s supporters in this and future elections. When it came to the election on 
December 17 1995, Chernetsky beat off Bakov’s challenge, the latter winning only 16 
per cent on the second round. Bakov showed himself once again to be a gifted 
political campaigner, but not a credible replacement for Chernetsky, who had built up 
a base of genuine popularity in the city,  projecting an image of dependable 
professionalism, confirmed by his winning the all-Russian competition ‘Russian 
Mayor-95’
xxxii. The bases for Chernetsky’s success in this and subsequent elections 
was his ability to combine a liberal/social democrat outlook with the style and 
experience of a late soviet-era industrial magnate and a detailed understanding of how 
the city’s infrastructure actually worked. This ensured that he outlived both the first 
generation of well-meaning progressive mayors who were out-manoeuvred by vested 
interests and the old-guard industrial managers who were unable to adapt to electoral 
politics and the need to interact with the public.  
 
If, in the early years of democratisation (1990-3), conflict had been on the horizontal 
level – between executive and representative bodies, from this point the main axis of 
conflict was vertical, between city and region. From this election onwards, the 
political, economic and social dynamics of the region were to reflect the struggle for 
supremacy between governor and mayor. In some respects this was not new – for 
example the Institute of Philosophy had supported Rossel whilst the Institute of 
Economics had supported Strakhov 
xxxiii, this principle was now to become further 
embedded as all electoral contests, and the increasingly long and bitter campaigns that 
preceded them, became duels between Rossel and Chernetsky, either directly or 
through surrogates. This was true not only for the gubernatorial elections of 1999 and 
2003, and the mayoral elections of the same years, but also the elections to the 
Regional Assembly and the Ekaterinburg City Duma.  It became standard practice for 
the Governor’s team to create and support and an anti-mayoral bloc of deputies in the 
City Duma and for the Mayor’s team to do the same in the Regional Duma.  In 
addition, Chernetsky was elected a member of the region’s second chamber, the 
legislative assembly, where he chaired the committee on local self-government (he 
had also been a deputy of the Regional Council in 1994-6). In the 1998 elections for 
the Regional Duma Chernetsky’s Our Home Our City won over 20 per cent against a 
mere 9 cent for Rossel’s Transformation of the Urals, encouraging Chernetsky to aim 
for the governorship in 1999.  
 
In 1997 Chernetsky had appointed Vladimir Tungusov as Deputy Mayor for 
Organisation and Public Relations. Tungusov had since 1991 headed the construction 
company ‘Our Home’ and was the key strategist in the party ‘Our Home Our City. 
Known by allies and opponents alike as ‘the grey cardinal’ Tungusov was in charge of 
appointments within the city administration (including the city’s eight districts) and 
combined this with heading the Mayor’s political team, including election strategy 
and tactical issues surrounding the City Duma and Regional Assembly. This led to 
  60rivalry between Tungusov and Yakov Silin the Chair of the City Duma, also an ally of 
Chernetsky, although the two not always agree
xxxiv. Despite the severity and longevity 
of the political conflict this did not lead to complete integration of teams – apart from 
the certainty that the PR teams of region and city would publicise scornful 
commentaries on the efforts of their respective authorities, individual policy decisions 
were not predictable or programmed in the way that might have been expected under 
a conventional political party structure, but were taken individually and an alliance 
between senior figures on one issue did not automatically lead to a similar alliance on 
another. In this way both Chernetsky and Rossel maintained undiluted power within 
their respective authorities throughout the period under discussion.  
 
In the 1999 election Chernetsky, who started from a position of strength after the 
Regional Duma results of the previous year, was targeted in a sustained PR campaign 
of unprecedented intensity from the regional media, which succeeded in damaging his 
campaign. In the meantime the regional media gave an easy ride and even assisting to 
the other main challenger, Alexander Burkov, who had together with Anton Bakov, 
set up the oppositionist movement ‘May’ given to carrying out high-profile 
provocations, occupying buildings, calling officials to public account
xxxv.  As a result, 
at the first round Chernetsky was pushed into third place. For the second round the 
regional media turned their fire wholly onto Burkov and the dangers presented by his 
‘extremist’ movement
xxxvi, and Rossel was able to win comfortably
xxxvii.  
 
The campaign of 1999 reflected wider trends – the PR barrage was very much like 
that which destroyed the presidential bid of Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov the 
following year, while the tactic (as it appeared to be) of encouraging alternative 
opposition movements which can be used to sideline genuine opposition parties 
before being despatched appears to have become a feature of Russian political tactics 
and analysis. However ‘May’ and Rossel’s team were never one and the same, which 
was underscored by Bakov’s abrupt switching sides after the gubernatorial election in 
September and supporting Chernetsky in the mayoral election of December 1999, 
which the latter comfortably won. However the experience of the gubernatorial 
election showed Chernetsky’s media to have been outgunned by that of the governor 
in terms of resources, scale, intensity and ruthlessness.  Although Chernetsky’s own 
re-election campaign had been successful, Tungusov and his deputy Sergei Tushin in 
charge of campaigning were obliged to expand their media resources in order to keep 
pace and by 2003 they were seen to have achieved parity with the regional media, or 
even attained a relative advantage, with two television stations, Channel 41 and RTK, 
against the region’s OTV channel. Newspapers and glossy journals were also evenly 
divided although readerships were small compared to television audiences.  
 
Tushin adopted a disciplined quasi-military approach within the overall strategy set 
out by Chernetsky and Tungusov. Media tactics were worked out with precision 
regarding short and medium objectives, sequencing and style of operation (‘area 
bombardment’ versus ‘precision strikes’ etc.). The ideal was to have a game plan that 
worked according to chess logic, anticipating opponents’ responses three moves 
ahead. The opposition, under Levin operated in similar fashion, although the nature of 
the oblast level (a clear split between Governor’s residence and oblast 
government/administration meant they had less focus that the city, where for political 
forces were concentrated and   unambiguously under the control of the Mayor and 
Tungusov.   
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Chernetsky was also active in politics beyond the confines of Sverdlovsk Region. He 
was leader of the association ‘Cities of the Urals’ and was a leading figure in the 
Union of Russian Cities, of which he has been President since 2001. He was also to be 
a member of the Council of Local and Regional Authority representatives at the 
Council of Europe and a member of the presidential Council for Local Self-
Government established by Putin
xxxviii.  Most significantly Chernetsky was elected 
head of the regional branch of ‘Fatherland’ (Otechestvo), which had been set up the 
previous year by Yuri Luzhkov, mayor of Moscow.  As federal power stabilised under 
Primakov premiership and later the Putin premiership and presidency, lobbying of the 
federal level and competing to demonstrate federal-level approval, became 
increasingly important – hence Rossel and Chernetsky both (separately) meeting with  
Primakov in Moscow in the run-up to the gubernatorial elections of 1999.  
  
 
After 2000 it was Rossel who began to appear vulnerable – as the archetypal assertive 
regional boss he might have been expected to be out of favour with the Putin 
presidency, especially as Chernetsky was, from 2001 the deputy head of the regional 
branch of the pro-Putin party United Russia which had emerged from the union of 
‘Unity’ and ‘Fatherland’. Chernetsky’s ally Porunov was chair of the Regional Duma, 
supported by the United Russia fraction, controlled by Chernetsky and his team. 
Rossel’s attempt to remove Porunov led to a boycott by his supporters and the 
Regional Duma ceased to function for much of the period 2001-2. In the meantime 
Chernetsky had built up good relations with Pyotr Latyshev the president’s 
representative for the new Urals Federal District, whereas Rossel was outspoken in 
his criticism of the institution of federal districts
xxxix. When, on arrival in the city in 
2001, Latyshev attempted to place his headquarters in the most imposing building in 
Ekaterinburg, which happened to be used as a children’s centre, and was obliged to 
back down after well-publicised protests which were supported by the Governor, it 
was the mayor’s administration that found the federal district alternative 
accommodation.  
 
Hemmed in from above and below, Rossel was not to be marginalised, however. In 
mid-2001 he succeeded in recruiting the Chernetsky’s 1
st Deputy Mayor, Yuri 
Osintsev, and appointing him as External Affairs Minister in the regional government. 
Osintsev formerly as senior manager at the Uralmash factory, had become well-
known in the city, was charismatic and regarded as a progressive moderniser. From 
2000 Osintsev had been responsible for the setting up the City Strategic Plan (see 
below).   
 
It was soon apparent that Osintsev was being groomed as the next region-backed 
challenger for the mayoral election of 2003
xl, especially when Rossel appointed 
Osintsev as the ‘curator’ of Ekaterinburg (after winning the 1995 election Rossel had 
divided the region into sectors, each of which had a curator who in effect had the task 
of checking on the activities of local authorities). Assigning to Osintsev the role of 
checking on his former boss was means of giving him a head start in the election 
campaign. Osinstev began to cultivate the opposition (i.e. anti-mayor) deputies of the 
city duma, and was considered to the initiator of a new fraction, the ‘inter-regional’ 
group bringing together enemies and erstwhile allies of Chernetsky. Osintsev’s 
intentions became more explicit in January, 2003, when Osintsev caused a sensation 
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front of the assembled media) accusing the city administration of massive fraud
xli.   
 
In the meantime Rossel’s lobbying of the federal authorities began to bear fruit. 
Firstly he was granted the possibility of running for a third term, and secondly, as the 
campaign for the mayoral election campaign commenced, United Russia endorsed 
Osintsev as their official candidate (although he had not previously been a member of 
the party), and not Chernetsky, despite the latter being deputy head of their regional 
organisation. Chernetsky as a result was effectively marginalized and snubbed by 
United Russia, as were his allies who had constituted the United Russian fraction on 
the Oblast Assembly.   
 
This, by any simple reading of how power worked in the Russian provinces, should 
have been enough to spell the end for Chernetsky.  However, even under Putin’s 
presidency support from United Russia no more meant automatic success at the polls 
than support from Our Home is Russia guaranteed victory for Strakhov in the 
gubernatorial election eight years earlier
xlii.  
 
The problem facing Osintsev’s future campaign was that it lacked a major issue to 
campaign on, beyond Osintsev’s personal appeal.  The previous year the city had been 
voted the most flourishing regional capital, winning the ‘golden rouble’ award for 
financial-economic regeneration, the city had successfully launched the large-scale 
Urals-Siberia Exhibition in July. Although accusations of corruption were levelled 
against the mayor and the city administration during the campaign by the regional 
media, this was not an area where the region could demonstrate superiority, as well as 
confusing the electorate in that the candidate who was now so critical of the city 
administration had been well known in the city as 1
st Deputy Mayor only two years 
earlier under the same mayoral regime.   
 
The one area that which Osintsev could potentially use in a future mayoral campaign 
was the Strategic Plan, for which he had been the lead official in its early stages, as 1
st 




The Conflict over the City Strategic Plan  
 
The Strategic Plan was a major theme in the political and administrative life of 
Ekaterinburg in 2000-3, the most intense period of region-city rivalry. The issue 
acquired a highly symbolic status as it provided an arena for both co-operation (in the 
early stages) and conflict (in the later stages) between city and region. The Plan’s 
preparation mobilised a substantial part of the city’s elite and civil society at the same 
time as projecting the city’s image to a wider audience at federal level and other large 
cities in the Federation
xliv. The strategy development process was supported by a UK 
bi-lateral project, for which the authors of this paper were responsible
xlv.  
 
Work had begun on the Strategic Plan for Ekaterinburg (intended to guide 
development until 2015) in 1999 not long after the publication of the St Petersburg 
City Strategy, seen as the first modern city strategic plan in the Russian Federation. 
Osintsev presided over a group of academics and local consultants who were in 
favour of moving Ekaterinburg away from its traditional reliance on defence industry 
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st century’ post-industrial commercial future, capitalising on what its 
location on the Eurasian overland trade route 
xlvi.  In this early phase the work was 
coordinated by Osintsev’s ally, Victor Maslakov, head of the city Economic 
Department.  
 
Although it was understood that the city strategy was a potential rival of the regional 
plan (which took the traditional form of a ‘scheme for the distribution of productive 
forces’, there was at the outset a clear, if understated, agreement that economic 
development was in the interest of both region and city and therefore politically 
neutral.  The regional Minister for Economy, Galina Kovalyeva, maintained good 
relations with Osintsev and the city economic team, even presenting a paper at the 
second large-scale strategy conference in November, 2000
xlvii. Kovalyeva’s paper 
argued for development to be balanced between industry and services, in effect 
seeking a common ground between the city and regional positions. At the same 
conference Osintsev and Chernetsky made keynote speeches focusing on the need to 
develop business and services, so that the city would become a genuine ‘capital’ city 
of the wider region rather than the inward-looking factory-city of the Soviet 
period
xlviii. In a press conference after the same conference Osintsev was obliged to 
explain to the regional journalists that this did not means the aim was to close down 
the city’s industries.   
 
However, although the region’s coverage of the city strategy retained a sceptical tone 
it was broadly supportive. To some extent this represented a legacy of the Gosplan 
hierarchy – the issue of regional and city strategies were identified with the largely 
non-political economic roles of Kovalyeva at the regional level and Osintsev at the 
city level, so that the political figures, the Governor and the Mayor were less directly 
involved, enabling the strategy as a whole to be seen as non-political. This was to 
change once Osintsev moved to the region in May, 2001.  
  
The Governor’s appointment of 1
st Deputy Mayor Yuri Osinstev as the External 
Affairs Minister for the Region was seen, correctly as it turned out, as the first stage in 
Osintsev’s becoming a Governor-backed candidate for Mayor in the coming elections 
of December 2003. It also upset the delicate balance of understanding that had grown 
up between regional and city administrations regarding the strategic plan.  Rather than 
acting as a bridge between city and region on strategy issues, Osinstev’s location in 
the regional government raised two potentially damaging possibilities - either a 
separate rival strategy for the city, prepared by the region, or increased regional 
influence over the development of the city strategy.  
 
Although the strategy was now formally being coordinated by a 1st Deputy Mayor, 
Vitaly Smirnov, for several months after Osintsev’s departure the key role in the 
strategy appeared to be being played by Maslakov, who had served under Osintsev as 
Head of Economy and who had now followed Osintsev to the region, where he had 
been appointed head of the land and property department
xlix (a key area of region-city 
tension) the aim here being rather transparently to allow the region to acquire the 
knowledge that had enabled the city to past conflicts over land acquisition and 
development. At the same time Maslakov continued to exercise tight control over the 
development strategy.  There was a suspicion that Maslakov might use his influence 
to either delay the strategy’s development or pursue a separate agenda, possibly on 
behalf of the region
l. As was to occur on several occasions these underlying tensions 
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strategy process
li. After Osintsev’s departure, Maslakov began to exert pressure on 
the bi-lateral project, challenging the basis on which it worked, in what was seen to be 
an attempt either to take control of or eliminate the project
lii. This was regarded with 
disquiet by several within the administration, in that it seemed to be part of an attempt 
to exercise a high degree of control over the strategy process and the development of 
the strategy document, not necessarily in the city’s interests. Although the strategy 
document itself was under tight control it was possible to submit it for external review. 
In August 2001 the bi-lateral project referred the draft strategy produced by 
Maslakov’s team to external referees
liii. The latter’s criticisms were severe and 
unambiguous and led to a reaction within the administration with the result that 
document was dropped, and Maslakov was removed from the strategy coordination 
committee and from the process overall.  
 
This led to a major change in approach. The Mayor took control of the strategy on a 
daily and weekly basis, alternating with 1
st Deputy Mayor Smirnov, who was now 
able to coordinate the process without having to accommodate Maslakov’s influence. 
Two leading city academics
liv were appointed to replace Maslakov in terms of being 
responsible for the overall concept of the strategy, working with the new head of the 
economy department, Vysokinsky, the only member of the Osintsev/Maslakov group 
to remain in the city and side with the Mayor against Osintsev’s challenge. A large 
partnership body (the ‘Programme Council’) was formed and began to meet on a 
regular basis (both in plenary conferences and in sub-sections) to approve overall 
strategic direction and later the individual strategic projects. All the functional Deputy 
Mayors became involved as responsible for sections of the strategy. The city strategy 
thus began to move in the direction of international trends regarding public 
involvement and institutional partnership
lv, and further from a purely technocratic 
model of strategy. The final document, which drew on an elaborate system of working 
groups, appeared in March 2003, and listed more than one hundred authors
lvi.   
 
The approach thus combined centralisation (direct involvement and monitoring by the 
Mayor and 1
st Deputy) with wider participation and partnership both inside the city 
administration (across departmental boundaries) and between the administration, 
business and civil society. This approach did leave the head of economic department, 
now Maslakov’s former protégé Vysokinsky, in a strong position, but there was now a 
much clearer line of subordination to both Mayor and 1
st Deputy Mayor and a higher 
level of mobilisation of partners so that the strategy could not ‘captured’ as appeared 
to have occurred under Maslakov.   
 
However, the dispute that led to the removal of Maslakov from the strategy team may 
in retrospect be seen as the first of several rounds in a city/regional conflict regarding 
the city strategy, a conflict that would not be resolved until June, 2003. Although 
regional officials, including Yuri Osintsev himself, were members of the Programme 
Council, and increasing polarisation could be discerned between the city and the 
region regarding the strategy. An attempt was made to involve senior regional 
officials in the management board (pravleniye) of the Programme Council, but with 
limited success
lvii . One explanation would be that while the Mayor’s direct 
involvement in leading the strategy process made that process far more effective 
within the city administration, society and business, it could make partnership 
working with the region more problematic, given that the Mayor was a political as 
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lviii. However the more likely explanation is that the 
political team at the regional level had already decided to make the city strategy a 
theme in regional/city conflict
lix. This view is confirmed by the fact that Yuri 
Osintsev was appointed to be responsible for the regional development strategy, 
normally under the control of the regional economic ministry. With Osintsev known 
to be a future mayoral candidate on behalf of the region, this effectively politicised 
one of the few areas (economic development) where the region and city had 
maintained a degree of cooperation.  
 
Evidence of polarisation between city and region over the strategy grew and the 
strategy itself was developed during 2002.  By late 2002, with the mayoral election 
little over a year away Yuri Osintsev began to be presented not only as a future mayor, 
but one who would have a different strategy:  
 
“Each of the two main political forces seeking to run the city for the next four years 
will be presenting the electorate with its own development plan…the city authorities 
think that the Urals capital should become a commercial-financial, entertainment and 
conference centre on the border of Europe and Asia…Mayor Chernetsky himself 
states that his plan is based on the experience of the British city of Birmingham which 
has changed over the last thirty years from being an industrial city to and financial 
and entertainment centre dominated by the service sector. ….An alternative 
development plan for the city is proposed by Sverdlovsk Regional Administation 
under the humble title of ‘Scheme for the Distribution of Productive Forces...oriented 
primarily on the real sector of the city’s economy…The regional authorities consider 
that the development of Ekaterinburg as a financial and entertainment centre is an 
important task. But, while following European models, the specific nature of the Urals 
capital should not be forgotten.., the regional plan seeks to triple industrial 
production in the city by 2015…The struggle between these two conceptions takes on 
a special significance in that the curator of the regional programme, Yuri Osintsev 
and considered to be the main rival of Arkady Chernetsky at the next election…so that 
the citizens of Ekaterinburg will have the possibility of choosing between two options 
for the future of their city. And only their vote will decide whether it will become a 
Urals Birmingham, full of exchanges, banks, bowling alleys and aquaparks or 




This was a caricature of the ideological difference that was emerging between city 
and region, and ironic in that as deputy mayor Osintsev had himself been criticised by 
industrialists for speaking in favour of diversifying away from a reliance on heavy 
industry.  However a genuine difference of emphasis was emerging between city and 
region. On a number of occasions in 2002 Chernetsky publicly referred to the fact that 
the most profitable and highest paid enterprises on the territory of Ekaterinburg were 
a perfume plant and a chocolate factory and there was no reason why this should be 
seen as inferior to the traditional defence enterprises.   
 
A more fundamental difference lay in the new strategic plan’s emphasis on quality of 
life and public services, especially the social bloc (education, health, social services) 
and housing/utilities. This shift of emphasis away from a preoccupation with industry 
refected Chernetsky’s view, expressed at several conferences and public meetings in 
2000-2 that Ekaterinburg had been developed in the Soviet period as a ‘factory-city’, 
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wellbeing of the city’s inhabitants and the city’s development as a multi-functional 
internationally-oriented ‘Eurasian capital’.  The strategy’s emphasis on the key areas 
of education, health and housing were seen to have influenced the subsequent 
development of the ‘national projects’ under federal vice-premier Medvedev
lxi 
 
However, the view was strongly held within the city administration that the Strategic 
Plan should not become a theme of the election campaign as this would undermine its 
longer-term legitimacy (as a plan in its own right, as opposed to a sub-division of a 
regional plan). Legitimacy also required that the plan be ratified by the City Duma 
rather than adopted unilaterally by the Mayor, and that this should take place well 
before the election, due for December 17, 2003. There was also to be a gubernatorial 
election in September, 2003, so to avoid the three-month election campaigning period 
for either election the strategy had to be ratified by mid-June.  
 
The Duma was due to debate the strategic plan on 25 April. The day before, Regional 
Deputy Premier Osintsev delivered to Yakov Silin, the Chair of the Duma, a report on 
the strategic plan by his staff at the regional ministry of external affairs
lxii. The report 
strongly recommended that the deputies should not adopt the strategic plan.  The next 
day the Duma session was inquorate with nearly half the deputies – those belonging to 
pro-region/anti-mayor deputies (unofficially) boycotting the session. The boycott was 
a major event in adversarial PR terms - the debate had been scheduled to take place 
not in the council chamber but in the great hall of the city administration building, 
with a large audience of invited notables and all the regional and city media present, 
so that the boycott and its aftermath dominated the local and regional media. 
 
 The fourteen (out of twenty-seven) deputies that boycotted the proceedings consisted 
primarily of the two pro-regional opposition factions – Alexander Khabarov’s OPS 
Uralmash (the Uralmash Political and Social Union created in 1999 by the Uralmash 
criminal firm (see section on organised crime below) and its allies, the Inter-regional 
group, (seen to have been Osinstev’s own creation)
lxiii led by Maksim Serebrennikov, 
a former member of OPS Uralmash. The boycott, and the high-profile manner in 
which it had occurred projected the strategic plan for the first time into the centre of 
the political arena between city and region, and led to an escalation of that conflict in 
public relations terms. The boycott was strongly criticised by Silin and by Chernetsky 
in speeches at the abortive Duma session and in a subsequent press conference. 
Although in retrospect it was clear that there was a link between the boycott and the 
objections to the strategy contained in Osintsev’s report delivered in person to the 
chair of the Duma the previous evening, the boycott deputies were initially silent, as if 
absent for other reasons 
lxiv.  However, the media coverage of the boycott was such 
that the deputies concerned felt obliged to give a press conference themselves to 
justify their position.  
 
 The main arguments in Osintsev’s report were that the city strategy should not be 
approved separate from a regional strategy and that the partnership arrangements 
associated with the Strategic Plan, and the partnership structure (Programme Council) 
associated with it were not workable and that the process should in effect begin again 
after the election with a new mayor. The report also criticised the emphasis on city 
marketing and image making that was seen to inform the city strategy. These points 
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lxv, which 
appeared to close this debate, as the original report was no longer referred to.  
 
However following a meeting immediately the boycott, the bi-lateral project became 
embroiled in a dispute with the Osintsev’s allies in the city duma, the inter-regional 
group of deputies, led by ex-OPS Uralmash Maksim Serebrennikov. Following a 
meeting to discuss why the Inter-regional Group had boycotted the Strategy, the 
deputies publicised through the regional media a story that the British Government 
were demanding a refund of the project budget from the city administration (the 
deputies were unaware that bi-lateral technical assistance project budgets are not 
transferred to the beneficiary and therefore could not be refunded by them).  This led 
to a public exchange of open letters that was given prominence by both the pro-mayor 
and pro-regional media
lxvi and was for a period the focus of the PR-conflict between 
the two sides.  
 
The dispute was not without an element of farce – after receiving a strongly-worded 
letter from the project complaining about the circulation of the story referred to above, 
the deputies appealed publicly for support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation and other federal agencies
lxvii. The dispute culminated in an what 
was seen as a difficult interview for Osintsev on the independent fourth TV channel, 
in which he was obliged to explain why his allies in the City Duma had come into 
conflict with an  international  project with which he had been associated at 1
st Deputy 
Mayor and for which he was still indirectly responsible as Minister for External 
Affairs. Immediately prior to that interview, agreement was reached with Osintsev 
that the strategy and the project should no longer be a focus for political PR.  The 
agreement was observed – the project received no further attention from the regional 
media and the strategy did not figure as a significant theme in the election campaign, 
contrary to what had been anticipated. Curiously not all the Oblast media coverage of 
the dispute took Osintsev’s side – some examples presented the project’s case fairly, 
concluding that  
 
“The emotional protest by the British side, against the attempts to make the 
development plan of Ekaterinburg a trump card in a political game has proved a 
great help to mayor Chernetsky’s team in deflecting the attacks of its opponents. On 
25 April the mayor of Ekaterinburg had stated that the deputies’ sabotage of the 
strategic plan was an obedient execution of a political instruction. Duma chair Yakov 
Silin was more specific, placing the responsibility with the Oblast leadership, whilst 
Sergei Tushin, head of the analytical section of the mayor’s administration said that 
behind the scandal was the hand of Yuri Osintsev who hoped to be the next 
mayor”
lxviii.   
 
This was one of the first indications of a clear split between two PR teams at the 
oblast level, one led by Alexander Ryzhkov, reporting to Alexei Vorobyev, premier of 
the Sverdlovsk Oblast Administration, and the governor’s PR team, led by Alexander 
Levin. The governor’s team reportedly regarded the strategic plan as non-political
lxix 
and moreover were hostile to Osintsev, preferring to back city duma opposition 
deputy Jan Gabinsky as their candidate for mayor
lxx 
 
The definitive end to the dispute over the strategy came on 10 June (the last day 
before the start of the campaign for the gubernatorial election in September), after 
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turn) by the Duma Chair Yakov Silin, a quorate City Duma convened to debate the 
strategy.  
 
At the end of a four-hour debate the final vote was fifteen in favour, four against and 
four abstentions
lxxi. The hard core of the OPS Uralmash group continued to oppose 
the plan (in line with the Governor’s position) although some of their allies changed 
sides and supported the strategy. The four ‘inter-regional group’ deputies abstained, 
thereby confirming that Yuri Osintsev, whilst not supporting the strategy, would no 
longer oppose it and that the strategy would not be a major theme in the mayoral 
election campaign in December.  
 
Despite the widely-held view that the Strategic Plan was embarked on purely for 
electoral purposes the city administration avoided using the plan in its election 
campaign (although there were references in some bulletins to Osintsev’s report and 
the arguments against it). The city administration continued with the develop and 
implement the constituent programmes of the strategy long after the election. More 
than four years later, in 2007 the programme council (the city’s development 
partnership created in 2002 in the early phase of the strategy) was meeting almost 
monthly to debate and approve sub-projects designed to implement the strategy’s 
programme objectives. The only difference was that these programmes had now been 
adapted to meet the aim and targets of the federal ‘national programmes, the priorities 
of which were not dissimilar to the city strategy’
lxxii. 
 
In the event, both the gubernatorial and mayoral elections were dominated by a quite 
different issue, that of organised crime. Before reviewing its role in the elections of 
2003 it is necessary to consider the changing role of organised crime in Sverlovsk 
region over the previous decade.  
 
 
Organised Crime in Sverdlovsk   
 
It is often assumed that organised crime appeared in Russia during the period between 
perestroika in the late 1980s and privatisation in the early 1990s. Although the 
collapse of Soviet power and the emergence of private property had major effects on 
the opportunities available to criminal organisations, the roots of organised crime as a 
nationwide phenomenon date back to the 1930s and the development of the gulag 
penal system. This facilitated the development of a unified criminal sub-culture, with 
its own mores, speech and rules of conduct, interpreted and enforced byan elite of 
vory v zakone (‘thieves in law’). Separation from the state and its representatives was 
a strict principle, although the criminal sub-culture was in many respects a by-product 
of the Soviet state – the more strong and oppressive the state regime became, the more 
organised and powerful the underworld became
lxxiii.  
 
The first official use of the term ‘organised crime’ in the USSR was in 1985 in 
Uzbekistan
lxxiv. By 1989 the term was accepted sufficiently to be the subject of a 
parliamentary order and in 1992 the Russian directorate for the Struggle against 
Organised Crime (RUBOP) was created, and by the mid-1990s the term and the 
phenomenon were commonplace. However, as the Russian state and economy 
changed, so did the system of organised crime. Volkov has described how the old 
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‘avtoriteti’, ‘bandits’ or ‘violent entrepreneurs’ who, far from avoiding the state, 
sought to strengthen their links with the state to advance commercial interests. 
Whereas the traditional thieves sub-culture grew up as a by-product of a collectivist 
socialist state, the bandits grew up as part of a system product of weak-state 
capitalism in Russian during the 1990s
lxxv. As such they regarded themselves not only 
as partners of the state but to a degree substitutes for the state, selling services and 
providing a system of authority and organisation.  In that period of the 1990s when 
the state was weakest
lxxvi it was seen by some as being merely one protection agency 
among others.  
 
Organised crime in Russian can be divided into three levels – the first level being 
criminal groups and bands of up to 30 members, operating without any cover from 
state officials
lxxvii, but may have links to individual law enforcement officers
lxxviii. The 
second level consists of more disciplined organised criminal groups (OPG) up to 50 
persons, but with a core of no more than 10, with more systematic links with the state, 
judicial and law and order officials
lxxix. The third level is that of the Organised 
Criminal Society (OPS), with more than 50 persons and links not only to state 
officials of different types but also to political parties and voluntary organisations.  
 
The emergence of the OPS and their involvement in the social or voluntary sector 
may be seen as reflecting the continuing weakness of the Russian state in terms of 
horizontal coordination. The formal system of authority has tended to focus on the 
vertical, ignoring the wider international trends towards governance and partnership. 
The vacuum left by the abolition of the Communist Party that had previously 
provided horizontal coordination, however imperfectly, created a niche that could be 
filled by OPS organisations (in for example the voluntary sector where relationships 
between state and NGOs have often been problematic) until they almost came to be 
seen as part of the normal order of things    
 
Since 2000 there has been a tendency towards rationalisation and consolidation of 
criminal groups into larger more organised OPS, moving towards an institutional form 
that is less obviously dependent on violence than in the 1990s, and more similar to 
mainstream business. This consolidation has occurred from below, through market 
forces, but also from above, via the so-called ‘red roofs’ (krasniye kryshi) consisting 
of networks of corrupt state officials who are seen deploy criminal groups or methods. 
This is a similar phenomenon to what Volkov refers to as ‘gosurdarstvenniki’ (state 
people) who represent a new stage of centralisation of crime away from the regional 
clusters of criminal organisations that had consolidated the local networks of ‘roofs’ 
from the late 1990s onwards
lxxx.  
 
It is possible to conclude that whereas in the Soviet period formal and informal power 
(in the criminal sense) were sharply distinct categories, the weakening of the state 
from the late 1980s onwards led to a position where informal power effectively 
replaced formal power for many transactions. There followed a period (late 1990s-
early 2000s) in which the formal power regained its strength whilst informal power 
consolidated. This led to a paradoxical situation in which informal power-holders lost 
their influence except those that were able to become incorporated into state structures 
or were formed through members of state structures mimicking the methods of the 
informal criminal sector.  
  70 
 
The Rise of OPS ‘Uralmash’  
 
Sverdlovsk region had become known as a criminal centre from the late 1980s, the 
industrial and mineral wealth of the region, and its strategic location creating making 
the region attractive to illegal business
lxxxi., and from 1994 until the end of the decade 
the number of crimes in the region was higher than in Moscow or St Petersburg, 
despite a smaller population. In the 1993 the situation as already such that the 
presidential envoy to the region, V.V. Mashkov made a public appeal to President 
Boris Yeltsin as follows: 
 
 “It is my duty to inform you the socio-political situation in Sverdlovsk Region, 
which in its post-war development could serve as a model for all Russia, has 
reached a stage where one may categorically state that our country has begun 




Initially criminal activities were of the more traditional type – extortion, protection 
rackets, illegal trade. However the advent of mass privatisation, in a period when 
there was relatively little legal capital available for the purchase of enterprises, 
opened up a major new area of activity (false acquisition of assets) for the more 
ambitious criminal organisations, and allowed them to expand into more legitimate 
business and ultimately to enter politics in order to protect and expand their holdings. 
The phenomenon was not, of course, confined to Sverdlovsk – the St Petersburg 
Duma elections of 1998 saw an early example of large numbers of undisguised (or 
poorly disguised) criminal candidates
lxxxiii. 
 
The Uralmash criminal gang was founded in the late 1980s, taking its name from a 
large industrial district of Ekaterinburg (then Sverdlovsk), its members being drawn 
from the sports sector as well as from traditional criminal circles
lxxxiv, notably the 
Tsiganov brothers, seen as the founder-godfathers of the group.  The group first 
concentrated on traditional racketeering taking control of the city markets by the mid-
1990s and extending into the small business and alcohol distribution sectors. The 
killing of Grigory Tsiganov by the Central
lxxxv gang in 1991 unleashed a series of 
gang wars in which the Uralmash organisation, using bombs and automatic weapons 




By the late 1990s they had expanded into less traditional sectors as such as banking 
and metals export. As Table 2 shows, the period from the mid-1980s to mid 200s saw 
a substantial rise in the level (i.e. status) of operations, organisational development 
and political power of criminal gangs in the Urals.  Whilst the roots of organised 
crime in the region may be traced far back into the Soviet period, the economic 
liberalisation of the early 1990s, accompanied by weak laws and law enforcement, 
allowed a rapid extension in their sphere of influence in the economy, which in turn 
provoked, among the more adaptive groups, rapid development of the gangs in 
institutional terms so that they acquired complex organisational and commercial 
structures, expanded into charitable activities, culminating in their entry into politics.  
 




Stages  Period  Results 




Control over individual 
enterprises especially in trade 
and catering, then individual 
sectors. Establishing contacts 
with officials and law 
enforcement officers  
Formation of organised 
criminal groups (OPG). 
Territorial and sectoral 
expansion (through gang 
warfare)  
1992-95  Control over whole sectors, 
establishment  of spheres  of 
influence and consolidation of 
links with individual officials.  
Expansion of lead 
OPG’s influence and 




Registration of new businesses 
(including security firms) by 
OPG, beginnings of PR activity 
to improve OPG image, and 
obscure criminal activities.  
Consolidation of influence in the 
economy, high profile 
social/charity initiatives 
Formation of Organised 
Crime Societies (OPS)  
1996-2000 Establishment of financial 
holding companies and more 
elaborate commercial 
undertakings. Incorporation of 
wider numbers of social and 
political actors. Participation in 
elections.  
Legalisation and  





Increased influence for groups of 
deputies representing OPS 
interests. Bankruptcy of many  
OPS businesses. Funds placed 
abroad or hidden in real estate 
foundations.  
Reduction on OPS 
influence as a result of 
campaigns against 
organised crime.  
2006-7  Many OPS leaders arrested or in 
hiding. Reduction in numbers 
and visibility of OPS members. 
 
 
In Sverdlovsk region in the early 1990s criminal gangs could be divided into those 
that were ethnically Russian (‘Uralmash’, the ‘Central’ gang, the ‘Blues’, the 
‘Khimmash’ and the ‘Afghans’
lxxxviii ), and those that were based on minority 
ethnicities (Georgians, Chechens, Azeris, Armenians, Tadzhiks) and others.  The mid-
1990s saw a period of violent gang warfare in which Uralmash fought and won a 
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against the ethnic minority gangs.  The battle followed a pattern that was being 
repeated in other large cities in Russia where, as described by Volkov
lxxxix, the 
traditional collectivist gangs were sidelined by market-oriented ‘violent 
entrepreneurs’ of which Uralmash were an influential prototype.  
 
Having established themselves as the leading ethnic Russian gang Uralmash engaged 
in conflict with the ethnic minority gangs, forcing them back into increasingly narrow 
niches, whilst Uralmash itself expanded out of traditional criminal sectors into energy, 
communications and metals trading,
xc becoming a shareholder in a series of new 
banks dealing oil and metal exports
xci . According the security service data, by 1998 
OPG Uralmash had established 200 companies, including 12 banks and were 
shareholders in a further 90 companies
xcii.  Up to 30 per cent of the organisation’s 
profits were reinvested in production in the region and also into a growing number of 
social initiatives. These were geared to improving the gang’s image sufficient to 
enable them to enter the political arena
xciii 
xciv, in alliance with leading regional 
political forces.  
 
A widely quoted (within the region) opinion poll of 1993 found that 74 per cent of 
respondents believed that real power in the region belonged to a ‘mafia that had 
bought officials’, a view it found to be apparently shared by 65 per cent of officials
xcv. 
An similar question in 2003 found that as many as 82 per cent of respondents believed 




The apogee of Uralmash’s influence was attained in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
with the escalation of the rivalry between the regional and city political elites. After 
2003, in which Uralmash’s role became the major election campaign theme, they 
suffered a loss in whatever legitimacy they had gained over the preceding years, and 
came under greater pressure from law enforcement agencies leading to the arrest of 
key figures in the period 2003-6. Just as after the abolition of gubernatorial elections 
from 2004 meant that regional politics would increasingly go ‘underground’, so from 
2004 Uralmash began to adopt a much lower profile in political and business terms. A 
similar decline in overt criminal influence took place in neighbouring regions such as 
Chelyabinsk, Tyumen  and Kurgan.  
 
In retrospect it is curious why gangs such as Uralmash made the transition from being 
the instruments or backers of political campaigns to assuming a higher profile as 
politicians in their own right. The assumption was that if the public tolerated behind-
the-scenes influence of criminal gangs as in the early 1990s elections, they would 
accept the gangsters themselves in the role of politicians. In the event, this assumption 
proved misplaced. Also their influence was dependent on the continuing open conflict 
between the two political regimes, region and city, and once this became less direct 
after 2003 (under pressure from the federal level) the political influence of Uralmash 
and its leaders appeared declined rapidly.   
 
The pictures that emerges is therefore that of a rapid rise of a new form of criminal 
organisation that became a prisoner of its own success – its penetration of the regional 
economy was on a such a scale that it sought to protect its position through a 
relatively high profile entry into politics. This may be seen to have overstretched the 
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federal agencies. It might be possible to argue that the fortunes of the group in this 
case rose with regional autonomy fell as the power of the federal centre was re-
asserted.  
The analysis above suggests that the conventional picture of ‘criminalisation of 
power’ may be an exaggeration – instead it may be argued that the integration of the 
criminal gangs into the political system represented a stage in their own evolution 
away from the crude violent entrepreneurialism of the early 1990s towards becoming 
legal ‘amnestied’ business
xcvii.  According to this view one might argue that it was not 
so much that the state was becoming criminalized but that the criminal organizations 
were becoming ‘statified’, not just in terms of becoming allied to, or legitimized by 
the state, but in terms of carrying out quasi state functions. As one Urals politician 
noted:  
“Where the state and justice could not carry out functions such as guarantor creditor, 
defender, judge etc. These were done through the efforts of former criminal groups 
who have steadily evolved into business groups, which have gone ahead of the state in 
establishing the institutions of the market economy – banks, exchanges, export firms 
and so on. That’s why they have become a real force, influencing all aspects of life. 
Moreover they invest their capital in the Russian economy and is political transition. 
And they were doing this before the agencies of the state, who lacked the necessary 
resources”.
xcviii 
Not all agreed with this assessment: “At least one third of the current economic and 
political elite in our region is drawn from representatives of criminal gangs. The 
legalisation of their activities that took place in the late 1990s does not mean that 
either the leaders or their placemen have changed. The same rules, the same 
hierarchy, but a much wider sphere of activity. It’s now possible to name a whole 
series of people, who can be seen amongst politicians and senior officials, who only 
yesterday were up to their elbows in blood”
xcix 
In 1999 Alexander Khabarov, now the lead figure in OPS Uralmash changed the 
name of the organisation from Organised Crime Society Uralmash to ‘Social and 
Political Union’ Uralmash (the Russian acronym OPS was the same in both cases)
 c. 
This was seen as a key stage in legalisation and provided a potentially acceptable 
under which to be elected to the City Duma. The first of the gang to be elected was 
Alexander Kukovyakin in 2001
ci. Other members ran for election to the Oblast Duma, 
and by the time the leader of OPS Uralmash, Alexander Khabarov was elected to the 
City Duma in April, 2002, he was one of eight Uralmash deputies who, along with 
five ‘inter-regional’ deputies made up an anti-mayor bloc of 14 out of 27 City Duma 
deputies, the first time since the abolition of the former city soviet in 1993 that the 
Mayor faced a majority capable of blocking all decisions. Thus a certain symmetry 
was obtained – a pro-Mayor majority on the Oblast Duma complicated regional 
decision-making, whilst a pro-regional majority in the City Duma would now oppose 
the city administration. The ‘pro-mayor’ group on the City Duma were not 
unconditional supporters of the mayor, several were regularly even routinely critical 
of the administration. The difference was that OPS Uralmash and the inter-regionals 
were opposed on principle to the mayor’s regime and in this respect they were 
working to the governor’s (or deputy governor’s) agenda.    
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The alliance between the Oblast elite and OPS Uralmash was an open secret. 
Rumours had long circulated of a pact whereby Uralmash supported Rossel in the 
election of 1995 onwards, and by 1999 the links had became obvious to the extent that 
they were a ready source of sensational copy for the federal media
cii. In one press 
conference Rossel declared that OPS Uralmash no longer had any problems with the 
law (in fact several of the city Uralmash deputies were pending arrest by the security 
services for serious crimes, protected only by the immunity from prosecution they 
enjoyed as elected politicians) and that the organisation was making a genuine 




The behaviour of the regional media confirmed the alliance. Glowing portraits of 
leading OPS Uralmash members would appear in glossy region-backed journals
civ 
and the media emphasized the charitable and economic roles exercised by OPS 
Uralmash. Khabarov’s election in 2002 was openly celebrated by members of the 
regional PR team, and there were some who appeared to look forward to Khabarov 
replacing Silin (the Mayor’s ally) as chair of the city duma
cv.  Khabarov was not, of 
course, just any gangster. Although his gangster identity was unmistakably reflected 
in his speech and manner, he differed from the traditional criminal bosses, not least by 
being a candidate of pedagogical sciences, but he shared the sporting background of 
many elite gangsters of the era, being a veteran of the Soviet Olympic skiing team.  
Although he had taken part in the gang wars of the early to mid-1990s, Khabarov 
seemed inclined towards building a stable network of criminal and legalized business. 
After the ‘suicide’ in Bulgaria of fellow Uralmash leader Kruk in 2000, Khabarov had 
been able to steer Uralmash into an agreement with its old rivals the Central group, 
headed by Varaksin (who had also been elected to the city duma), so that the latter 
controlled the hotels and restaurant sector in the city centre, leaving Uralmash to 
focus on business and industry. Uralmash looked set for continuing expansion in 
terms of both wealth and influence. In retrospect, however, Uralmash’s entry into 
electoral politics was a major error of judgement on the part of both Uralmash itself 
and the Oblast authorities. .   
 
 
The Election Campaigns of 2003 
 
At the start of 2003 Eduard Rossel appeared isolated, being deeper than ever in 
conflict not only with Chernetsky but with the president’s representative for the Urals, 
Latyshev. In a climate of growing centralization the legacy of the ‘Urals Republic’, 
had the potential to be a political albatross, and the proud stance of a tough regional 
populist leader, so effective at defending one’s corner in the chaotic 1990s could have 
drawbacks. As one regional analyst put it:   
 
“It seems that over 10 years of uninterrupted power E. Rossel has fallen out with the 
whole of the country’s political beau-monde” 
cvi 
 
Paradoxically it may have been the precisely the residual aura of ‘separatism’ left 
from Urals Republic that enabled Rossel to have what amounted to a special status, in 
a way analogous to that of Mintimer Shaimiev, president of Tatarstan, and thereby to 
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as long as they showed respect.    
 
By July, with only two months to go before the gubernatorial election Rossel’s 
unfailing ability to lobby the center had paid off. Not only did he now have the 
blessing of the President to run for a third term, but he would do so as the candidate 
from United Russia, the first governor to be elected for United Russia rather than one 
of its predecessor parties
cvii 
 
Now it was Chernetsky who was under pressure. With Rossel in favour once again at 
the federal centre, and with United Russia backing him, not Chernetsky, the mayoral 
election would be much more difficult than in 1999. In response Tungusov and 
Tushin, Chernetsky’s campaign team, may be seen to have opted for a two stage 
approach: first to establish the theme of organized crime in the gubernatorial elections 
in September, 2003 and then, having established it with public opinion, to use the 
still-warm theme again in December, 2003 when it would be needed to defend the 
mayor against Osintsev’s challenge, especially in the second round. The choice of 
Bakov to stand for governor against Rossel with a campaign theme of organized 
crime was a bold one. Bakov had the reputation of an adventurer, to say the very least, 
who had been involved in a number of scandalous incidents (notably when he had 
been arrested in 2001 for assaulting the oligarch Fedulev during a forced takeover of 
the Khimmash plant), and he had been a close associate of Rossel’s during the period 
when the Governor and Uralmash had allegedly become allied. However these factors, 
plus Bakov’s undeniable gift for self-publicity, may have been precisely what ensured 
a large audience for his public accusations, which were outspoken and dramatic even 
by the standards of Sverdlovsk politics
cviii:   
 
“I kept silent, like we all did. And I thought it was normal… you learn from an early 
age that there is no justice and....you’re not surprised when you see a police chief 
sharing a table with a known bandit. You’re no longer surprised when an underworld 
‘avtoritet’ is praised on television for his philanthropy or when thieves stand for 
election as council deputies”
cix 
 
Perhaps the most effective part of this address was where Bakov described how 
federal politicians such as Seleznev
cx  regarded Sverdlovsk with horror as a 
criminalized region. This hit at the pride of local inhabitants, the self-image of 
Ekaterinburg being that of a highly-educated and progressive city. People could 
ignore the rising profile of OPS Uralmash, but the idea that the city was known for 
this above all else would have struck home. Bakov’s bid for the governorship was of 
course heavily defeated – no one could compete seriously with Rossel’s profile across 
the region. However it had almost certainly made a big impact on the real electoral 
battleground, Ekaterinburg.  
 
The assumption that Osintsev would be the runner-up in the first round of the mayoral 
contest in December that year was correct. There were a number of other candidates, 
most of whom polled very few votes (OPS Uralmash’s  Khabarov and Serebrennikov 
both ran – perhaps to distract attention from their alleged alliance with Osintsev, and 
received very low votes). The local banker Gusev fought a well-funded campaign but 
lacked a clear campaign theme. Jan Gabinsky, the duma deputy, had been strongly 
backed by the governor’s team at first, but was mercilessly lampooned not only by the 
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the combined pressure of which his campaign image collapsed
cxi.   
 
 
The first round showed Osinstev in a close second place. Chernetsky polled 34 per 
cent to Osintsev’s 26 per cent. At this point three losing candidates Khabarov, 
Serebrennikov and Gabinsky, made a joint declaration (known as the ‘December 
agreement’) calling upon the population to vote for Osintsev, in what came to be seen 
as a ‘manifesto from OPS Uralmash in favour of Osintsev, and likely to damage his 
rating
cxii (OPS Uralmash’s own rating had collapsed under pressure from Bakov’s 
‘anti-mafia’ campaign).  
 
The real strength in Osintsev’s campaign came from elsewhere. On 10 December, the 
General Council of United Russia published its decision to support Osintsev, who had 
not previously been a member of that party.
cxiii. The regional branch of United Russia 
swung into action, accusing Chernetsky of slander for his statement that criminals 
supported Osinstev’s candidacy. United Russia suspended all local party members 
who refused to support Osintsev, including duma chair Silin and members of both city 
and oblast dumas.
cxiv Chernetsky was himself instructed on party grounds to support 
his opponent or face disciplinary proceedings.   
 
Osintsev’s team used the support received from the federal centre and from United 
Russia to full effect – deploying the slogan – “Putin for President, Rossel for 
Governor and Osintsev for Mayor” and ‘state power is coming to Ekaterinburg’ 
cxv 
and implying that the president wanted Osinstev to win
cxvi. The logic was expounded 
by Franz Klintsevich, who arrived in Ekaterinburg from the party headquarters in 
Moscow:  
 
“In this country serious changes are occurring. ..no one can deny that Russia is 
seeing a period of the strengthening of state power…Now United Russia has become 
an instrument of the President…in the autumn of this year we supported Eduard 
Rossel, who became the first governor to be elected with the support of a federal party. 
Now it’s time to choose a mayor of Ekaterinburg and the general council has 
supported Yuri Osintsev. That way we will have a logical vertical of power: there is 
President Putin, there is Governor Rossel. Now there must be mayor Osintsev”
cxvii.  
 
On the other side, Bakov made a public appeal, reminding voters that Khabarov and 
OPS Uralmash had called on them to vote for Osinstev, and predicting that if 
Chernetsky lost, OPS Uralmash would begin a bloody re-distribution of city 
property
cxviii and this broadly was the line followed by the pro-mayor campaign.   
 
The organized crime theme had undeniable resonance, particularly in the week 
leading up to the second round on 21 December (previously it had been slow to build 
up momentum, especially given the weightiness of the attacks coming from United 
Russia). Once public opinion had become exercised by the criminal theme, the 
Oblast’s ability to counter this was limited – everyone had after all seen the Oblast 
media backing Khabarov’s election to the city duma the previous year. Khabarov 
himself made a bizarre statement which attempted to argue that in appearing to 
support Osintsev he had actually been working for Chernetsky, thereby helping the 
latter by discrediting Osintsev who, he stated had refused to accept his support unlike, 
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cxix.  This contorted statement, widely 
reported, suggested that the crime theme had begun to damage the Osintsev campaign, 
leading them to take desperate measures.   
 
In the final days before the poll, what were termed the ‘heavy artillery’ from the 
federal level were deployed to support Osintsev - Boris Gryzlov the leader of United 
Russia, Bogomolov the secretary of the UR general council, the presidential 
administration head of internal policy
cxx and leaders of other federal parties including  
Vladimir Zhirinovsky who contributed a fiery tirade about Chernetsky’s Jewish 
origins (“he is of the race that has tormented and murdered Russia”
cxxi while copies 
of what were said to be Chernetsky’s bank account were circulated, apparently as 
proof that he had transferred $170m to a bank in Tel Aviv
cxxii.  
 
The result must have come as a surprise to the Party hierarchy:  Chernetsky – 54% , 
Osintsev 39 %, with 7% spoilt papers. Moreover the turnout, at 51 %, had been very 
high by Russian standards
cxxiii. Headlines declaring ‘Chernetsky beats United Russia 
appeared nationally
cxxiv, although Chernetsky was careful to deny that he had any 
quarrel with United Russia, of he was still a member.  
 
The mayoral election of 2003 was one the last no-holds-barred PR-intensive elections 
in Russia and one of the most closely fought. The result and the high turnout 
suggesting either that the crime theme had reached a substantial proportion of the 
population, or that there had been resentment at the ‘hand of Moscow’ attempting to 
depose the mayor
cxxv , or both. It could be argued that the mayor’s campaign 
senationalised the issue of organized crime and its links with the governor’s camp, but 
there was sufficient evidence for the public to be alarmed. When they read that, for 
example Khabarov and ex-OPS Uralmash colleagues Famiev and Serebrennikov had 
been promised the departments dealing with property, privatization and utilities 
reform if Osintsev should win, this might be a rumour, but it was a rumour that the 
experience of recent years offered no basis for doubt. Public concern was widespread 
over organized crime and had strengthened a civil movement ‘City without Crime’, 
but the elections of 2003 gave the first opportunity to voice this concern effectively.   
 
The mayoral election raises a question mark over the ability of United Russia, or any 
other ‘party of power’ to act as an effective agent of centralization. The party, in this 
case at least, had pressed on with a strong campaign against a mayor who had a strong 
local following and was a key member of the regional organisation of United Russia. 
They had done this presumably not simply because Rossel had lobbied them to do so, 
but because they wanted United Russia to win elections in key regions and cities. 
They had backed Rossel in Sverdlovsk most likely because they realized that his 
position was so strong among the electorate that it would be self-defeating to back a 
different candidate. However they failed to see that Chernetsky was in an equally 
strong position with the electorate of Ekaterinburg. The problem was very likely that 
United Russia officials thought that it would not be possible to work with both Rossel 
and Chernetsky in the same party and so tried to remove Chernetsky. They had not 
anticipated the collision between their pro-legality, pro-vertical State message and the 
fact that their allies in the region had long had a reputation for collaboration with 
organized crime to the extent of even helping known criminals to get elected. Overall 
it appeared as though Governor Rossel had been able to push the party’s federal 
leadership towards a position that had suited him but not the party
cxxvi.  
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Finally the mayoral election of 2003, with its high turnout and unpredictable result 
may be taken as evidence that highly developed PR tactics need not be seen as 
inimical to democracy in a Russian context.  A genuine debate had occurred about 
regional and local governance and the rule of law, albeit conducted through the 
medium of inflammatory language and mutual accusation.  
 
After that election it was clear that:  
 
1.  Public opinion would no longer tolerate visible collaboration between 
authorities and organized crime. This partly reflected the traditional of 
progressive civil society that had had long existed in Ekaterinburg, but also 
that stability and prosperity meant that people felt bolder than in the mid-
1990s when they had been passive impoverished spectators of the gang wars.  
 
2.  Public opinion could not be relied on to defer to recommendations from above 
(i.e. from the federal centre), especially if these were seen as dismissive of 
their city or region. This does not mean that voters were voting against Putin – 
it is very likely that many of those who voted for Chernetsky in December had 
voted for Rossel in September and would vote for Putin the following year.  
 
3.  United Russia would need work more closely with regional and local elites 
(and not simply act on what an individual governor told them) if it was to 
maintain its own popularity in elections. People who would willingly vote for 
Putin as president would not necessarily vote consistently for the ‘state 
vertical’, in the sense of voting at all levels for whoever could be portrayed as 
a pro-Putin candidate.  
 
4.  That in a war of electoral attrition both city and regional elites could defend 
their own position indefinitely but not win on the other’s home ground. 
Therefore it was in the interests of both, as well as of the federal centre, to find 
some form of co-existence.  
 
 
The election campaign threw together all three levels of government, plus the 
informal power of the criminal sector, in highly dramatic and concentrated fashion. It 
was clear that the influence of organised crime was set to be radically reduced, whilst 
the power of the federal centre was to increase, although it would have to use more 
subtle tactics, at least in this region.  
 
          
The Fall of ex-OPS Uralmash 
 
The mayoral election of 2003 stalled the decade-long progress of ex- OPS Uralmash
 
cxxvii towards acceptance as legitimate business, however defined.  However the 
catalyst for their downfall was a dispute over centralisation within the criminal world, 
between Moscow and the regions.  
 
Following the Beslan school massacre in August, 2004 a series of explosions and arson 
attacks against Caucasian
cxxviii property and businesses took place in Ekaterinburg. On 15 
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Caucasians were however present. The crowd was in fact a gathering of the Uralmash, 
Central and Blue gangs, called to debate how to resist what was seen as an attempt the 
Moscow (Caucasian) underworld to infringe their territory. What was presented as a rally for 
inter-communal peace was in fact a show of strength against an alleged move by Caucasian 
organised crime groups in Moscow, operating through traditional criminal structures, 
represented in Ekaterinburg by the ‘Blues’ were seeking to establish a structure to control 
Sverlovsk Oblast. The response would be a gang war by OPS Uralmash and OPS Centre to 
take control of the Blues in order to prevent their becoming a vehicle for takeover by Moscow. 
As Khabarov declared:  
 
«..Dark forces, including Moscow thieves-in-law want to come into our 
Oblast..these forces are moving like a wave across the whole country and in 




Whether or not Khabarov and Varaksin’s show of force affected their Moscow rivals, 
it scared the federal media, for whom the potential power of the criminal gangs had 
never been made so manifest. Questions were asked in the State Duma by 
Zhirinovsky’s LDPR party about a coming inter-regional gang war.  The leadership of 
United Russia responded by asking the Federation Council to investigate, which led to 
a demand that the law and order forces in the region fulfil their responsibilities, which 
was accepted by Latishev, the president’s representative
cxxx (who said that this was 
already in progress).  
 
In December, 2004, after a scandal involving the acquisition by Khabarov and 
Varaksin of 40 per cent of a regional bank, Bank24.ru. Khabarov was arrested for 
extortion, while Varaksin fled. Considerable publicity surrounded the arrest, most 
seeing it as proof that the authorities were now seriously combating organised crime, 
although some inevitably saw it as part of a struggle between criminal clans in 
Moscow and Sverdlovsk. Few however expected the next turn of events.  
 
On 27 January, 2005 Khabarov was found hanged in his cell in Ekaterinburg.  The 
death of Khabarov shocked the political elite of the region – Rossel (apparently 
shocked) commented “I could have expected anything but that”, whilst Oblast deputy 
Famiev was the first to suggest Khabarov had been murdered, the implication that the 
killing was organised by the Moscow underworld
cxxxi, although the official version 
remains suicide.  
 
The combination of the bad publicity (and strong public reaction) in the election 
campaigns of 2003, the death of Khabarov and a new campaign against organised 
crime led by the Urals Federal District all amounted to a serious decline in ex-OPS 
Uralmash’s influence. Within months its leading members were either jailed or in 
hiding abroad. No ex-OPS Uralmash candidates were fielded for the municipal 
elections of 2005 (apart from anything else, election as city deputy no longer gave 
immunity from arrest) and of its allies from the anti-mayoral bloc of 2002-3, only 
Gabinsky was re-elected.  
 
With the decline of ex-OPS Uralmash, the influence of organised crime over politics 
and mainstream business and industry was very substantially reduced. The effect in 
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have created openings for others especially in areas such as narcotics that Uralmash 
had restricted or opposed. How far the Sverdlovsk underworld really came under the 
control of Moscow groups as alleged by Uralmash is difficult to assess. If crime did 
become centralised in this fashion it was also likely to become more specific in its 
scope, without the breadth of ambition that characterised Uralmash in the 1990s and 
early 2000s.   
 
 
Inside the Bear’s Tent  
 
From 2004 the leadership United Russia 
cxxxii began to work on building peace 
between Chernetsky and Rossel, presumably in the expectation that each could deliver 
success for United Russia in federal elections. Rossel and Chernetsky still 
manoeuvred against each other in the Oblast Duma and City Duma
cxxxiii, although 
each now had a clear majority in their respective dumas.  
 
Much more surprisingly, from 2004 Chernetsky and Rossel began to appear in public, 
apparently on friendly terms. Cynics held that this became especially noticeable in the 
run-up to elections, where now both were backing United Russia
cxxxiv.  There were 
however also major practical benefits for the city and region in their new partnership 
– projects such as the airport and several large territorial development projects have 
been completed or launched as a result of investor confidence increasing due to the 
end of open hostilities and start of genuine collaboration between city and oblast.  
 
There was a brief return of anti-mayor activism in early 2007 (analogous moves were 
being seen to be made against city mayors elsewhere in Russia), with attempts to 
remove Chernetsky from the future election (due March 2008) by legal means 
cxxxv. 
With finance-related charges being drawn up against both Chernetsky and Tungusov 
predictions of Chernetsky’s downfall began to appear once again, the implication 
being that large-scale business (presumably with federal links) would move in. 
According to one report the position was summed up by Kabanov, the head of the 
national anti-corruption committee, in the following terms: 
 
‘The posts of mayor or governor are now economic posts and they cost a lot of money. 
There’s going to a new division of property (in Russia) and your mayor’s ‘roof has 
got thin’ as they say in proto-criminal circles’
cxxxvi.  
 
It is curious how in Russia the idea has taken hold that money alone is sufficient to 
win elections, when the evidence (from this case, as well as many others
cxxxvii) that 
this is not the case.   
 
This may have been recognized by the federal leadership, which appears to have 
treated Rossel and Chernetsky better than many other regional leaders, perhaps on 
account of each having a very strong local following.  In June, 2007, Vladislav 
Surkov, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, with overall responsibility 
for political parties and movements, began a series of individual meetings with 
regional heads, beginning with Eduard Rossel. With other once-powerful Yeltsin-era 
governors such as Prusak (Novgorod) and Titov (Samara) resigning 
cxxxviii for 
(reportedly) not preventing conflict between ‘business groups’ on their territory and 
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federal elections
cxxxix, one might have expected Rossel to be in danger, but the 
outcome of the discussion was that Rossel would stay in post. Chernetsky was called 
to see Surkov the following week. The result was confirmation that Chernetsky would 
be second on the regional United Russia list, after Rossel (this is indeed was 
subsequently occurred) and that the federal centre would support him a mayor in the 
March, 2008 elections
cxl. For his part, Rossel arranged for the oblast duma to reduce 
the number of rounds in the mayoral election to one, which was reported as being a 
‘present’ to Chernetsky, although it would presumably more in Chernetsky’s interest 
to keep two rounds as no known candidate would be likely to beat him on the second 
round, whereas if there were a large number of candidates he might not win an 
outright majority in one round
cxli 
 
Whether this brings the Rossel-Chernetsky rivalry to a definitive end is not entirely 
clear. However it seems likely that their teams collaborated in September, 2007 in 
order to dispose of any threat from the second Kremlin-backed party, the Party of 
Justice and its populist leader in Sverdlovsk Oblast, Evgeny Royzman.  Royzman, a 
State Duma deputy known to some as ‘young Uralmash’ as he fronted OPS 
Uralmash’s anti-narcotics charity, had been vaunted as a candidate to run for mayor in 
2008, using his position as a leading member of the Party of Justice as a basis for his 
campaign (just as Gabinsky in 2003 had hoped to use his position in the Party of Life).  
It had been agreed that Royzman would head the Party of Justice list for  Sverlovsk in 
December 2007 duma elections 
 
In the event an elaborate ‘sting’ was organized (by Tungusov, it was widely assumed) 
whereby the Party of Justice list ended up being headed not by Royzman but by none 
other than Alexander Burkov (Bakov’s associate who had formerly led the ‘May’ 
movement and had figured in many political intrigues over the past decade) with the 
rest of the list being made up of his allies. This took Royzman and other leaders of the 
Party of Justice by surprise, but they were unable to alter the result, which ensured 
that Royzman would not have the benefit of a senior federal party position to support 
his candidacy for mayor (a similar ruse had been played on Gabinsky by Bakov in 
2003).  
 
In the meantime President Putin had declared that he was backing United Russia, 
thereby making this the definitive Kremlin party, and leaving the other pro-Putin 
party, the Party of Justice, effectively marginalized.  This led to a further twist 
whereby the obliging Burkov announced that he would be prepared to join United 
Russia after all, and to persuade his colleagues on the Party of Justice list to do the 
same, thereby engineering the closing down of the Party of Justice list in Sverdlovsk 
Oblast. This would give a boost to the percentage of votes for United Russia in the 
Oblast. This was reportedly welcomed by Rossel’s chief of staff and acting head of 
United Russia in the region, Alexander Levin, who praised the idea and in exchange 
(reportedly) offered Burkov the full support of the Governor if he were to run for 
Mayor of Ekaterinburg in March, 2008
cxlii .  
 
However this scenario, very much in the Byzantine traditions of the region, seems 
unlikely to materialize. In October Chernetsky and Rossel were present at Putin’s 
birthday celebrations in Moscow, and the opportunity was taken also to celebrate 
Rossel’s 70
th birthday, with Chernetsky presenting his former foe with a valuable 
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What can be concluded from this review of seventeen years’ in the political life of 
Sverdlovsk and the city of Ekaterinburg?  In terms of the questions posed at the 
beginning of this paper, the answers that may be derived from the narrative are as 
follows.  
 
Why was the conflict so sustained compared to other regions, i.e. why did neither side 
give in?  There are several answers using a four-dimensional framework
cxliii 
 
a) Structural.  
Ekaterinburg was a striking example of the trend whereby monocentric regions 
are more disposed to conflict, with not just a high proportion of the region’s 
population concentrated in the city, but a much higher percentage of business and 
service (an estimated 80 per cent of regional retail sales) for example. This gave a 
very solid base for a mayor to reject subordination to a governor. It has been 
shown by Kathryn Stoner-Weiss 
cxliv that the more concentrated the economy the 
more likely that region and sub-regional levels will co-operate. We would not 
support her corollary, that regions where all levels are in agreement perform better 
– during the period 2001-3 Ekaterinburg grew in commercial terms faster than any 
other city in Russia, and received federal awards for this, despite having highly 
adversarial relations between levels. Stoner-Weiss’s findings may apply for the 
industrial economy of cities but not services. Thus the very wide range of sectors 
in Ekaterinburg’s industrial economy supports the view that less concentration 
may mean more potential for conflict. With services it may be the reverse – if 
service development is concentrated in one city, and if that sector is growing 
rapidly, then this can provide the basis for a long-running city-region conflict.  
 
b) Institutional 
The narrative shows Ekaterinburg to have a strong institutional culture in which 
elements that may be present in other Russian regions are developed to a higher 
degree. There were similarities in the structure and styles of operation of both the 
governor and the mayor, with a passing resemblance to the regime of Boris 
Yeltsin (prior to 1994 – unlike Yeltsin neither Chernetsky or Rossel had any 
obvious weaknesses nor were there any period when they were not clearly in 
control of the situation).  There are common elements – the sense of a war footing 
– with certain relationships and practices fixed with a high degree of certainty so 
that a very high level of uncertainty and unpredictability in the institutional 
environment can be dealt with. The role of a highly stable and loyal the 
political/OR team was essential to the survival of both sides, whilst the 
administrative team was subject to changes, sometimes according to political 
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c) Psychological  
The competitiveness and uncertainty of the political/institutional culture almost 
certainly have a selective effect on the type of person capable of leading in those 
conditions over a long period, and the nature of those responsible for the political 
teams waging the PR war. It is hard to believe that many other regions had 
persons combining the deviousness and professionalism of those responsible for 
these functions in Sverdlovsk. The psychological character of the region plays a 
part here – Sverdlovsk had its moment of glory during the five-year plans and 
during the Second World War when industry including much high technological 
production were moved there. This has given it a combination of psychological 
self-sufficiency combined with resentment at any attempt by the capital city to 
pull rank. The two leaders also came from atypical backgrounds for party bosses 
(Rossel a German, Chernetsky a Jew) but had excelled in the ‘hard school’ of 
party industrial management, far from the institutes from which the generations of 
‘young reformers’ graduated. The progressive mayors of 1990 were usually not 
re-elected whilst their conservative equivalents often never faced a challenge. 
Rossel and Chernetsky combined the strengths of the industrial nomenklatura with 
a more open intellectual approach, leading one towards the ideal Urals republic 
and the other towards the idea of an outward-looking post-industrial business 
capital in the former closed factory-city.  
 
d) Ideational 
The view of Matsuzato cited at the beginning of this paper that Chernetsky and 
Rossel were interchangeable falls down when one approaches their conflict from 
the point of view of ideas. Rossel has never seemed able to move on from the 
Gosplan/Gaullist ideal of an industrial region, with sectors being backed and 
supported by the state. Chernetsky on the other hand may have been a heavy 
industrial manager by origin but over the more than a decade in office became the 
main proponent of the idea of the autonomous city as an engine of growth and 
civil society development, so that a city built as a factor could evolve into 
something closer to the European urban ideal. This informed the strategy at a time 
when it was still possible to see documents whose authors felt it necessary to 
justify funding the health service on the basis that it helped workers to increase 
production. There were many advocates of European-style self-government in 
Russia in the 1990s and many were elected  once but Chernetsky was almost the 
only case where a mayor who believed in local self-government of cities had the 
quite different capacity necessary to stay in control of one for more than one 
mandate.   
 
The incomplete Leviathan: Hobbes and Russia 
The remaining questions – concerning organised crime and the issue of Locke 
versus Hobbes in Russia - are linked in this case and can be answered together. 
Firstly we may note the ways in which the development of the organised crime 
sector shadowed developments in the formal political sector, how the chaos of the 
1990s gradually stabilised around a new set of principles, but how the problem of 
levels of authority continued to be an issue even when territories had ceased to be 
a cause of conflict. Secondly we can see an overall trend whereby as the state 
became more stable and more powerful so the criminal sector began to change and 
seek to legitimise itself. The story of Uralmash suggests that although the region’s 
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the state, there was if anything a stronger trend whereby organised crime sought to 
become like a state or even to be submerged in the state in order to survive. 
Thirdly, and more importantly we can see that Shlapentokh’s view of Hobbes as 
the state that enters the stage to end the anarchy of the war of all against all that 
follows in the wake of the collapse of the Lockean dream of civil society does not 
quite fit the facts of what occurred in Sverdlovsk Oblast. It was not the federal 
state that prevented organised crime from continuing its advance in Ekaterinburg, 
it was the citizens in response to an appeal by the city leadership. The mayor’s 
election victory of 2003 was in effect a referendum on organised crime and the 
city’s autonomy. The result weakened organised crime in the city and prepared the 
ground for the federal agencies to take action, as occurred the following year. Had 
the mayor and the city elite given way and become subordinate, organised crime, 
albeit in an increasingly ‘statified’ form, would have survived and it is hard to see 
how the federal level could have dealt with it without overturning the whole 
regional structure of power. The 2003 election isolated OPS Uralmash and 
rendered them identifiable and vulnerable. In a large country, especially with a 
regional level, Leviathan cannot actually prevent the state of war continuing 
without the pluralist checks and balances provides by other levels closer to the 
ground.   
 
The notion that an opposition between Locke and Hobbes may be used to explain 
what has occurred in Russia over the last two decades appears at first to fit the 
narrative. Firstly Locke’s assumption that the default ‘state of nature’ was 
peaceful as a rule did not deny the need for a state for protection (nor did he 
believe that government emerged from below (as government pre-dated 
records)
cxlv . Locke’s concern is not with marginalising state power but 
emphasising it legal (and therefore limited) character. However his advocacy of 
institutional checks and balances implies an acceptance that laws of themselves 
cannot guarantee good governance – and it was perhaps this aspect of Locke that 
has been insufficiently appreciated in Russia since 1990. The operation of checks 
and balances imply conflict, or at least the potential for conflict. Here we may 
recall Hobbes’ broad definition of the state of war:  
 
For war consisteth not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in the tract of time, 
wherein the will to contend battle is sufficiently known
cxlvi. 
 
This potential for ‘battle’ could be taken to be the basis for the operation of checks 
and balances – without a ‘potential for battle’, no system if scrutiny or oversight  
is likely to achieve much. Without a mechanism of open political competition 
within the elite neither the concentration of state power nor the elaboration of the 
legislative base are sufficient to prevent corruption and state weakness ‘on the 
ground’. Central power may be unchallenged, but this does not mean it can project 
itself throughout the system. Therefore the opposition between centralisation 
(Hobbes) or civil society (Locke) is a false one – both require a multi-layered 
system of checks and balances to be effective, and competitive electoral 
democracy provides the best basis for this. Rivalries like that between Chernetsky 
and Rossel can be in the public interest, as the election of 2003 and the reaction 
against organised crime demonstrated.  
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Chernetsky in the 2003 mayoral election even when instructed by United Russia to support Osintsev or 
be expelled from the Party.  
 
xxxv E.Loskutova , Biography of Anton Bakov,  http://www.anticompromat.ru/bakov/bakbio.html. The 
creation of May anticipated the movements launched under the coordination of Surkov (deputy head of 
the presidential administration) and Anton Bakov in 2004-5. 
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xxxvi   See S.Kuznetsov ‘Dviuzheniye “Mai” – rostki grazhdanskogo obschestva ili zachatki 
ekstremisma?’ for a discussion of the extremism/civil society dichotomy of ‘May’,   
http:///xxx.svoboda.ural.ru/ch/ch19990522.html  
 
xxxvii According to media reports, ‘May’ had no genuine activists but consisted entirely of workers from 
the Serov metallurgical plant (a factory in the town of Serov in the north of Sverdlovsk Oblast, that had 
been given to Bakov during the mid-1990s when he was allied with Rossel). For each attendance at a 
May rally the workers were given 1-200 ‘Urals Franks’ to spend in the company shop. The same hired 
activitists supported Bakov in a mass attack on the Khimmash chemical plant which ended with Bakov 
forcibly expelling the previous owner, the oligarch Fedulev (admittedly a highly compromised figure in 
his own right), from the premises. The May movement transformed the political fortunes of Bakov’s 
associate Burkov, who went from winning 1% in previous elections to winning 28% against Rossel in 
the 1999 Gubernatorial contest. Although Rossel won easily with 78%, Burkov had succeeded in 
joining  the political elite and went on win seats at regional and national levels. See Kommersant 
Den’gi 16 (471)  26 April, 2004.   
 
xxxviii Chenetsky was to lobby consistently for an expansion for the fiscal base of local self-government, 
for which he made a strong case in front of President Putin  at the 2003 annual conference of the 
Congress of Municipalities.  
 
xxxix See S.Kondratiev ‘The Urals Federal Okrug’ in P.Reddaway and R.Orttung (eds.) The Dynamics of 
Russian Politics: Putin’s Reform of Federal-Regional Relations. Vol. 1, 2004. pp 196-9.  
 
xl  It would be more accurate to say one of the candidates. Rossel had difficulty in choosing one 
candidate to oppose Chernetsky, both in 1999 and 2003. Several were backed, with the final choice 
being made on the eve of the election. For much of the run-up to the election of 2003 Rossel’s team 
had been backing a different candidate, Gabinsky, seeing Osinstev more as a stalking horse to trip up 
and destabilise the Mayor’s position.  
 
xli The city administration denied the charges, which were never, to our knowledge, proven.  
 
xlii The limitations on the ability of parties of power to secure their desired outcome in elections is 
discussed by A. Konitzer in ‘Voting for Russia’s Governors’ , Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2005. A 
series of defeats by United Russia gubernatorial candidates in the early 2000s was seen as encouraging 
a move to use legal methods of disqualification instead and, ultimately to abolish elections for regional 
heads altogether.   
 
xliii In Russian governance, whether at federal, regional or municipal level, the Economy department 
has lead responsibility for overall development strategy, a legacy of the Soviet state planning hierarchy 
of Gosplan. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Gosplan became the Ministry of Economy of the 
Russian Federation (the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine and several other former soviet republics 
follows a similar logic) . Departments of Economy at municipal level are not hierarchically subordinate 
to the Ministry of Economy, but are required to collect and submit statistics.   
 
xliv   Some within the city hold the view that the federal projects presided over potential successor to 
Putin, Dmitri Medvedev (with whom the city’s strategists had met in 2003), on which part of the 
federal budget’s oil-generated surplus is being spent, took their inspiration from the Ekaterinburg City 
Strategy, which placed an emphasis on Education, Health and Housing as strategic areas of 
improvement in a way that was uncharacteristic of Russian policy in the early 2000s – interview with 
senior economic manager, Ekaterinburg City Administration. June, 2007.  
 
xlv  Russia-Advice to the City of Ekaterinburg (RACE), DFID (UK Department for International 
Development, which ran from 2000 to 2003 and was co-ordinated by the authors of this contribution. 
Elena Denezhkina was project manager and a member of the Co-ordinating Council and of the Board 
of the Programme Council for the Ekaterinburg Strategic Partnership. Adrian Campbell was project 
director. See the city strategy web-site http://www.strategy-burg.ru/ , also ‘The Ekaterinburg City 
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Strategy’. Interview with Adrian Campbell in ‘Stolitsa Urala’, Issue 3, July, 2003 (in Russian) and 
Russian national radio interview with Adrian Campbell,  Ekho Moskvy, April, 2003 (in Russian). 
 
xlvi    See article by Igor Saveliev ‘Ekaterinburg Obraz Goroda XXI veka’, http://www.arm-
group.ru/rus/talks/articles/citydev/yekaterinburganimageforxxicentury/ 
 
xlvii   G.A. Kovalyeva ‘Rational’noye razmeshcheniye proizvodstvennykh cul – fundamental’naya 
osnova perspektivnogo pazvitiys goroda Ekaterinburga’, papoer presente at Russian Cities on the 
threshold of the twenty-first century, theory and practice of strategic management, 31 October – 1 
November, 2000, Ekaterinburg.  
 
xlviii   Observed by authors at conference, ‘Russian Cities on the Threshold of the XXI century, 
Ekaterinburg, November, 2000.  
 
xlix This pattern of network migration is not uncommon in Russian organisations. If a leading figure 
joins a different organisation, the persons who had enjoyed the patronage of that figure in the first 
organisation will frequently then move across to the second.  In this case the pattern was not followed 
observed entirely. After Maslakov followed Osintsev to the region, it was assumed that their protégé 
Alexander Vysokinsky, who replaced Maslakov as head of the city economic department, but in the 
event Vysokinsky stayed and took over the running of the strategy, under the direction of the Mayor 
and 1
st Deputy.  
 
l Convesations with city official, Ekaterinurg, October, 2001.  
 
li    T h i s  i s  n o t  o f  c o u r s e  a n  i s o l a t e d  c a s e .  A s  an external element inserted into a complex   
organisational/political environment, a donor projects may become a lightning conductor for 
underlying conflicts within that system.  
 
lii  In a meeting in June 2001, for example Maslakov publicly declared that no agreement existed 
between the bi-lateral project and the city administration. Only when a copy of an agreement  from 
February, 2001 with Maslakov’s own signature was produced (and of which all other copies in the 
administration building disappeared) was this challenge dropped.     
 
liii   Boris Zhikharevich of the Leontiev Centre in St Petersburg, and Artashes Gazaryan, of the Local 
Government Centre in Klaipeda, among others.   
 
liv Dr Alexander Bochko of the Academy of Sciences and Professor Animitsa of the Urals Economic 
University.  
 
lv See structure of Ekaterinburg strategic partnership (programme council) on on http://www.strategy-
burg.ru/index.php?page=authors 
 
lvi Strategicheskiy Plan Ekaterinburga, Ekaterinburg Municipal Formation and Programme Council of 
Strategic Development of Ekaterinburg. Ekaterinburg, 2003.  
 
lvii Although conflict and rivalry between city and region had been a constant feature of the political 
and administrative context in Ekaterinburg this does not preclude cooperation – active animosity tends 
to be confined the elected heads (Governor and Mayor) and their respective political/PR teams. The 
administrative teams – regional government (in the sense of a group of functional ministries presided 
over by a Chair or premier) and the city departments led by deputy mayors and 1
st deputy mayors could 
and did cooperate to a degree. Thus it was possible to involve the premier of the regional government 
to take part in the board of the programme council, but understood that the governor would not take 
part. Equally, the 1
st Deputy Mayor of Ekaterinburg would routinely take part in meetings of the 
economic council set up by the governor, whereas it would have been difficult for the mayor to attend 
such a meeting. Thus there was a working distinction between political and administrative spheres, 
although as elections approached the distinction became more difficult to maintain.  
 
lviii According to the same logic, the city was able to collaborate with the Oblast Government on topics 
where the Governor was not directly involved. 
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lix  Although the region’s hostility to the city strategy became increasingly evident as the strategy 
developed, it is not clear how far direct confrontation over the strategy, as described in this paper, was 
an explicit aim of the political/PR team in the Governor’s residence, or whether it was more the 
initiative of a different PR team, working directly for Yuri Osintsev as regional foreign affairs minister 
and mayoral candidate. Anecdotal evidence suggested that there were very distinct teams working in 
political/PR tactics at the regional level and that there was less than full agreement about Osintsev’s 
campaign.  
 
lx  ‘Ekaterinburg or Birmingham’ by Nikolai Eichler, http//www.politsovet.ru/analytic.asp?article=1260    
27 November, 2002. Note : this pro-Osinstev article appeared on a web-site controlled by Anton Bakov 
who was to lead Chernetsky’s campaign against Osintsev the following year. Clearly in 2002 Bakov 
was not yet fully allied to the mayor’s  team.  
 
lxi Conversation with city officials, June, 2007. The strategy had been presented widely, especially 
through the urban strategy network established by Boris Zhikharevich at the Leontiev Centre in St 
Petersburg, and had been brought to Medvedev’s attention in 2003-4.  The participatory structure of the 
strategy co-ordination council and the partnership principle embodied by the programme council, as 
welL; as the arrangements for cooperation between stakeholders, experts and line managers were also 
highly innovative in a Russian context.   
 
lxii Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Svedlovsk Region, ‘Analytical conclusions on the draft strategic plan 
of Ekaterinburg up to 2015’ prepared by the Deputy Chair of the Oblast Government and delivered to 
the City Duma of Ekaterinburg on 23 April, 2003’”.  
 
lxiii Conversation with Ekaterinburg city officials, and with the Inter-regional Deputies’s Faction (in 
April, 2003).  
 
lxiv Curiously the boycott was not initially declared such by its organisers. At the meeting the Duma 
Chair, Yacov Silin had been obliged to read out a list of excuses from those who were absent. Most 
memorably, a group of the OPS Uralmash deputies said they could not attend as they were celebrating 
their leader Khabarov’s birthday.  These excuses were not sent beforehand as this would have removed 
the element of surprise, which was considerable.   
 
lxv A. Campbell and E. Denezhkina, “Comments on the ‘Analytical conclusions on the draft strategic 
plan of Ekaterinburg up to 2015’ prepared by the Deputy Chair of the Oblast Government and 
delivered to the City Duma of Ekaterinburg on 23 April, 2003’”  15 pages. Sent to Regional 
Administration 28 April, 2003. Published on (city) API news web-site (in Russian).  26 May, 2003 
under the heading:  ‘Britansky experty rekomenduyut Ekaterinburgskoi gordumye prinyat 
strategichesky plan goroda, nesmotrya na vozrazheniya Yuriya Osintseva. 
http://www.apiural.ru/politic/?news_id=9271   
 
lxvi  e.g.  Director proiekta RACE obvinyaet nekotopykh deputatov Ekaterinburgskikh deputativ vo lzhi, 
http://www.apiural.ru/politic/?news_id=8605  7.05.03.     
Ekaterinburg. Deputaty gordumy pozhaluyutsya na ‘khamskiye deistviya Britanskikh uchenykh. 
http:www.regions.ru/news/1101157/    12.05.03.  
‘Strategicheskaya Feeriya: rossisskaya deistvitel’nost’ v zerkale skandala’, Revizor No. 5 May-June, 
2003. 
 




lxix Conversation with pro-oblast journalists in May, 2003.  
 
lxx Vtoroi front protiv Gabinskogo, Politsoviet.ru/analytic.asp.article=5156, 19.09.03 
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lxxi http://www.egd.ru/index.php?menu_id=16041&show_id=8858.   The strategic plan itself was  seen 
by some as the precursor for the Russian Federation’s national projects, see http://www.pnp-ekb.ru/.  
 
lxxii  Meeting with Arkady Chernetsky and city officials, June, 2007.  
 
lxxiii   Vadim Volkov ‘Violent Entrepreneurs: the use of force in the making of Russian capitalism’, 
Cornell University Press. 55.  
 
lxxiv ‘On the results of research into detected groups and the observed forms of organised crime in the 
Uzbek SSR’. Central  Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, 1985.  
 
lxxv V.Volkov’Violent Entrepeneurs:the use of force in the making of Russian Capitalism, ITHACA, 
Cornell University Press, 2002. pp 54-63.  
 
lxxvi Volkov considers that Russia in the 1990s was close to the Hobbesian ‘state of nature’, with the 
state reduced to no more than one of a range of protection institutions. Whilst this may be an 
exaggeration,  our research in the mid-1990s in Nizhny Novgorod  and Ekaterinburg  found evidence of 
the inter-linked network of krishi (‘roofs’) who provided protection services, disputes between whom 
were increasingly subject to a form of justice provided by avtoriteti at the next level up. This network 
was seen by respondent as more conherent and more reliable than the state system at the time.  
 
lxxvii Mafia v Ekaterinburge, V.b. Zhitenev, Institute of Social Research and Techniques. Ekaterinburg, 
1993.  
 
lxxviii Most groups of this type have a limited territorial or sectoral focus, but others operate on an inter-
regioanl or intenational level.  
 
lxxix I.e. providing a level cover or ‘roof’ for illegal activity.  
 
lxxx Volkov op.cit. 191.  
 
lxxxi.  According to the local press those released from the elite prisons in the vicinity tend to stay in 
Ekaterinburg.  
 
lxxxii Letter to B.N.Yeltsin from the President’s Representative for Sverdlovsk Region, V.V.Mashkov, 
13 January, 1993. 
  
lxxxiii One may hypothesize regarding a possible correlation between urban centres being economically 
strong, having liberal electorates ad the emergence of strong criminal organisations. The explanation 
would b that progressive electorates tended to be concentrated in the more developed urban centres. 
These more affluent and liberal centres saw the sharpest falling away of the soviet-era ruling elite from 
the late 1980s onwards, and especially after the elections of 1990. The reformist ideology held that 
speed of reform was of the essence and that state enforcement was not, and that organised crime was 
either an ephemeral by-product of transition or even a necessary stage in the ‘primitive accumulation of 
capital’. In more traditional regions the maintenance of old elite networks may have meant that 
organised crime was kept within tighter bounds and was not able to expand into politics.  
 
lxxxiv The brothers Grigory and Konstanin Tsiganov 
 
lxxxv The central gang, led by Oleg Vagin and (after Vagin’s demise,),  Varaksin were based in the city 
centre around the service sector, unlike Uralmash who were based in the industrial suburbs.  
 
lxxxvi  The term ‘blues’ refers to the practice of extensive body-tattooing among long term inmates in 
Soviet and Russian penal colonies. These traditional criminals have little in common with, and have 
been hostile to, the new wave of businesslike criminals of the Uralmash type (Volkov’s Violent 
Entrepreneurs)..  
 
lxxxvii   Table 2 is based on the analysis of many local and national press reports over the period 
concerned, as well as interviews. 
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lxxxviii In some cases associations and voluntary groups concerned with those who had served in the war 
in Afghanistan became organised crime groups.  
 
lxxxix Volkov, op.cit,  
 
xc Oblastnaya Gazeta, 17.10.1993. 
 
xci Zhitenev, op.cit.  
 
xcii  The main spheres of influence of this group were in copper-related holdings e.g. ‘Evropa’, 
petrochemicals ‘Uralnefteproduct’, mobile services (‘Uralvestcom’), car sales, breweries 
 
xcii Expert,  15.04.2002. 
 
xciv The name OPS (Organised Crime Society) became known in 1993 following the arrest of 
Konstantin Tsiganov, its then leader.  The arrest caused a reaction in the business community. The head 
of the broker firm ‘Eurasia’, Andrei Panpurin referred to OPS Uralmash as being not a criminal group 
but a ‘financial group’ with a speciality in socially-oriented activities, and referred to their ‘civilised 
and democratic’ style of operation., that businesses were not squeezed by them but that so that 
Konstantin Tsiganov was a ‘stabilising factor’ for the enterprises that came into contact with him, and 
that he upheld a balance of power within the city that could be upset following his arrest.  Tsiganov 
was released and the group continued its operations but in a more discreet fashion.  Panpurin, it later 




xcvi Uralsky Rabochiy, November 2006.  
 
xcvii Oblastnaya Gazeta 28.05.04. 
 
xcviii Interview with local politician, Ekaterinburg,, 2003. 
 
xcix Interview with member ofcity duma, 2003.  
 
c Uralsky Rabochy 28.12.1999. 
 
cii  See Vesti.ru 12.11.99  ‘Chisto ural’skiye umel’tsi’,  
 
ciii Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 June, 1999. 
 
civ See, for example, the profile of Kukovyakin in Revizor No. 6 June-July, 2003.  
 
cv Conversations with regional officials, 2002.  In the end it was not Khabarov who reoplaced Silin, but 
Porunov, the mayor’s ally who had previously been chair of the Oblast Duma, who replaced Silin 
following a cooling of relations between Silin and Chernetsky 
   
cvi Region Ekspert, February, 2003: 11.  
 
cvii Nezavisimaya Gazeta 10 July.  
 
cviii Some considered Bakov to be not only a ‘scandalously known businessman’ but also ‘rumoured to 
be close to criminal groups’.  
 
cix  Anton Bakov ‘Ne mogu Molchat’’. http://www.bakov.ru/nemogu.shtml 
 
cx Gennady Seleznev, then speaker of the State Duma, with whom Bakov was on good terms, as he was 
also with Surkov, in the Presidential Administration.  
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cxi A video tape was broadcast, showing Gabinsky in the city duma apparently asking OPS Uralmash 
Kukovyakin for financial support for his campaign, without realising the microphone was switched on.  
The end to his campaign was reportedly brought about by Anton Bakov using federal connection to 
have his rating in the Party of Life lowered, therefore undermining his campaign stance of being a 
substantial political figure.  
 
cxii Uralsky rabochy  11 December 2003.  
 
cxiii Oblastnaya Gazeta 16 December 2003.  
 
cxiv Kommersant,m 19 December, 2003.  
 
cxv  Ekaterinburg – na smenu,, Narodnaya Volya no 25 (72)  13 December, 2003. Yuri Osintsev: 
Razgovor po Cuschesvu. (manifesto). 
 
cxvi Oblastnaya Gazeta, 9 December, 2003. 
 
cxvii Oblastnaya Gazeta 16 December, 2003.  
 
cxviii Vecherny Ekaterinburg, 15 December, 2003.  
 
cxix Kommersant 18 December, 2003.  
 
cxx Ekaterinburgskaya Nedelya 52(512) 25 December, 2003.  
 
cxxi Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 December, 2003.  
 
cxxii Sto millionov tuda, sto syuda. I bse iz byudjeta. 4 December, 2003. reproduced on 
compromat.ru/main/rossel/chernetskij1000.htm 
 
cxxiii Delovoi Ural 48 (553) 23 December, 2003.  
 
cxxiv Kommersant 23 December, 2003.  
 
cxxv Ekaterinburgskaya Nedelya 52(512) 25 December, 2003. 
 
cxxvi Delovoi Ural 48 (553) 23 December, 2003. 
 
cxxvii In December 2002 Khabarov had formally disbanded OPS Uralmash, although it clearly continued 
its existence and Khabarov was routinely referred to as the head of ex-Uralmash 
 
cxxviii Caucasian here refers to ethnicities based in the contemporary Caucasus – Georgian, Armenian 
Chechen.  
 
cxxix Uralpolit.ru, 16 September, 2004.  
 
cxxx  Uralpolit,ru, 5 October 2004.  
 
cxxxi Uralpolit.ru 28 January, 2005.  
 
cxxxii The symbol of United Russia is a bear.  
 




cxxxv Conversations with Ekaterinburg city officials, June, 2007.  
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cxxxvi   Zakat ‘koprporatsiya Ekaterinburg’: u Arkadi Chernetskogo ‘prokhudilos krysha’. 
http://www,lenta66.ru/politic/2007/06/26/40-67.  
 
cxxxvii See Konitzer, op.cit.  
 
cxxxviii In Russian governance there is some reticence about publicly firing senior officials. Instead they  
go ‘of  their own volition’, typically after being put in a position where this is the logical outcome.   
 
cxxxix Gubernatorsky pasience: chego hochet Kreml? 
http://www.golossamara.ru/politics/2007/08/28/3802 
 





cxlii Burkov gotov brosit’ kampaniyu I vstupit’ v ‘Edinuyu Rossiyu’. http://www.ura.ru/content/svrd/11-
10-2007/articles/2650.   This last article should be handled with care, as it could be a case of ‘black PR’ 
(dangerous disinformation), but it provides a near-perfect example of the Sverdlovsk/Ekaterinburg 
mastery of  Byzantine intrigue.  One should not assume that Chernetsky will necessarily run in March, 
2008,  although all the evidence suggests that he will. If he chose not to, having been electyed to the 
State Duma, Burkov might be a candidate who would be acceptable to both Chernetsky and Rossel.  
 
cxliii C.Parsons ‘How to map arguments in Political Science’, Oxford University Press, 2007.  
 
cxliv K. Stoner-Weiss, Local Heroes, Princeton, 1997.  
 
cxlv Locke, 1946 op.cit xix.  
 
cxlvi Hobbes op.cit. p.143.  
94